While credit default swaps (CDSs) can be used to hedge credit risk exposures or to speculate, we examine another use of them: banks buy CDS referencing their borrowers to obtain regulatory capital relief. Such capital relief activities have unintended consequences, as banks extend riskier loans when they buy CDS to boost capital ratios. While capital-induced CDS-user banks achieve higher profitability during normal times, they perform worse and request more government support in crisis periods than other banks that use CDS for trading or speculation. Our findings suggest that banks’ CDS trading for capital relief purposes may make these banks riskier

Using regulatory data on CDS holdings and corporate bond transactions, I provide evidence for a liquidity spillover effect from CDS to bond markets. Bond trading volumes are 70% larger for investors with CDS positions written on the debt issuer. Moreover, higher CDS trading activity substantially improves the liquidity of the underlying bonds, particularly around rating downgrades. Additional analyses reveal that the spillover effect is partly driven by naked CDS positions, highlighting one of the adverse consequences of naked CDS bans for bond markets. The results suggest that the presence of an accessible CDS market enhances the liquidity of the underlying bond market.

This paper highlights the adverse consequences of sluggish credit rating updates in creating information efficiency distortions and investment anomalies. We first document significant credit default swap (CDS) return momentum yielding 7.1% per year. We further show that cross-market momentum strategies based on information in past CDS performance generates an alpha of 10.3% per year in stocks and 7.3% per year in bonds. These CDS momentum and cross-market effects are stronger among more liquid, informationally rich CDS contracts whose CDS spreads move in anticipation of important, yet slow-moving, credit rating changes. (JEL G12, G14) Received February 19, 2020; editorial decision July 10, 2020 by Editor Jeffrey Pontiff

This paper studies how the COVID-19 shock affects the CDS spread changes and abnormal stock returns of U.S. firms with different levels of debt rollover risk. We use the COVID-19 crisis as a quasi-natural experiment of adverse cash flow shock that increases the default risk of firms facing an immediate liquidity shortfall. We find that the COVID-19 shock significantly increased the CDS spread and decreased the shareholder value for firms facing higher debt rollover risk. The effect is stronger for non-financial firms, for firms that are financially constrained, and for firms that are highly volatile. Moreover, we find that firms with immediate refinancing needs suffered more than firms with distant refinancing needs during the COVID-19 shock, which further confirms that firms’ debt rollover risk is indeed a key factor that drives the heterogenous reactions to the shock. The paper provides fresh insights into the role of firms’ debt rollover risk during the COVID-19 health crisis

We document extreme disruption in debt markets during the COVID-19 crisis: a severe price crash accompanied by significant dislocations at the safer end of the credit spectrum. Investment-grade corporate bonds traded at a discount to credit default swaps; exchange-traded funds traded at a discount to net asset value, more so for safer bonds. The Federal Reserve’s announcement of corporate bond purchases caused these dislocations to disappear and prices to recover. These facts inform potential theories of the disruption. The best explanation is an acute liquidity need for specific bond investors, such as mutual funds, leading them to liquidate large positions

From 2005 to 2015, the 25 largest global financial institutions paid combined more than $285 billion in legal penalties. We examine the reaction of banks' stocks, bonds, and credit default swaps to the announcements of monetary penalties. We observe a reduced default risk and lower financing costs, as well an increase in the stock market valuation, suggesting that banks benefit from settling lawsuits. The positive reaction is likely driven by the resolution of uncertainty surrounding these proceedings. While the sued bank's systemic risk increases in the size of the relative monetary penalty, we also document positive spillover effects to other banks facing pending lawsuits with the same plaintiff, demonstrating the systemic effect of law enforcement against banks. Furthermore, banks appear to correctly anticipate penalties, as they are cash flow-effective but not income-effective in the year they are announced