When agents can learn about their abilities as active investors, they rationally “trade to learn ” even if they expect to lose from active investing. The model used to develop this insight draws conclusions that are consistent with empirical study of household trading behavior: Households ’ portfolios underperform passive investments; their trading inten-sity depends on past performance; and they begin by trading small sums of money. Using household data from Finland, the article estimates a structural model of learning and trad-ing. The estimated model shows that investors trade to learn even if they are pessimistic about their abilities as traders. It also demonstrates that realized returns are significantly downward-biased measures of investors ’ true abilities. (JEL D10, G11) While most households adjust their stock portfolios only infrequently, some trade very actively and underperform passive investments.1 I ask whether a model in which investors rationally learn from experience can explain this be-havior, and, if so, what the model tells us about households ’ beliefs. In my model, investors are uncertain about their abilities and learn as they trade. If the value of observing another signal is high, then an investor trades even if she expects to lose money, thus apparently trading “too much. ” If a trade is successful, the investor infers skill and subsequently trades more. If an investor loses money, she will infer less skill and subsequently trade less. After enough losses, she stops trading altogether. Investors who are especially uncertain about their abilities trade small amounts early in their careers until

Being hired into a job depends not only on one’s own skill but also on that of other applicants. When another able applicant applies, a well-suited worker may be forced into unemployment or into accepting an inferior job. A model of this process defines over- and underqualification and provides predictions on its prevalence and on the wages of mismatched workers. It also implies that unemployment is concentrated among the least skilled workers, while vacancies are concentrated among high-skilled jobs. Four data sets are used to confirm the implications and establish that the hiring probability is low when competing applicants are able.

The US Securities and Exchange Commission’s mandated CEO pay ratio is a simple, but salient, metric that could resonate with employees given it focuses on their compensation. Reporting a relatively or surprisingly high ratio reduces employee perceptions of their pay, views of the CEO, and hampers productivity growth. Employee pay satisfaction drops after disclosing a high ratio even if their wages were previously disclosed and when the pay ratio disclosure adds little new information. Disclosures by firms with a high ratio contain more discretionary language to explain the ratio or portray employee relations positively and are more likely to be covered by the media. However, neither information source substantially alters the employee response to a salient ratio. Our work illustrates that requiring firms to disclose a salient metric can have unintended consequences on employees and suggests caution in requiring firms to report simplified Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) metrics that are inherently multifaceted.

Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) face additional capital requirements and closer supervision. We study how closer supervision affects corporate credit supply and investigate consequences for firms. GSIB designations reduce lending on average by 5.9% but to risky firms by 7.2%. The consequences are lower asset, sales, and investment growth, especially among high-risk borrowers, and reduced R&D expenditures among all GSIB-dependent firms. Closer supervision therefore reduces banks' risk-taking but has potentially unintended implications for firms' ability to finance innovation, which seems to crucially depend on bank credit. The supervision-induced effects are larger than those attributed to GSIB-specific capital surcharges.

The above article has been retracted at the request of authors Robert Libby and Hun‐Tong Tan, in agreement with the Editor‐in‐Chief, Patricia C. O'Brien, the copyright holder, the Canadian Academic Accounting Association (CAAA), and Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Bentley University conducted an investigation confirming that Dr. J. E. Hunton, while a faculty member at Bentley University and without the knowledge of his co‐authors, engaged in research misconduct, specifically data fabrication. Dr. Hunton provided the data used in the above study, and did not respond to a request for comment. Based on Bentley's initial report and further investigation into details specific to this paper, we conclude that the validity of the data cannot be confirmed. To correct the academic literature and maintain standards of academic integrity, we therefore retract the paper. The article was published online in Contemporary Accounting Research on 13 May 2010, in Wiley Online ( wileyonlinelibrary.com ). Reference Tan , H.‐T. , R. Libby , and J. E. Hunton . 2010 . . Contemporary Accounting Research 27 (): 187 – 208 . doi: 10.1111/j.1911‐3846.2010.01006.x

In emerging markets, the agency conflicts between controlling owners and the minority shareholders are difficult to mitigate through conventional corporate control mechanisms such as boards of directors and takeovers. We examine whether external independent auditors are employed as monitors or as bonding mechanisms, or both, to alleviate the agency problems. Using a broad sample from eight East Asian economies, we document that firms with agency problems embedded in the ownership structures are more likely to employ Big 5 auditors. This relation is evident among firms that raise equity capital frequently. Consistently, firms hiring Big 5 auditors receive smaller share price discounts associated with the agency conflicts. Also, we find that Big 5 auditors take into consideration their clients' agency problems when making audit fee and audit report decisions. Taken together, these results suggest that Big 5 auditors do have a corporate governance role in emerging markets.

This experiment examines whether there are systematic offsetting differences in the manner in which initial decision makers and reviewers attend to information which ensure that evidence inconsistent with initial judgments is given adequate consideration. Differences in attention are proposed, which result in differential recall of evidence by the initial decision maker and reviewer and thus influence what knowledge initial decision makers and reviewers bring to their discussions and subsequent decisions. The results suggest that the review process can act as an effective control by increasing the chances that the implications of inconsistent evidence are considered.

The existing empirical literature fails to agree on the nature of the intertemporal relation between risk and return. This paper attempts to resolve the issue by estimating a conditional two‐factor model motivated by Merton's intertemporal capital asset pricing model. When long‐term government bond returns are included as a second factor, the partial relation between the market risk premium and conditional market variance is found to be positive and significant. The paper also helps explain the convoluted empirical relation between the market risk premium, conditional market variance, and the nominal risk‐free rate previously reported in the literature.

a t i s t i c a l m a te r ia l th e y p ro v id e d .The w r i t e r Is g r a t e f u l to th e o f f i c e r s o f th e banks who co o p e ra te d in th e c a se s t u d i e s , and to th e many Ohio b a n k e rs who

In this article, we examine whether comovement in the stock prices of pairs of Chinese firms connected to the same political network are systematically shaped by the prevailing coordination versus competition incentives of that network’s politicians. We find strong evidence from 2000 to 2012 (Jiang’s and Hu’s regimes) that stock price comovement is affected by the embeddedness of the firm–politician ties within the network. Among pairs of firms connected to a network through a common politician, we document an increase in stock price comovement. For those pairs of firms connected to a common network via separate politicians (rather than a common politician), we document a relative decrease in stock price comovement. This negative effect suggests that politicians’ relationships within these political networks are generally adversarial rather than cooperative in nature. These results become significantly weaker during Xi’s regime from 2013 to 2017, suggesting that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and state-owned enterprise reforms may have attenuated these political network effects on the firms. Our additional tests also show that stock price comovement becomes even more positive (negative) in settings which are expected to increase the coordination or decrease the competition (decrease the coordination or increase the competition) of the politicians.