Knowledge that Transforms

Unlike the prediction of a frictionless open economy model, long-term average savings and investment rates are highly correlated across countries—a puzzle first identified by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). We quantitatively investigate the impact of two types of financial frictions on this correlation. One is limited enforcement, where contracts are enforced by the threat of default penalties. The other is limited spanning, where the only asset available is noncontingent bonds. We find that the calibrated model with both frictions produces a savings–investment correlation and a volume of capital flows close to the data. To solve the puzzle, the limited enforcement friction needs low default penalties under which capital flows are much lower than those in the data, and the limited spanning friction needs to exogenously restrict capital flows to the observed level. When combined, the two frictions interact to endogenously restrict capital flows and thereby solve the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle.

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This paper develops methods for evaluating marginal policy changes. We characterize how the effects of marginal policy changes depend on the direction of the policy change, and show that marginal policy effects are fundamentally easier to identify and to estimate than conventional treatment parameters. We develop the connection between marginal policy effects and the average effect of treatment for persons on the margin of indifference between participation in treatment and nonparticipation, and use this connection to analyze both parameters. We apply our analysis to estimate the effect of marginal changes in tuition on the return to going to college.

We prove—in the standard independent private-values model—that the outcome, in terms of interim expected probabilities of trade and interim expected transfers, of any Bayesian mechanism can also be obtained with a dominant-strategy mechanism.

We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. The principal determines the set of projects from which the agent may choose. The principal can verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent, but does not know which other projects were available to the agent. We consider situations where the collection of available projects is exogenous to the agent but uncertain, where the agent must invest effort to discover a project, where the principal can pay the agent to choose a desirable project, and where the principal can adopt more complex schemes than simple permission sets.

By employing two alternative measures of fundamental value, we reexamine the value relevance of accounting information over time. Consistent with some recent studies, we do not find evidence on the temporal decline in R 2s of conventional value-relevance regressions when the stock price is replaced by these measures as the dependent variable. Further, our results show that the divergence between fundamental value and the prevailing stock price (a) increases over time and (b) is associated with measures of noise trading and other arbitrage risks and costs. Additional analyses also reveal that proxies measuring the extent of noise trading increase over time. Overall, we do not find evidence that there is a loss over time in the value relevance of accounting information with respect to fundamental value. More importantly, we show that measures of price divergence are associated with noise trading as well as other arbitrage costs and risks (such as transaction costs and information uncertainty) that prohibit market prices from converging to fundamental values.

Analytical Procedures (APs) provide a means for auditors to evaluate the reasonableness of financial disclosures by comparing a clients reported performance to expectations gained through knowledge of the client based on past experience and developments within the company and its industry. Thus, APs are fundamentally different than other audit tests in taking a broader perspective of an entitys performance vis-a-vis its environment. As such, APs have been found to be a cost-effective means to detect misstatements, and many have argued that a number of prior financial frauds would have been detected had auditors employed effective APs. With several dramatic and far-reaching developments over the past decade, the current study examines whether and how APs have changed during this period. In particular, we focus on the impact of significant enablers and drivers of change such as technological advancements and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We also compare our findings to an influential study of the practices of APs by Hirst and Koonce (1996) that was conducted over 10 years ago. We interview 36 auditors (11 seniors, 13 managers, and 12 partners) from all of the Big 4 firms using a structured questionnaire. The data reveal some similarities in findings when compared to prior research (e.g., auditors continue to use fairly simple analytical procedures). However, there are a number of significant differences reflecting changes in AP practices. For instance, as a result of technology auditors now rely more extensively on industry and analyst data than previously. Further, auditors report that they develop more precise quantitative expectations and use more nonfinancial information. They also appear to rely more on lower level audit staff to perform APs, conduct greater inquiry of non-accounting personnel, and are willing to reduce substantive testing to a greater extent as a result of APs conducted in the planning phase. Finally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has had an impact in greater consideration and knowledge of internal controls, which is seen as the most important factor driving the use and reliance on APs.

This study complements and extends prior decision aid (DA) research by examining the DA reliance behavior of professional buy-side financial analysts in the context of their actual work environment. A large mutual fund company provided data on buy-side analysts' earnings forecasts over the course of one year, during which forecasts were made at the end of each quarter for the following four consecutive quarters. As part of the decision process, all analysts could voluntarily access a DA to assist them in forecasting earnings. Consistent with extant DA theory, the results indicate that analysts with greater performance-contingent incentives were less likely to rely on the DA and analysts with more complex portfolios were more likely to rely on the DA. Contrary to the results of most DA research and inconsistent with extant DA theory, analysts with greater task ability relied more on the DA than analysts with lesser ability. Finally, when DA reliance was high, analysts' forecast accuracy was also high, regardless of DA accuracy. The results provide valuable insight into the use of DAs by professional decision makers and the influence of DA reliance on their judgments in light of real-world pressures and performance consequences. The theoretical and practical implications of this study call for more research into why, how, and under what conditions highly skilled knowledge workers rely on the advice of DAs.

We examine how inventory overproduction among high fixed costs firms affects these firms’ contemporaneous and future accounting performance, and how financial analysts and the stock market incorporate implications of these relations in their reactions. We find that higher fixed costs firms engaging in opportunistic overproduction are able to increase their contemporaneous return on assets (ROAs), but only those higher fixed costs firms that also experience inventory increases, sales declines, and issue common stock also experience declines in their future accounting performance. We further find that financial analysts are aware of this phenomenon and appropriately reduce their forecasts of future earnings per share (EPS) for higher fixed costs firms that experience sales declines and inventory increases. In general, we do not find that the stock market penalizes such opportunistic overproduction.