We examine the investor sentiment and limits-to-arbitrage explanations for the positive cross-sectional relation between cash holdings and future stock returns. Consistent with the investor sentiment hypothesis, we find that the cash holding effect is significant when sentiment is low, and it is insignificant when sentiment is high. In addition, the cash holding effect is strong among stocks with high transaction costs, high short selling costs, and large idiosyncratic volatility, indicating that arbitrage on the cash holding effect is costly and risky. In line with the limits-to-arbitrage hypothesis, high costs and risk prevent rational investors from exploiting the cash holding effect

We empirically evaluate the predictions of the mispricing hypothesis with limits-to-arbitrage suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and the q-theory with investment frictions proposed by Li and Zhang (2010) on the negative relation between asset growth and average stock returns. We conduct cross-sectional regressions of returns on asset growth on subsamples split by a given measure of limits-to-arbitrage or investment frictions. We show that: (i) proxies for limits-to-arbitrage and proxies for investment frictions are often highly correlated; (ii) the evidence based on equal-weighted returns shows significant support for both hypotheses, while the evidence from value-weighted returns is weaker; and (iii) in direct comparisons, each hypothesis is supported by a fair and similar amount of evidence

We propose a model of limited arbitrage based on financial relationships. Financially constrained arbitrageurs may choose to seek additional financing from banks that have the technology to profit from the strategies themselves. A holdup problem arises because banks cannot commit to providing capital. To minimize competition, arbitrageurs will choose to stay constrained and underinvest in the arbitrage unless banks have sufficient reputational capital. This problem arises when mispricing is largest. More competition among financiers, higher arbitrageur wealth, and allowing for explicit contracts can worsen the holdup problem. When arbitrage is risky, financial relationships are more valuable, mitigating the problem

Classic option pricing theory values a derivative contract via dynamic delta hedging and treating the contract as redundant relative to the underlying security. Dynamic delta hedging proves highly effective in practice, but the remaining risk is still large because of the practical limits of arbitrage. Derivatives can play primary roles in risk allocation. This paper quantifies the percentage variance reduction of delta hedging on U.S. stock options, proposes a top-down return attribution framework to identify the remaining risk sources of the delta-hedged option investment, and constructs a statistical return factor model to explain the variations of the delta-hedged option returns

A blockchain replaces central counterparties with time-consuming consensus protocols to record the transfer of ownership. This settlement latency slows cross-exchange trading, exposing arbitrageurs to price risk. Off-chain settlement, instead, exposes arbitrageurs to costly default risk. We show with Bitcoin network and order book data that cross-exchange price differences coincide with periods of high settlement latency, asset flows chase arbitrage opportunities, and price differences across exchanges with low default risk are smaller. Blockchain-based trading thus faces a dilemma: Reliable consensus protocols require time-consuming settlement latency, leading to arbitrage limits. Circumventing such arbitrage costs is possible only by reinstalling trusted intermediation, which mitigates default risk

We analyze strategic speculators’ incentives to trade on information in a model where firm value is endogenous to trading, due to feedback from the financial market to corporate decisions. Trading reveals private information to managers and improves their real decisions, enhancing fundamental value. This feedback effect has an asymmetric effect on trading behavior: it increases (reduces) the profitability of buying (selling) on good (bad) news. This gives rise to an endogenous limit to arbitrage, whereby investors may refrain from trading on negative information. Thus, bad news is incorporated more slowly into prices than good news, potentially leading to overinvestment

We develop a novel methodology to infer the amount of capital allocated to quantitative equity arbitrage strategies. Using this methodology, which exploits time-variation in the cross-section of short interest, we document that the amount of capital devoted to value and momentum strategies has grown significantly since the late 1980s. We provide evidence that this increase in capital has resulted in lower strategy returns. However, consistent with theories of limited arbitrage, we show that strategy-level capital flows are influenced by past strategy returns and strategy return volatility and that arbitrage capital is most limited during times when strategies perform best. This suggests that the growth of arbitrage capital may not completely eliminate returns to these strategies

We examine how institutional ownership structure gives rise to limits to arbitrage through its impact on short-sale constraints. Stocks with lower, more concentrated, short-term, and less passive ownership exhibit lower lending supply, higher costs of shorting, and higher arbitrage risk. These constraints limit the ability of arbitrageurs to take short positions and delay the correction of mispricing. Stocks with more concentrated ownership exhibit smaller announcement day reactions, larger post-earnings announcement drift, and an additional negative abnormal return of -0.47% in the week following a positive shorting demand shock

This paper characterizes equilibria in the Shleifer-Vishny model of limits of arbitrage. To prove existence, one has to consider types of equilibria ignored by Shleifer and Vishny, even if one adopts their parameter restrictions. For example, the only equilibrium may be one in which maximization of expected wealth requires an “all-or-nothing” investment strategy, with intermediate investment levels being strictly unprofitable. If one goes beyond Shleifer and Vishny's parameter restrictions, multiple equilibria may arise, and equilibrium selection may be governed by sunspots. Moreover, there may exist an equilibrium in which the asset price returns to fundamentals despite worsening noise trader sentiment

“Limits of Arbitrage” theories hypothesize that the marginal investor in a particular asset market is a specialized arbitrageur rather than a diversified representative investor. We examine the mortgage‐backed securities (MBS) market in this light. We show that the risk of homeowner prepayment, which is a wash in the aggregate, is priced in the MBS market. The covariance of prepayment risk with aggregate wealth implies the wrong sign to match the observed prices of prepayment risk. The price of risk is better explained by a kernel based on MBS market‐wide specific risk, consistent with the specialized arbitrageur hypothesis