In this study, we examine whether environmental, social, and governance (ESG) funds' investment decisions are sensitive to the existence and extent of firms' voluntary environmental disclosures. We create our measures of voluntary environmental disclosure using bigrams extracted from the Global Reporting Initiative standards. We provide robust evidence that voluntary environmental disclosure in conference calls is associated with greater ESG fund ownership in the subsequent period, incremental to firms' ESG ratings. We also provide evidence that fund managers' reliance on environmental disclosure is concentrated in water, waste, emissions, and compliance disclosures. ESG fund ownership increases with environmental disclosure that is more positive and specific. Our primary finding persists both when we rely on the sustainability report as an alternative proxy for environmental disclosure and when we use fund‐level tests. Overall, our evidence is consistent with ESG funds relying on firms' disclosures when making investing decisions and inconsistent with recent regulatory concerns that ESG fund managers are not following through on their stated investing strategies.

We quantify the immediate net effect of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) on the tax burden of corporate profits for public US corporations. We find similar reductions in effective tax rates for domestic and multinational firms, yet the entirety of multinational tax savings stemmed from tax savings on their domestic, not foreign, earnings. We find no significant change in the federal tax burden on foreign earnings neither on average norspecifically for firms most likely to be subject to new anti‐abuse provisions. We find some evidence that firms not targeted by anti‐abuse provisions saw reductions in their federal tax burden on foreign income. Overall, while the tax burden on domestic income decreased significantly, our findings suggest the tax burden on the foreign earnings of US multinationals is largely unaffected despite the overhaul of the international tax system. Importantly for US multinationals' investment decisions, while foreign income was heavily tax‐favored prior to tax reform, we find that foreign and domestic incomes are similarly taxed after TCJA enactment.

We examine how two attributes of preventive and detective controls affect employee performance and employee motivation. Specifically, we examine how the extent to which controls (1) restrict employees’ autonomy, and (2) provide more or less timely feedback impacts employees’ performance and intrinsic motivation. These characteristics are the defining differences between preventive and detective controls in that preventive controls restrict employee autonomy relative to detective controls and preventive controls always provide immediate feedback; whereas, detective controls can provide either immediate feedback or delayed feedback. We conduct an experiment to examine how and why these two types of formal controls impact employees’ performance in an incomplete contract setting in which one dimension of the employees’ task is compensated and one dimension is controlled. The results show that detective controls with more timely feedback improve employees’ performance toward the control objective, without affecting their intrinsic motivation. In contrast, the restriction of autonomy associated with preventive controls, has no additional effect on employees’ performance toward the control objective over detective controls with timely feedback but significantly reduces employees’ motivation. Neither control characteristic has a significant effect on employees’ performance on the compensated dimension of the task, suggesting that monetary incentives continue to provide an effective motivation. Our results reveal the importance of designing and implementing controls that provide timely feedback but do not restrict autonomy.

There is a widespread belief among observers that a lower premium is paid when the target CEO is retained by the acquirer in a private equity deal because conflicts of interest lead her to negotiate less aggressively on behalf of the target shareholders. Our empirical evidence is not consistent with this belief. We find that, when a private equity acquirer retains the target CEO, target shareholders receive an acquisition premium that is larger by as much as 18% of pre-acquisition firm value when accounting for the endogeneity of the retention decision. Our evidence is consistent with what we call the “valuable CEO hypothesis.” With this hypothesis, retention of the CEO can be valuable to private equity acquirers because, unlike public operating companies with managers in place, these acquirers have to find a CEO to run the post-acquisition company and the incumbent CEO may be the best choice to do so because she has valuable firm-specific human capital. When a private equity acquirer finds a target with a CEO who can manage the post-acquisition company better than other potential CEOs, we expect target shareholders to receive a larger premium because the post-acquisition value of the target is higher.

Clustering of IPO underwriting spreads at 7% poses two important puzzles: Is the market for U.S. equity underwriting services anti-competitive and why do equity underwriters invest in reputation-building? This study helps resolve both puzzles. Modeling endogeneity of firm-underwriter choice using a two-sided matching approach, we provide strong evidence of price and service differentiation based on underwriter reputation. High-reputation banks receive average reputational premia equaling 0.65% (0.47%) of average IPO (SEO) underwritten proceeds, which constitutes 10% (13%) of their underwriting spreads. Equity issuers working with high-reputation underwriters receive significant benefits, including higher offer values and lower percentage spreads net of reputational premia.

In collaboration with the Authority for the Financial Markets in the Netherlands, we manipulate the content of official letters that instruct financial intermediaries to submit a mandatory self‐assessment. As part of the Registered Report Process, we submitted our hypotheses, experimental procedure, and planned statistical analyses before data collection. We predicted that a request indicating a supportive regulatory attitude has a positive effect on reporting quality on average. We also predicted this effect to be stronger for small firms and for firms with a long‐term orientation, and to become negative for firms with a short‐term orientation. Planned analyses show that a supportive letter reduced reporting quality unless firms had a long‐term orientation, supporting the moderating influence of time horizon, but providing no support for the expected average effect or for moderation by firm size.

This paper examines the impact of the combined U.S. state and federal mortgage interest deduction (MID) on homeownership attainment, using data from 1984 to 2007 and exploiting variation in the subsidy arising from changes in the MID within and across states over time. We test whether capitalization of the MID into house prices offsets the positive effect on homeownership. We find that the MID boosts homeownership attainment only of higher-income households in less tightly regulated housing markets. In more restrictive places, an adverse effect exists. The MID is an ineffective policy to promote homeownership and improve social welfare.

Using unique data on mutual fund portfolios with different investment scopes, we study the extent of international diversification. Mutual funds invest in a surprisingly limited number of stocks—about 100. The number of holdings from a given region declines as the investment scope broadens. Moreover, unexploited gains exist from international diversification. Funds that invest globally could achieve better risk-adjusted returns by adding stocks held by more specialized funds within the same family. These findings are not driven by different sectoral allocations, lack of information or instruments, transaction costs, or different tail risks. Instead, organizational factors might play an important role.

We show that leading investor disagreement proxies have near-zero cross-correlation – making disagreement pricing inferences challenging. We develop a frictionless model that generates overpricing from latent disagreement, jointly rationalizes major proxies, and generates new testable predictions. Equilibrium interrelationships motivate a new disagreement measure, DIS, which is more predictive of returns cross-sectionally than major proxies and more consistently predictive across macroeconomic regimes. We provide evidence that the friction-based channel of Miller (1977) and a frictionless mechanism coexist and are empirically separable. DIS also provides a micro-founded, disagreement-based account of the IVOL puzzle, absorbing IVOL’s predictability while revealing its regime and friction dependence.

We construct a matrix showing the share of the year 2000 population in every country that is descended from people in different source countries in the year 1500. Using the matrix to adjust indicators of early development so they reflect the history of a population's ancestors rather than the history of the place they live today greatly improves the ability of those indicators to predict current GDP. The variance of early development history of a country's inhabitants is a good predictor for current inequality, with ethnic groups originating in regions having longer histories of organized states tending to be at the upper end of a country's income distribution.