Quarterly Journal of Economics1998113(2), 467-496open access
We develop a theory of the ownership of firms in an environment without secure property rights against state encroachment. “Private ownership” leads to excessive revenue hiding, and “state ownership” (i.e., national government ownership) fails to provide incentives for managers and local governments in a credible way. Because “local government ownership” integrates local government activities and business activities, local government may better serve the interests of the national government, and thus local government ownership may credibly limit state predation, increase local public goods provision, and reduce costly revenue hiding. We use our theory to interpret the relative success of local government-owned firms during China's transition to a market economy.
Quarterly Journal of Economics1998113(3), 733-771open access
The more liquid a firm's assets, the greater their value in a short-notice liquidation. It is generally thought that a firm should find it easier to raise external finance against more liquid assets. This paper focuses on the dark side of liquidity: greater asset liquidity reduces the firm's ability to commit to a specific course of action. As a result, greater asset liquidity can, in some circumstances, reduce the firm's capacity to raise external finance. Firms with “excessively” liquid assets are in the best position to finance illiquid projects. This leads us to a theory of financial intermediation and disintermediation based on the liquidity of assets.
Quarterly Journal of Economics1998113(2), 387-432open access
Transactions take place in the rm rather than in the market because the rm o ers agents who make speci c investments power. Past literature emphasizes the allocation of ownership as the primary mechanism by which the rm does this. Within the contractibility assumptions of this literature, we identify a potentially superior mechanism, the regulation of access to critical resources. Access can be better than ownership because: i) the power agents get from access is more contingent on them making the right investment; ii) ownership has adverse e ects on the incentive to specialize. The theory explains the importance of internal organization and third party ownership. A preliminary version of this paper circulated with the title \\Implicit Property Rights in a Theory of the
Quarterly Journal of Economics1998113(3), 835-867open access
This paper investigates the effects of customer discrimination on the employment and earnings of minorities, particularly blacks. Data are used from a new survey of employers in four large metropolitan areas in the United States. Our results show that the racial composition of an establishment's customers has sizable effects on the race of who gets hired, particularly in jobs that involve direct contact with customers and in sales or service occupations. Race of customers also affects wages, with employees in establishments that have mostly black customers earning less than those in establishments with mostly white customers.
Quarterly Journal of Economics1998113(4), 1137-1167open access
In 1839 the French government purchased the Daguerreotype patent and placed it in the public domain. Such patent buyouts could potentially eliminate the monopoly price distortions and incentives for rent-stealing duplicative research created by patents, while increasing incentives for original research. Governments could offer to purchase patents at their estimated private value, as determined in an auction, times a markup equal to the typical ratio of inventions' social and private value. Most patents purchased would be placed in the public domain, but to induce bidders to reveal their valuations, a few would be sold to the highest bidder.
Quarterly Journal of Economics1998113(4), 1215-1244open access
This paper compares the changing skill structure of wage bills and employment in the United States with six other OECD countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). We investigate whether a directly observed measure of technical change (R&D intensity) is closely linked to the growth in the importance of more highly skilled workers which has occurred in all countries. Evidence of a significant association between skill upgrading and R&D intensity is uncovered in all seven countries. These results provide evidence that skill-biased technical change is an international phenomenon that has had a clear effect of increasing the relative demand for skilled workers.
Quarterly Journal of Economics1998113(1), 253-284open access
We develop a model of optimal schooling investments and estimate it using new data on approximately 700 identical twins. We estimate an average return to schooling of 9 percent for identical twins, but estimated returns appear to be slightly higher for less able individuals. Simple cross-section estimates are marginally upward biased. These empirical results imply that abler individuals attain more schooling because they face lower marginal costs of schooling, not because of higher marginal benefits.
Quarterly Journal of Economics1998113(3), 693-732open access
Current concern with the impact of new technologies on the wage structure motivates this study. We offer evidence that technology-skill and capital-skill (relative) complementarities existed in manufacturing early in this century and were related to the adoption of electric motors and particular production methods. Industries, from 1909 to 1929, with more capital per worker and a greater proportion of motive energy coming from purchased electricity employed relatively more educated blue-collar workers in 1940 and paid their production workers substantially more. We also find a strong positive association between changes in capital intensity and the nonproduction worker wage bill from 1909–1919 implying capital-skill complementarity as large as in recent years.
This paper analyzes the effect of uncertainty about the mean return on the risky asset on the portfolio decisions of an investor who has a long investment horizon. Building on the earlier work of Detemple (1986), Dothan and Feldman (1986), and Gennotte (1986), it is shown that the possibility of future learning about the mean return on the risky asset induces the investor to take a larger or smaller position in the risky asset than she would if there were no learning, the direction of the effect depending on whether the investor is more or less risk tolerant than the logarithmic investor whose portfolio decisions are unaffected by the possibility of future learning. Numerical calculations show that uncertainty about the mean return on the market portfolio has a significant effect on the portfolio decision of an investor with a 20 year horizon if her assessment of the market risk premium is based solely on the Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1995) data.
In rational, efficiently functioning and complete markets, returns on derivative and underlying securities should be perfectly contemporaneously correlated. Due to market imperfections, one of these markets may reflect information faster. The use of high-frequency data and the choice for a small unit time interval to measure these lead-lag relations comes at the cost of some or many missing observations, causing traditional estimators to either under- or overestimate covariances and correlations. We use a new estimator to estimate lead-lag relationships between the cash AEX index, options and futures. We find that futures returns lead both options and cash index returns by approximately 10 minutes. The relationship between options and the cash market is not completely unidirectional.