This study explores the role of investor sentiment in a broad set of anomalies in cross-sectional stock returns. We consider a setting in which the presence of market-wide sentiment is combined with the argument that overpricing should be more prevalent than underpricing, due to short-sale impediments. Long-short strategies that exploit the anomalies exhibit profits consistent with this setting. First, each anomaly is stronger (its long-short strategy is more profitable) following high levels of sentiment. Second, the short leg of each strategy is more profitable following high sentiment. Finally, sentiment exhibits no relation to returns on the long legs of the strategies.

We use a novel experiment in China to examine the effects of having a quasi-official investor own a small number of shares on specific firm outcomes. We find that, relative to control firms, pilot firms experience an increase in dissenting votes from independent directors, a reduction in tunneling and earnings management activities, and an improvement in merger performance. Independent directors questioned by the quasi-official shareholder in activism events subsequently lose board seats in the director market. Overall, our results shed light on a new mechanism for enhancing the protection of minority shareholders.

Accounting standards require firms to distinguish recurring revenues and expenses from nonrecurring gains and losses, which are often referred to as special items. However, not all special items are genuinely nonrecurring. Exploiting the setting of earnings conference calls, we explore whether analysts can identify opportunistic special items, as evidenced by asking for more information about them. We find evidence that managers' discussions of special items more often relate to predicted special items, whereas analysts have more questions about potentially opportunistic special items. Managers adopt a relatively more negative tone and use more words when answering questions about potentially opportunistic special items. Finally, we find that analysts who question potentially opportunistic special items have fewer opportunities to speak in the subsequent call, consistent with managerial retaliation.

The Hou et al. (2015) q-factor model outperforms other factor models in capturing the price-to-high (PTH, the ratio of current price to 52-week high price) anomaly; that is, high-PTH stocks earn high future returns. PTH's relations with future profitability and future investment growth are both significantly positive, and they mirror PTH's relation with future returns in the cross section and by time horizons. Incorporating the information about future investment growth contained in price level variables (e.g., PTH) helps the q factors to capture better those anomalies rooted in future investment growth. Together, these results suggest that the PTH anomaly is consistent with the investment capital asset pricing model.

We test whether Standard and Poor's (S&P) assigns higher bond ratings after it switches from investor-pay to issuer-pay fees in 1974. Using Moody's rating for the same bond as a benchmark, we find that when S&P charges investors and Moody's charges issuers, S&P's ratings are lower than Moody's. Once S&P adopts issuer-pay, its ratings increase and no longer differ from Moody's. More importantly, S&P only assigns higher ratings for bonds that are subject to greater conflicts of interest, measured by higher expected rating fees or lower credit quality. These findings suggest that the issuer-pay model leads to higher ratings.

We examine the relation between mandatory environmental disclosure and corporate green innovation. Adopting a difference-in-differences research design, we find that the adoption of state-level greenhouse gas emissions disclosure mandates is associated with an increase in the quantity of patents related to climate change mitigation/adaptation technologies (i.e., “green innovations”). This increase is stronger among firms with more environmental investors, suggesting investor preferences influence this relation. We also document a positive association between these mandates and firms’ future environmental performance ratings, suggesting a positive externality. However, we find that these mandates are associated with a reduction in future financial performance for some firms, suggesting a potential negative effect on shareholder welfare. Collectively, our results provide new evidence on the real effects of mandatory environmental disclosure and the determinants of green innovation and contribute to the literature on the motivations for green innovation and the literature on corporate disclosure and investment decisions.

We document that firms vary in their timeliness of support for the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement following the death of George Floyd in May 2020, and that timeliness is an indicator of authenticity. We predict that firms that speak out quickly in support of BLM (via Twitter or their websites) have made more investments in diversity and inclusion, relative to firms that speak out slowly (via conference calls or annual reports) or that remain silent. Consistent with this prediction, quick -disclosing firms have greater workforce diversity, have boards with greater ethnic diversity, and are more likely to tie executive compensation to diversity and inclusivity. Furthermore, quick -disclosing firms increase their hiring of both Black American employees and Black directors relative to firms that stay silent. We also document that quick-disclosing firms are part of more supportive stakeholder networks. We develop an inclusivity index and show that firms with higher index levels are more likely to speak out on the Capitol Riots, the Asian Spa Shootings, and voting rights.

Mutual funds have emerged and rapidly developed since 2000 in China. This study tests empirically the impact of mutual funds’ ownership on firm performance in China, using a large sample for the period of 2001–2005. We find that equity ownership by mutual funds has a positive effect on firm performance. The result is robust to several measures of firm performance and various estimations. Our finding supports recent regulatory efforts in China to promote mutual funds as a corporate governance mechanism and suggests that pooling diffuse minority interests of individual shareholders who are prone to free-rider problems via mutual funds is beneficial.

Using a sample of state pension funds’ equity holdings, we find evidence of not only local bias, but also bias towards politically-connected stocks. Political bias is detrimental to fund performance. State pension funds have longer holding durations of politically-connected local firms and display disposition behavior in these positions. Political bias is positively related to the percentage of politically-affiliated trustees on the board and Congressional connections. The more politically-affiliated trustees on the board, the more the fund shifts toward risky asset allocations. Overall, our results imply that political bias is likely costly to taxpayers and pension beneficiaries.

We investigate the role played by institutional development in the prevalence and performance of firms that are owned and/or managed by entrepreneurs or their families, while controlling for the potential effect of cultural norms. China provides a good research lab since it combines great heterogeneity in institutional development across its provinces with homogeneity in cultural norms, law, and regulation. Using hand-collected data from publicly listed Chinese firms, we find that, when institutional efficiency is high, entrepreneur- and family-controlled firms are more prevalent and exhibit superior performance than non-family firms. We find that the positive effects of family ownership and the negative effects of family control in excess of ownership that have been documented in earlier studies around the world are only significant in high-efficiency regions, and only for family-controlled firms proper, but not for entrepreneur-controlled firms. Institutional development also helps reconcile the divergence of results across prior studies regarding the performance impact of founders and their families as managers and not just owners. When institutional efficiency is high, the sign of the management effect is entirely contingent of whether the Chairman or CEO is the entrepreneur himself/herself (positive) or a family member (negative); when institutional efficiency is low, the effect is positive in both cases, and more strongly so in the case of a family member serving as CEO.