Knowledge that Transforms

Public provision of education is usually viewed as a form of redistribution in kind.However, does it arise when income redistribution is feasible as well?I analyze a twodimensional model of political decision-making with endogenous political parties.Society chooses both the tax rate and the allocation of the revenues between income redistribution and public education.Agents differ in their income and in their age, where young agents prefer public education and the old prefer income redistribution.I find that when the cohort size of the young is not too large then public education arises as a political compromise between the rich and the young segment of the poor.They collude in order to reduce the size of government (which benefits the rich) and target some of its resources to education (which benefits the young poor).When the cohort size of the young is too large however, income redistribution crowds out public provision of education in the political equilibrium.

The federal government spends billions of dollars each year on programs designed to increase the resources available to hospitals that serve the poor. This paper explores the intended and unintended effects of such targeted funds. First, how do these funds distort the behavior of state and local governments who wish to appropriate the funds for other uses? Second, to the extent that these funds do increase resources in the targeted hospitals, do patients benefit? We use the rapid and uneven growth in Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments across states and hospitals to answer these questions. We identify states that were most able to appropriate DSH funds and show that, while DSH payments to public hospitals in these states were systematically diverted, DSH payments to other hospitals and in other states were not diverted. Additional resources that were made available to hospitals (rather than appropriated by the state) were associated with significant declines in infant and post-heart attack mortality. A range of evidence suggests that these improvements were due to better hospital care. Overall, our analysis implies that public subsidies can be an effective mechanism for improving medical care and outcomes for the poor, but that the impact is limited by the ability of state and local government to divert the targeted funds.

We characterize a three‐factor model of commodity spot prices, convenience yields, and interest rates, which nests many existing specifications. The model allows convenience yields to depend on spot prices and interest rates. It also allows for time‐varying risk premia. Both may induce mean reversion in spot prices, albeit with very different economic implications. Empirical results show strong evidence for spot‐price level dependence in convenience yields for crude oil and copper, which implies mean reversion in prices under the risk‐neutral measure. Silver, gold, and copper exhibit time variation in risk premia that implies mean reversion of prices under the physical measure.

We examine whether mandating banks to issue subordinated debt would enhance market monitoring and control risk taking. To evaluate whether subordinated debt enhances risk monitoring, we extract the credit‐spread curve for each banking firm in our sample and examine whether changes in credit spreads reflect changes in bank risk variables, after controlling for changes in market and liquidity variables. We do not find strong and consistent evidence that they do. To evaluate whether subordinated debt controls risk taking, we examine whether the first issue of subordinated debt changes the risk‐taking behavior of a bank. We find that it does not.

We investigate how the market for corporate control (external governance) and shareholder activism (internal governance) interact. A portfolio that buys firms with the highest level of takeover vulnerability and shorts firms with the lowest level of takeover vulnerability generates an annualized abnormal return of 10% to 15% only when public pension fund (blockholder) ownership is high as well. A similar portfolio created to capture the importance of internal governance generates annualized abnormal returns of 8%, though only in the presence of “high” vulnerability to takeovers. The complementarity effect exists for firms with lower industry‐adjusted leverage and is stronger for smaller firms.

This study proposes a rational expectations equilibrium model of crises and contagion in an economy with information asymmetry and borrowing constraints. Consistent with empirical observations, the model finds: (1) Crises can be caused by small shocks to fundamentals; (2) market return distributions are asymmetric; and (3) correlations among asset returns tend to increase during crashes. The model also predicts: (1) Crises and contagion are likely to occur after small shocks in the intermediate price region; (2) the skewness of asset price distributions increases with information asymmetry and borrowing constraints; and (3) crises can spread through investor borrowing constraints.

In a model with housing collateral, the ratio of housing wealth to human wealth shifts the conditional distribution of asset prices and consumption growth. A decrease in house prices reduces the collateral value of housing, increases household exposure to idiosyncratic risk, and increases the conditional market price of risk. Using aggregate data for the United States, we find that a decrease in the ratio of housing wealth to human wealth predicts higher returns on stocks. Conditional on this ratio, the covariance of returns with aggregate risk factors explains 80% of the cross‐sectional variation in annual size and book‐to‐market portfolio returns.

I develop a model of financial networks in which linkages not only spread contagion, but also induce private sector bailouts, where liquid banks bail out illiquid banks because of the threat of contagion. Introducing this bailout possibility, I show that linkages may be optimal ex ante because they allow banks to obtain some mutual insurance even though formal commitments are impossible. However, in some cases (e.g., when liquidity is concentrated among a small group of banks), the whole network may collapse. I also characterize the optimal network size and apply the results to joint liability arrangements and payment systems.

This paper documents strong evidence for behavioral biases among Chicago Board of Trade proprietary traders and investigates the effect these biases have on prices. Our traders appear highly loss‐averse, regularly assuming above‐average afternoon risk to recover from morning losses. This behavior has important short‐term consequences for afternoon prices, as losing traders actively purchase contracts at higher prices and sell contracts at lower prices than those that prevailed previously. However, the market appears to distinguish these risk‐seeking trades from informed trading. Prices set by loss‐averse traders are reversed significantly more quickly than those set by unbiased traders.

This paper develops a theory of strategic trading in markets with large arbitrageurs. If arbitrageurs are not well capitalized, capital constraints make their trades predictable. Other market participants can exploit this by trading against them. Competitors may find it optimal to lend to arbitrageurs that are financially fragile; additional capital makes the arbitrageurs more viable, and lenders can reap profits from trading against them for a longer time. The strategic behavior of these market participants has implications for the functioning of financial markets. Strategic trading may produce significant price distortions, increase price manipulation, and trigger forced liquidations of large traders.