Knowledge that Transforms

We analyze the determinants of a firm's ownership structure when decisions over risk are taken by majority vote of risk-averse shareholders. We show that when a fraction of small, diversified shareholders abstains from voting, mid-sized blockholders may emerge to mitigate the conflict of interests between one large shareholder, who prefers less risky investments, and these small, non-voting shareholders. The paper offers a novel explanation for the puzzling observation that many firms have multiple blockholders. The paper develops numerous empirical implications, for example on the link between ownership structure and risk choices and on the relative size of blocks.

Evaluating agency theory and optimal contracting theory views of corporate philanthropy, we find that as corporate giving increases, shareholders reduce their valuation of firm cash holdings. Dividend increases following the 2003 Tax Reform Act are associated with reduced corporate giving. Using a natural experiment, we find that corporate giving is positively (negatively) associated with CEO charity preferences (CEO shareholdings and corporate governance quality). Evidence from CEO-affiliated charity donations, market reactions to insider-affiliated donations, its relation to CEO compensation, and firm contributions to director-affiliated charities indicates that corporate donations advance CEO interests and suggests misuses of corporate resources that reduce firm value.

We study the dynamics of an innovative industry when agents learn about its strength, i.e., the likelihood that it gets hit by negative shocks. Managers can exert risk-prevention effort to mitigate the consequences of such shocks. As time goes by, if no shock occurs, confidence improves. This attracts managers to the innovative sector. But, when confidence becomes high, less managers exerting low risk-prevention effort also enter. This accelerates the growth of the industry, while inducing a decline in risk-prevention. The longer the boom, the stronger the confidence, the larger the losses if a shock occurs. While the above dynamics arise in the first best, with asymmetric information there is excessive entry of inefficient managers, earning informational rents at the expense of efficient managers. This inflates the innovative sector and increases its vulnerability.

This paper is a new incarnation of the defunct work previously circulated under the titles "Neoclassical Factors," "An equilibrium three-factor model," "Production-based factors," "A better three-factor model that explains more anomalies," and "An alternative three-factor model." We are extremely grateful to Robert Novy-Marx

Previous studies of liquidity in the foreign exchange (FX) market span short time periods or focus on specific measures of liquidity. In contrast, we provide a comprehensive study of FX liquidity and commonality over more than two decades and a cross-section of forty exchange rates. After identifying the most accurate liquidity proxies based on low-frequency and readily available data, we show that commonality in FX liquidities is stronger for developed currencies and in highly volatile markets. We also show that FX liquidity deteriorates with risk in stock, bond and FX markets, and that riskier currencies are more exposed to liquidity drops.

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms choose their investment level and capital structure, trading off the tax advantages of debt against the risk of costly default. Bankruptcy costs are endogenous, as bankrupt firms are forced to liquidate their assets, resulting in a fire sale if the market is illiquid. When the corporate income tax rate is positive, firms have a unique optimal capital structure. In equilibrium, firms default with positive probability and their assets are liquidated at fire-sale prices. The equilibrium features underinvestment and is constrained inefficient. In particular there is too little debt and default.

This paper derives the value and the risk of aggregate human capital in a dynamic equilibrium production model with Duffie-Epstein preferences. In this setting the expected return of a risky asset is a function of the asset's covariance with consumption growth and a weighted average of the asset's covariance with aggregate wage growth and aggregate financial returns. A calibration of the model matching the historical ratio of wages to consumption in the United States (85% between 1950 and 2007) suggests that the weight of human capital in aggregate wealth is 87%. The results of the calibration follow from the relative size of wages and dividends in the economy and the dynamics of the ratio of wages to consumption, which are counter-cyclical. As a result, human capital is less risky than equity, implying that the risk premium of human capital is lower than that of equity.

We derive conditions under which limits on executive compensation can enhance efficiency and benefit shareholders (but not executives). Having its hands tied in the future allows a board of directors to credibly enter into relational contracts with executives that are more efficient than performance-contingent contracts. This has implications for the ideal composition of the board. The analysis also offers insights into the political economy of executive-compensation reform.

Reduced-form models of default that attribute a large fraction of credit spreads to compensation for credit-event risk typically preclude the most plausible economic justification for such risk to be priced, namely, a contemporaneous drop in the market portfolio. When this “contagion” channel is introduced within a general equilibrium framework for an economy comprising a large number of firms, credit-event risk premia have an upper bound of a few basis points, and are dwarfed by the contagion premium. We provide empirical evidence that indicates credit-event risk premia are less than 1 bp, but contagion risk premia are significant.