This paper analyzes the relationship between banks’ divergent strategies toward specialization and diversification of financial activities and their ability to withstand a banking sector crash. We first generate market-based measures of banks’ systemic risk exposures using extreme value analysis. Systemic banking risk is measured as the tail beta, which equals the probability of a sharp decline in a bank’s stock price conditional on a crash in a banking index. Subsequently, the impact of (the correlation between) interest income and the components of non-interest income on this risk measure is assessed. The heterogeneity in extreme bank risk is attributed to differences in the scope of non-traditional banking activities: non-interest generating activities increase banks’ tail beta. In addition, smaller banks and better-capitalized banks are better able to withstand extremely adverse conditions. These relationships are stronger during turbulent times compared to normal economic conditions. Overall, diversifying financial activities under one umbrella institution does not improve banking system stability, which may explain why financial conglomerates trade at a discount

In a financial system in which balance sheets are continuously marked to market, asset price changes appear immediately as changes in net worth, and eliciting responses from financial intermediaries who adjust the size of their balance sheets. We document evidence that marked-to-market leverage is strongly procyclical. Such behavior has aggregate consequences. Changes in dealer repos – the primary margin of adjustment for the aggregate balance sheets of intermediaries – forecast changes in financial market risk as measured by the innovations in the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index VIX index. Aggregate liquidity can be seen as the rate of change of the aggregate balance sheet of the financial intermediaries.

Recently, developing countries have witnessed a sharp increase in foreign bank participation. We examine the impact on banking outreach using newly gathered data for Mexico, where foreign bank participation rose from 2% to 83% of assets during 1997–2005. Country-, bank-, and bank-municipality-level estimations show a decline in the number of deposit and loan accounts. While country- and bank-level estimations indicate an increase in the share of municipalities with bank branches and in the likelihood of bank presence, bank-municipality regressions show that only rich and urban municipalities benefited. Overall, the evidence is consistent with a decline in outreach.

When firms compete in the managerial labor market, the choice of corporate governance by a firm affects, and is affected by, the choice of governance by other firms. Firms with weaker governance offer managers more generous incentive compensation, which induces firms with good governance to also overpay their management. Due to this externality, overall level of governance in the economy can be inefficiently low. Poor governance can in fact be employed by incumbent firms to deter entry by new firms. Such corporate governance externalities have important implications for regulatory standards, ownership structure of firms, and the market for corporate control.

We study high-frequency exchange rates over the period 1993–2008. Based on the recent literature on volatility and liquidity risk premia, we use a factor model to capture linear and non-linear linkages between currencies, stock and bond markets as well as proxies for market volatility and liquidity. We document that the Swiss franc and Japanese yen appreciate against the US dollar when US stock prices decrease and US bond prices and FX volatility increase. These safe haven properties materialise over different time granularities (from a few hours to several days) and non-linearly with the volatility factor and during crises. The latter effects were particularly discernible for the yen during the recent financial crisis.

Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been proposed as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle, and experiments indicate that investors exhibit behavior consistent with MLA. But a caveat is that a large bulk of financial assets is managed by investment managers whose objectives may differ substantially from those of private investors. Most importantly they manage their clients' money, not their own. In this paper we test experimentally how individuals take risk with other people's (“clients”) money. We find that subjects behave consistently with MLA over their clients' money and take less risk with their clients' money than with their own

We examine empirically the response of bond returns and their volatility to good and bad macroeconomic news during expansions and recessions. We find that macroeconomic announcements are most important when they contain bad news for bond returns in expansions and, to a lesser extent, good news in contractions. In expansions, the bond market responds most strongly to bad news in non-farm payrolls, while in recessions good news about inflation is relatively more important. We also document that macroeconomic news impacts the volatility of bond returns at all maturities by increasing jump intensities and altering the jump size distribution.

We analyze the role of bankers on the boards of German non-financial companies for the period from 1994 to 2005. We find that banks that are represented on a firm's board promote their own business as lenders and as M&A advisors. They also seem to act as financial experts who help firms to obtain funding, especially in difficult times. We find little evidence that bankers monitor management and suggest that bankers on the board cause a decline in the valuations of non-financial firms. Banks’ equity ownership declined sharply during our sample period and the German financial system lost some of its formerly distinctive features.

We consider mean-variance portfolio choice of a robust investor. The investor receives advice from J experts, each with a different prior for expected returns and risk, and follows a min-max portfolio strategy. The robust investor endogenously combines the experts' estimates. When experts agree on the main return generating factors, the investor relies on the advice of the expert with the strongest prior. Dispersed advice leads to averaging of the alternative estimates. The robust investor is likely to outperform alternative strategies. The theoretical analysis is supported by numerical simulations for the 25 Fama-French portfolios and for 81 European country and value portfolios.

This paper investigates the risk versus mispricing explanation of superior returns to contrarian strategies using the interactions between value-to-market indicators and corporate financing transactions that increase or decrease a firm's outstanding equity. Portfolio-level analyses and firm-level cross-sectional regressions indicate that the well-documented contrarian profits soar when value stocks which repurchase shares (value repurchasers) and growth stocks which issue shares (growth issuers) are considered. Various risk measures indicate that value repurchasers are not riskier than growth issuers. Furthermore, time-series of realized growth rates, analysts' long-term growth estimates, and sensitivity of portfolio returns to investor sentiment support the misvaluation explanation