This article empirically studies the effects of the early law and economics movement on the U.S. judiciary. We focus on the Manne Economics Institute for Federal Judges, an intensive economics course that trained almost half of federal judges between 1976 and 1999. Using the universe of published opinions in U.S. Circuit Courts and 1 million District Court criminal sentencing decisions, we estimate the within-judge effect of Manne program attendance. Selection into attendance was limited, as the program was popular among judges of all backgrounds, frequently oversubscribed, and admitted participants on a first-come, first-served basis. We find that after attending economics training, participating judges use more economics language in their opinions, rule against regulatory agencies more often, and impose more severe criminal sentences. We argue that economics, as a rigorous social science, was especially effective in persuading judges.

Inflation expectations and the associated pass-through of oil price shocks depend on demand and supply conditions underlying the global oil market. We establish this result using a structural VAR model of the global oil market that jointly identifies transmissions of oil demand and supply shocks through real oil prices to both expected and actual inflation. We demonstrate that economic activity shocks have a significantly longer-lasting effect on inflation expectations and actual inflation than other types of real oil price shocks, and resolve disagreements around the role of oil prices in explaining the missing deflation puzzle of the Great Recession.

We investigate whether firms in close customer–supplier relationships are better able to identify and implement tax avoidance strategies via supply chains. Consistent with our prediction, we find that both principal customers and their dependent suppliers avoid more taxes than other firms. Further analysis suggests that principal customers and dependent suppliers likely engage in tax strategies involving shifting profits to tax haven subsidiaries. Moreover, tax benefits appear to explain both principal customer firms’ and dependent supplier firms’ organizational decisions. Overall, our study provides evidence of the importance of tax avoidance as a source of gains from these relationships.

We utilize the default by Argentina in 2001 and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, as natural experiments, to monitor the complex interactions between sovereign bonds when subjected to endogenous and exogenous shocks. By forming pairs of Latin American sovereign bonds, bundled into similar maturity class, the analysis highlights the complex nature of risk shifting, and the temporal nature of the volatility transmission and sharing mechanisms in the lead up to, and after, a crisis period. The results show that shorter maturity groups and longer maturity groups behave in fundamentally different ways in terms of volatility transmission, while one or two leading countries act as regional benchmarks. The dynamics are consistent with temporal but segmented investor preferences, with the arrival of crisis contributing to a breakdown in the previous relationships. In addition, there is additional economic benefit from utilizing knowledge of the volatility structure underlying the historic transmission channels to improve the portfolio outcomes of market participants.

Multi-asset class, multimarket central counterparties (CCPs) are becoming less uncommon as a result of merges between specialized (single-asset class, single market) CCPs and market demands for greater capital efficiency. Yet, traditional CCP risk management models often lack the necessary sophistication to estimate potential losses relative to the closeout process of a defaulter’s portfolio in a multi-asset class, multimarket environment. As a result, multi-asset class, multimarket CCPs usually rely on a simplified silo approach for risk calculation which not only fails to deliver efficiency, but may also increase systemic risk. The CORE (Closeout Risk Evaluation) approach, on the other hand, provides conceptual and mathematical tools necessary for robust and efficient central counterparty risk evaluation in multi-asset class and multimarket environments, acknowledging the portfolio dynamics involved in the closeout process as well as important “real life” market frictions.

We investigate the relation between option-based executive compensation and market measures of risk for a sample of commercial banks during the period of 1992–2000. We show that following deregulation, banks have increasingly employed stock option-based compensation. As a result, the structure of executive compensation induces risk-taking, and the stock of option-based wealth also induces risk-taking. The results are robust across alternative risk measures, statistical methodologies, and model specifications. Overall, our results support a management risk-taking hypothesis over a managerial risk aversion hypothesis. Our results have important implications for regulators in monitoring the risk levels of banks.

This paper presents our investigation of the factors that determine secondary market prices of developing country syndicated loans. Trading volume in this market has almost doubled yearly from 1985 to 1988 while average market prices declined from 73% to 41% of par value during the same period. We find that loan values depend on a country's solvency rather than its liquidity and show that a country's adoption of a debt conversion program significantly decreases its loans' market prices. Furthermore, the debt moratoria by Brazil and Peru, as well as the developing‐country‐specific provisions made by U.S. banks, impact loan prices negatively.

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