Knowledge that Transforms

What capital is missing in developing countries? We put forward “managerial capital,” which is distinct from human capital, as a key missing form of capital in developing countries. And it has also been curiously missing in the research on growth and development. We argue in this paper that lack of managerial capital has broad implications for firm growth as well as for the effectiveness of other input factors. A large literature in development economics aims to understand the impediments to firm growth, particularly in small and medium enterprises. Standard growth theories have explored the importance of input factors such as capital and labor in the production function of firms and countries. At the micro level, empirical studies such as Suresh de Mel, David McKenzie and Christopher Woodruff (2008), Abhijit Banerjee et al. (2009), and Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman (2009) have estimated the impact of access to finance for capital constrained microenterprises (see Karlan and Jonathan Morduch, 2009, for a review). At the macro level, papers by Robert King and Ross Levine (1993), Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales (1998), and Marianne Bertrand, Antoinette Schoar, and David Thesmar (2007) suggest the importance of the financial system for economic growth.

An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random “crackdowns,” i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effect of additional resources spent on speeding interdiction. (JEL K42, R41)

This paper analyzes prudential controls on capital flows to emerging markets from the perspective of a Pigouvian tax that addresses externalities associated with the deleveraging cycle. It presents a model in which restricting capital inflows during boom times reduces the potential outflows during busts. This mitigates the feedback effects of deleveraging episodes, when tightening financial constraints on borrowers and collapsing prices for collateral assets have mutually reinforcing effects. In our model, capital controls reduce macroeconomic volatility and increase standard measures of consumer welfare.

The Effectiveness of Peer Tutoring on Student Achievement at the University Level by Vincent G. Munley, Eoghan Garvey and Michael J. McConnell. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 277-82 of American Economic Review, May 2010

Principal-agent relationships are typically assumed to be motivated by efficiency gains from comparative advantage. However, principals may also delegate tasks to avoid taking direct responsibility for selfish or unethical behavior. We report three laboratory experiments in which principals repeatedly either decide how much money to share with a recipient or hire agents to make sharing decisions on their behalf. Across several experimental treatments, recipients receive significantly less, and in many cases close to nothing, when allocation decisions are made by agents. (JEL D82)

There is a widespread sense that over the last two decades firms have been decentralizing decisions to employees further down the managerial hierarchy. Economists have developed a range of theories to account for delegation, but there is less empirical evidence, especially across countries. This has limited the ability to understand the phenomenon of decentralization. To address the empirical lacuna we have developed a research program to measure the internal organization of firms - including their decentralization decisions - across a large range of industries and countries. In this paper we investigate whether greater product market competition increases decentralization. For example, tougher competition may make local manager's information more valuable, as delays to decisions become more costly. Since globalization and liberalization have increased the competitiveness of product markets, one explanation for the trend towards decentralization could be increased competition. Of course there are a range of other factors that may also be at play, including human capital, information and communication technology, culture and industrial composition. To tackle these issues we collected detailed information on the internal organization of firms across nations. The few datasets that exist are either from a single industry or (at best) across many firms in a single country. We analyze data on almost 4,000 firms across twelve countries in Europe, North America and Asia. We find that competition does indeed seem to foster greater decentralization.

This paper develops a new method to uncover the causal effect of trust on economic growth by focusing on the inherited component of trust and its time variation. We show that inherited trust of descendants of US immigrants is significantly influenced by the country of origin and the timing of arrival of their forebears. We thus use the inherited trust of descendants of US immigrants as a time-varying measure of inherited trust in their country of origin. This strategy allows to identify the sizeable causal impact of inherited trust on worldwide growth during the twentieth century by controlling for country fixed effects. (JEL N11, N12, N31, N32, O47, Z13)

I develop a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks. Platforms use insulating tariffs to avoid coordination failure, implementing any desired allocation. Profit maximization distorts in the spirit of A. Michael Spence (1975) by internalizing only network externalities to marginal users. Thus the empirical and prescriptive content of the popular Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (2006) model of two-sided markets turns on the nature of user heterogeneity. I propose a more plausible, yet equally tractable, model of heterogeneity in which users differ in their income or scale. My approach provides a general measure of market power and helps predict the effects of price regulation and mergers. (JEL D42, D85, L14)

Can Openness Mitigate the Effects of Weather Shocks? Evidence from India's Famine Era by Robin Burgess and Dave Donaldson. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 449-53 of American Economic Review, May 2010