Knowledge that Transforms

We study the effect of subjective mortality beliefs on life‐cycle behavior. With new survey evidence, we document that survival is underestimated (overestimated) by the young (old). We calibrate a canonical life‐cycle model to elicited beliefs. Relative to calibrations using actuarial probabilities, the young undersave by 26%, and retirees draw down their assets 27% slower, while the model's fit to consumption data improves by 88%. Cross‐sectional regressions support the model's predictions: Distorted mortality beliefs correlate with savings behavior while controlling for risk preferences, cognitive, and socioeconomic factors. Overweighting the likelihood of rare events contributes to mortality belief distortions.

We propose a theoretical measure of income hedging demand and show that it affects asset prices. We focus on the value factor and first demonstrate that our demand estimates are correlated with the actual demands of retail and mutual fund investors. We then show that the aggregate high‐minus‐low (HML) demand predicts HML returns. Exploiting the state‐level variation in income risk, we demonstrate that state‐level hedging demands predict state‐level HML returns. A long‐short portfolio that exploits this hedging‐induced predictability earns an annualized risk‐adjusted return of 6%.

We develop a continuous‐time model of liquidity provision in which hedgers can trade multiple risky assets with arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs have constant relative risk‐aversion (CRRA) utility, while hedgers' asset demand is independent of wealth. An increase in hedgers' risk aversion can make arbitrageurs endogenously more risk‐averse. Because arbitrageurs generate endogenous risk, an increase in their wealth or a reduction in their CRRA coefficient can raise risk premia despite Sharpe ratios declining. Arbitrageur wealth is a priced risk factor because assets held by arbitrageurs offer high expected returns but suffer the most when wealth drops. Aggregate illiquidity, which declines in wealth, captures that factor.

In one of the greatest extensions of property rights in human history, common law countries began giving rights to married women in the 1850s. Before this “women's liberation,” the doctrine of coverture strongly incentivized parents of daughters to hold real estate, rather than financial assets such as money, stocks, or bonds. We exploit the staggered nature of coverture's demise across U.S. states to show that women's rights led to shifts in household portfolios, a positive shock to the supply of credit, and a reallocation of labor toward nonagriculture and capital‐intensive industries. Investor protection thus deepened financial markets, aiding industrialization.

This paper explores whether affine models with volatility jumps estimated on intradaily S&P 500 futures data over 1983 to 2008 can capture major daily outliers such as the 1987 stock market crash. Intradaily jumps in futures prices are typically small; self‐exciting but short‐lived volatility spikes capture intradaily and daily returns better. Multifactor models of the evolution of diffusive variance and jump intensities improve fits substantially, including out‐of‐sample over 2009 to 2016. The models capture reasonably well the conditional distributions of daily returns and realized variance outliers, but underpredict realized variance inliers. I also examine option pricing implications.

We study the value premium using the multiples‐based market‐to‐book decomposition of Rhodes‐Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). The market‐to‐value component drives all of the value strategy return, while the value‐to‐book component exhibits no return predictability in either portfolio sorts or firm‐level regressions. Existing results linking market‐to‐book to operating leverage, duration, exposure to investment‐specific technology shocks, and analysts’ risk ratings derive from the unpriced value‐to‐book component. In contrast, results on expectation errors, limits to arbitrage, and certain types of cash flow risk and consumption risk exposure are due to the market‐to‐value component. Overall, our evidence casts doubt on several value premium theories.

Liquidity suppliers lean against the wind. We analyze whether high‐frequency traders (HFTs) lean against large institutional orders that execute through a series of child orders. The alternative is HFTs trading with the wind, that is, in the same direction. We find that HFTs initially lean against these orders but eventually change direction and take positions in the same direction for the most informed institutional orders. Our empirical findings are consistent with investors trading strategically on their information. When deciding trade intensity, they seem to trade off higher speculative profits against higher risk of being detected and preyed on by HFTs.

In this paper, we investigate how globalization is reflected in asset prices. We use shipping costs to measure firms' exposure to globalization. Firms in low shipping cost industries carry a 7% risk premium, suggesting that their cash flows covary negatively with investors' marginal utility. We find that the premium emanates from the risk of displacement of least efficient firms triggered by import competition. These findings suggest that foreign productivity shocks are associated with times when consumption is dear for investors. We discuss conditions under which a standard model of trade with asset prices can rationalize this puzzle.

The 30‐year U.S. swap spreads have been negative since September 2008. We offer a novel explanation for this persistent anomaly. Through an illustrative model, we show that underfunded pension plans optimally use swaps for duration hedging. Combined with dealer banks' balance sheet constraints, this demand can drive swap spreads to become negative. Empirically, we construct a measure of the aggregate funding status of defined benefit pension plans and show that this measure helps explain 30‐year swap spreads. We find a similar link between pension funds' underfunding and swap spreads for two other regions.

Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers propose the false discovery rate (FDR) to separate skill (alpha) from luck in fund performance. Using simulations with parameters informed by the data, we find that this methodology is conservative and underestimates the proportion of nonzero‐alpha funds. For example, 65% of funds with economically large alphas of are misclassified as zero alpha. This bias arises from the low signal‐to‐noise ratio in fund returns and the resulting low statistical power. Our results question FDR's applicability in performance evaluation and other domains with low power, and can materially change the conclusion that most funds have zero alpha.