Credit default risk for an obligor can be hedged with either a credit default swap (CDS) or a constant maturity credit default swap (CMCDS). We find strong evidence of persistent differences in the hedging cost associated with the two comparable contracts. Between 2001 and 2006, it would have been more profitable to sell CDS and buy CMCDS while after the crisis between 2008 and 2013 the opposite strategy was profitable. Panel data tests indicate that for our sample period the implied forward CDS rates are unbiased estimates of future spot CDS rates. The changes in the company implied volatility is the main determinant of trading inefficiencies, followed by the changes in GDP and in the interest rates before the crisis, and the changes in sentiment index and in the VIX after the crisis

While credit default swaps (CDSs) can be used to hedge credit risk exposures or to speculate, we examine another use of them: banks buy CDS referencing their borrowers to obtain regulatory capital relief. Such capital relief activities have unintended consequences, as banks extend riskier loans when they buy CDS to boost capital ratios. While capital-induced CDS-user banks achieve higher profitability during normal times, they perform worse and request more government support in crisis periods than other banks that use CDS for trading or speculation. Our findings suggest that banks’ CDS trading for capital relief purposes may make these banks riskier

We find firm cyclicality decreases by 40% after the inception of credit default swap (CDS) trading. The effect stems from CDS firms’ less aggressive asset growth in good times and is stronger for firms facing a more severe empty creditor problem. Important identification issues are addressed. The result cannot be explained with debt overhang, bank lending cyclicality, or the cyclicality of firms’ business fundamentals. It holds for the cyclicality of various corporate outcomes (inventories, cash, and employment). Importantly, CDS trading impedes unhealthy growth and enhances profitability and firm value. Our finding indicates an important positive real effect of financial innovation

We analyze the impact of the introduction of credit default swaps (CDSs) on real decision-making within the firm. Our structural model predicts that CDS introduction increases debt capacity more when uncertainty about the credit events that trigger CDS payment is lower. Using a sample of more than 56,000 firms across 51 countries, we find that CDSs increase leverage more in legal and market environments where uncertainty about CDS obligations is reduced and when property rights are weaker. Our results highlight the importance of legal uncertainty in the interpretation of the underlying trigger events of global credit derivatives

We show that credit default swap (CDS) trading on a firm's debt positively influences its technological innovation output measured by patents and patent citations. This positive effect is more pronounced in firms relying more on debt financing or being more subject to continuous monitoring by lenders prior to CDS trade initiation. Moreover, after CDS trade initiation, firms pursue more risky and original innovations and generate patents with higher economic value. Further analysis suggests that CDSs improve borrowing firms’ innovation output by enhancing lenders’ risk tolerance and borrowers’ risk- taking in the innovation process, rather than by increasing Research and Development (R&D) investment. Taken together, our findings reveal the real effects of CDSs on companies’ investments and technological progress

We examine the effect of introducing credit default swaps (CDSs) on firm value. Our model allows for dynamic investment and financing, and bondholders can trade in the CDS market. The model incorporates both negative and positive effects of CDSs. CDS markets lead to more liquidations, but they also reduce the probability of costly debt renegotiation and reduce costly equity financing. After calibrating the model, we find that firm value increases by 2.9% on average with the introduction of a CDS market. Firms also invest more and increase leverage. The effect on firm value is strongest for small, financially constrained, and low productivity firms

This paper provides the first empirical evidence of the externalities of credit default swaps (CDS). We find that a firm's leverage is lower when a larger proportion of its revenue is derived from CDS-referenced customers. This finding is robust to alternative samples and measures, placebo tests, and the selection of customers by suppliers. Moreover, firms affected by customer CDS trading issue equity to lower leverage, and their equity issuance costs are lower. These findings are consistent with the view that CDS trading on customers improves the information environment for suppliers. Therefore, while many firms are not directly linked to CDS trading, CDS trading on their customers has spillover effects on these firms’ financial policies

We analyze the impact of credit default swap (CDS) trading on bank syndication activity. Theoretically, the effect of CDS trading is ambiguous: on the one hand, CDS can improve risk-sharing and hence be a more flexible risk management tool than loan syndication; on the other hand, CDS trading can reduce bank monitoring incentives. We document that banks are less likely to syndicate loans and retain a larger loan fraction once CDS are actively traded on the borrower’s debt. We then discern the risk management and the moral hazard channel. We find no evidence that the reduced likelihood to syndicate loans is a result of increased moral hazard problems

We show that the propensity of a bank to experience extreme co-movements in its credit default swap (CDS) premia together with the market is priced in the bank’s default swap spread during the financial crisis. We measure a bank’s CDS tail beta by estimating the upper tail dependence between its default swap spreads and a CDS market index. Our study shows that protection sellers receive a premium for bearing the risk of extreme upward co-movements in default risk. The economic significance of this effect is large yet limited to the recent financial crisis. Banks in the upper quintile of CDS tail beta have spreads that are on average 140 basis points higher than those of banks in the lower CDS tail beta quintile

Using a regression-discontinuity design and within lender–borrower variation, we analyze how credit default swaps (CDSs) affect bank incentives and borrower outcomes in renegotiations after covenant violations. While existing studies document an investment decline after covenant violations, we find that covenant-violating firms maintain their investment subsequent to the introduction of CDS trading. Moreover, after CDS introduction, covenant-violating firms are less likely to default. Our results suggest that in the private debt markets, CDSs discipline borrowers, while the empty creditor problem due to CDS is mitigated because of lenders’ reputation concerns and lower coordination frictions