Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the foreign bias in international asset allocation. Following extant literature in behavioral finance, we argue that a society’s culture and the cultural distance between two markets play an important role in explaining the foreign bias. In particular, we hypothesize that the degree of a nation’s uncertainty avoidance affects the foreign bias (more uncertainty-avoiding countries allocate less to foreign markets), as does the degree of a country’s individualism (in individualistic countries performance is more directly attributed to a person and less to teams, causing these individuals to be more aggressive in their foreign asset allocations). We further expect that the degree of cultural distance between two countries affects the amount of money allocated to that market. Based on extensive robustness analyses, we find support for our hypotheses on the role of culture in international asset allocation.

This paper investigates economies of scope in the US insurance industry over the period 1993–2006. We test the conglomeration hypothesis, which holds that firms can optimize by diversifying across businesses, versus the strategic focus hypothesis, which holds that firms optimize by focusing on core businesses. We analyze whether it is advantageous for insurers to offer both life-health and property-liability insurance or to specialize in one major industry segment. We estimate cost, revenue, and profit efficiency utilizing data envelopment analysis (DEA) and test for scope economies by regressing efficiency scores on control variables and an indicator for strategic focus. Property-liability insurers realize cost scope economies, but they are more than offset by revenue scope diseconomies. Life-health insurers realize both cost and revenue scope diseconomies. Hence, strategic focus is superior to conglomeration in the insurance industry.

This paper investigates the effects of focus versus diversification on bank performance using data on Chinese banks during the 1996–2006 period. We construct a new measure, economies of diversification, and compare the results to those of the more conventional focus indices, which are based on the sum of squares of shares in different products or regions. Diversification is captured in four dimensions: loans, deposits, assets, and geography. We find that all four dimensions of diversification are associated with reduced profits and higher costs. These results are robust regardless of alternative measures of diversification and performance. Furthermore, we observe that banks with foreign ownership (both majority and minority ownership) and banks with conglomerate affiliation are associated with fewer diseconomies of diversification, suggesting that foreign ownership and conglomerate affiliation may play important mitigating roles. This analysis may provide important implications for bank managers and regulators in China as well as in other emerging economies.

We show that inflation risk is priced in international asset returns. We analyze inflation risk in a framework that encompasses the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) of Adler and Dumas (1983). In contrast to the extant empirical literature on the ICAPM, we relax the assumption that inflation rates are constant. We estimate and test a conditional version of the model for the G5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US) over the period 1975–1998 and find evidence of statistically and economically significant prices of inflation risk (in addition to priced nominal exchange rate risk). Our results imply a rejection of the restrictions imposed by the ICAPM. In an extension of our analysis to 2003, we show that even after the termination of nominal exchange rate fluctuations in the euro area in 1999, differences in inflation rates across countries entail non-trivial real exchange rate risk premia.

This paper evaluates the impact of financial sector reforms on the cost structure characteristics and on the ownership–cost efficiency relationship in Indian banking. It also examines the impact of reforms on the dynamics of competition in the lending market. We find evidence that deregulation improves banks performance and fosters competition in the lending market. Results suggest technological progress, once Indian commercial banks have adjusted to the new regulatory environment. This, however, does not translate in efficiency gains. There is also evidence of an ownership effect on the level and pattern of efficiency change. Finally, competition keeps building pace even in the re-regulation period and technological improvements are not hampered by the tightening of prudential norms.

This paper examines the impact of the current financial crisis on long-term US Treasury yields by testing the impact of a series of events from December 2007 to March 2009 on the spread between 10-year USD LIBOR swap and 10-year US Treasury (constant maturity) rates to measure risk associated with Treasuries. Controlling for the liquidity of the two markets, the default risk of the swap, and the net foreign purchases of Treasury securities, we find that 13 of the tested 20 events have significantly negative coefficients. We conclude that the lower spread is consistent with greater default risk for US Treasury securities.

This paper studies the impact of financial development on asset valuation. We model the agency theoretic perspective of risk-averse investors and financiers in a general equilibrium setting under the framework of rational expectations (i.e., symmetric information). We focus on real estate, as it constitutes a special case of complete market contracting where adverse selection and moral hazard are easily mitigated. Our results illustrate an increase in pareto-efficiency, as financial architecture advances from: (i) banks to capital markets; and (ii) plain vanilla debt to an innovative one with participation clauses. This is attributed to the reduction in agency costs and cross-sectional risk-sharing, leading to an increase in the value of property. Our results predict that an optimal financial system will orient itself towards efficient financial contracts, irrespective of its source of origination. We also rationalize the co-existence of banks and capital markets, and generalize our results under a set of restrictive conditions.

We investigate whether loan growth affects the riskiness of individual banks in 16 major countries. Using Bankscope data from more than 16,000 individual banks during 1997–2007, we test three hypotheses on the relation between abnormal loan growth and asset risk, bank profitability, and bank solvency. We find that loan growth leads to an increase in loan loss provisions during the subsequent three years, to a decrease in relative interest income, and to lower capital ratios. Further analyses show that loan growth also has a negative impact on the risk-adjusted interest income. These results suggest that loan growth represents an important driver of the riskiness of banks.

We empirically examine the impact of trading activities on the liquidity of individual equity options measured by the proportional bid–ask spread. There are three main findings. First, the option return volatility, defined as the option price elasticity times the stock return volatility, has a much higher power in explaining the spread variations than the commonly considered liquidity determinants such as the stock return volatility and option trading volume. Second, after controlling for all the liquidity determinants, we find a maturity-substitution effect due to expiration cycles. When medium-term options (60–90days maturity) are not available, traders use short-term options as substitutes whose higher volume leads to a smaller bid–ask spread or better liquidity. Third, we also find a moneyness-substitution effect induced by the stock return volatility. When the stock return volatility goes up, trading shifts from in-the-money options to out-of-the-money options, causing the latter’s spread to narrow.

Regulatory separation theory indicates that a system with multiple regulators leads to less forbearance and limits producer gains while a model of banking regulation developed by Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) predicts the opposite. Fragmented regulation of the US life insurance industry provides an especially rich environment for testing the effects of regulatory competition. We find positive relations between regulatory competition and profitability measures for this industry, which is consistent with the Dell’Ariccia and Marquez model. Our results have practical implications for the debate over federal versus state regulation of insurance and financial services in the US.