Investment of US firms responds asymmetrically to Tobin’s Q: investment of established firms—“intensive” investment—reacts negatively to Q whereas investment of new firms—“extensive” investment—responds positively and elastically to Q. This asymmetry, we argue, reflects a difference between established and new firms in the cost of adopting new technologies. A fall in the compatibility of new capital with old capital raises measured Q and reduces the incentive of established firms to invest. New firms do not face such compatibility costs and step up their investment in response to the rise in Q.

This paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is nontransferable. There exist infinitely many marketplaces, and each agent chooses which marketplace to be in: agents get to choose not only whom to match with but also whom they meet with. Perfect segmentation is obtained in equilibrium, where agents match with the first person they meet. All equilibria have the same matching pattern. Although perfect assortative matching is not obtained in equilibrium, the degree of assortativeness is greater than in standard models.

People continue to live in many big American cities, because in those cities housing costs less than new construction. While cities may lose their productive edge, their houses remain and population falls only when housing depreciates. This paper presents a simple durable housing model of urban decline with several implications which document: (1) urban growth rates are leptokurtotic --cities grow more quickly than they decline, (2) city growth rates are highly persistent, especially amount declining cities,

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This paper examines segregation in American cities from 1890 to 1990. We divide the century into three time periods. From 1890 to 1940, ghettos were born as blacks migrated to urban areas and cities developed vast expanses filled with nearly exclusively black housing. From 1940 to 1970, black migration continued and ghettos expanded. Since 1970, there has been a decline in segregation as blacks have moved to suburban areas and central cities have become less segregated. Across all of these time periods there is a strong positive relation between urban population or density and segregation. We then examine why segregation has varied so much over time. We find evidence that the mechanism sustaining segregation has changed. In the mid-20th century taken by whites to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods. By 1990, these legal barriers enforcing segregation had been replaced by decentralized racism, where whites pay more than blacks to live in predominantly white areas.

Using historical price records for Bordeaux Premiers Crus, we examine the impact of aging on wine prices and the long-term investment performance of fine wine. In line with the predictions of an illustrative model, young maturing wines from high-quality vintages provide the highest financial returns. Past maturity, famous châteaus deliver growing non-pecuniary benefits to their owners. Using an arithmetic repeat-sales regression over 1900–2012, we estimate a real financial return to wine investment (net of storage costs) of 4.1%, which exceeds bonds, art, and stamps. Returns to wine and equities are positively correlated. Finally, we find evidence of in-sample return predictability.

We extend the standard specification of the market price of risk for affine yield models, and apply it to U.S. Treasury data. Our specification often provides better fit, sometimes with very high statistical significance. The improved fit comes from the time-series rather than cross-sectional features of the yield curve. We derive conditions under which our specification does not admit arbitrage opportunities. The extension has extremely strong statistical significance for affine yield models with multiple square-root type variables. Although we focus on affine yield models, our specification can be used with other asset pricing models as well.

This paper examines racial and ethnic differences in high-cost mortgage lending in seven diverse metropolitan areas from 2004 to 2007. Controlling for credit score and other risk factors, African American and Hispanic borrowers are 103% and 78% more likely to receive high-cost mortgages for home purchases. A large part of the increase is attributable to sorting across lenders (55%-65%), and this, in turn, can be largely accounted for by the lender’s ex post foreclosure risk. The remaining within-lender differences are also concentrated in high-risk lenders, revealing the central role of these institutions in explaining market-wide racial and ethnic differences. Received December, 17 2014; editorial decision January 20, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

We document that announcement-period abnormal returns of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) equity investments in publicly traded firms are positive but lower than those of comparable private investments. Further, SWF investment targets suffer from declining return on assets and sales growth over the following three years. Our results are robust to controls for target and deal characteristics and are not driven by SWF target selection criteria. Larger discounts are associated with SWFs taking seats on boards of directors and with SWFs under strict government control acquiring greater stakes, supporting the hypothesis that political influence negatively affects firm value and performance.

We combine personnel records of the United States federal bureaucracy from 1997 to 2019 with administrative voter registration data to study how ideological alignment between politicians and bureaucrats affects turnover and performance. We document significant partisan cycles and turnover among political appointees. By contrast, we find no political cycles in the civil service. At any point in time, a sizable share of bureaucrats is ideologically misaligned with their political leaders. We study the performance implications of this misalignment for the case of procurement officers. Exploiting presidential transitions as a source of “within‐bureaucrat” variation in political alignment, we find that procurement contracts overseen by misaligned officers exhibit greater cost overruns and delays. We provide evidence consistent with a general “morale effect,” whereby misaligned bureaucrats are less motivated to pursue the organizational mission. Our results thus help to shed some of the first light on the costs of ideological misalignment within public organizations.