We propose a portfolio-balance model of the yield curve in which inflation is determined through an interest rate rule that satisfies the Taylor principle. Because arbitrageurs care about their real wealth, they only absorb an increase in the supply of nominal bonds if they are compensated with an increase in their real rates of return. Since the Taylor principle implies that the real return on nominal bonds positively depends on inflation, inflation increases in equilibrium when there is an increase in the supply of nominal bonds to compensate arbitrageurs for the additional supply they have to hold.

We study nine equity markets between 1900 and 1925 to provide an out-of-sample test of some major asset pricing anomalies during a period in which anomalies had not been documented. We find strong evidence of momentum in almost every market. We find no evidence of long-term reversals, which, coupled with the limited presence of institutional investors, suggests that underreaction should be considered as a key aspect of behavioral theories of momentum. We also find evidence for the size effect, betting-against-beta, and the outperformance of low volatility stocks, whereas we find mixed evidence of short-term reversal.

Internalization happens when orders submitted through the same broker are intentionally matched to each other on-exchange or off-exchange. We study the impact of allowing (modes of) internalization on trading rates, investor welfare, and payment for order flow (PFOF). Internalization affects the choice between limit orders and market orders and the participation of dealers in trading. Greater dealer participation creates a greater scope for PFOF. A crucial determinant is the size of the tick. For small ticks, compared with the absence of internalization, its presence leads to higher trading rates, lower investor welfare, and more PFOF. The opposite holds for wide ticks.

This study investigates the role of passive investors in the equity lending market by utilizing the expansion of exchange-traded fund (ETF) markets due to the Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) ETF purchasing program. We find that the BOJ’s purchases increase equity prices particularly for stocks with limited availability in the equity lending market. However, over the longer term, the BOJ’s cumulative purchases reduce lending fees, thus weakening the program’s effects. These findings suggest that ETF managers supply stocks that constitute ETFs to the equity lending market, and the lending behavior of ETFs, influenced by the BOJ’s program, alleviates short-selling constraints.

Using a novel typology of serial acquirers, we examine several puzzles documented in the prior literature. We show that acquisitions by different types of acquirers are driven by different factors, they acquire different sizes of targets, and subsequent acquisitions by acquirers are predictable ex ante. Controlling for market anticipation, the most frequent serial acquirers do not earn declining returns as they continue acquiring, while less frequent acquirers do. Our methodology enhances our understanding of serial acquisition dynamics, anticipation, and economic value adjustments. The methodology is likely to be relevant to topics related to event anticipation beyond those covered in this study.

We study the emergence of a new channel for firms’ political activity using dark money through undisclosed and unlimited contributions. After the U.S. federal court decisions in 2010, S&P 500 firms substantially increased their use of dark money. We find that dark money contributions complement political engagement through campaign contributions and lobbying. Firms disclose dark money contributions when they face heightened nondisclosure costs. Firms contributing to dark money groups benefit by receiving more procurement contracts and increased government subsidies. Our findings highlight that political connections by firms are evolving and expanding through new and largely unexplored channels.

We study the role of trust in traditional finance in the consumer adoption of various fintech products, including cryptocurrencies, peer-to-peer lending, other crowdfunding, roboadvisors, and alternative payment solutions. Using an online lab experiment, an experiment on an investment website, and a representative survey of Dutch households, we find no consistent evidence that trust in banks affects fintech adoption in any of the product categories, although we find weak evidence suggesting that trust in banks positively affects interest in alternative payment apps. Our results do not support the narrative that trust in traditional finance is a major driver of fintech adoption.

We analyze how creditor rights affect the nonsynchronicity of global corporate credit default swap spreads (CDS-NS). CDS-NS is negatively related to the country-level creditor-control rights, especially to the “restrictions on reorganization” component, where creditor-shareholder conflicts are high. The effect is concentrated in firms with high investment intensity, asset growth, information opacity, and risk. Pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms led to a decline in CDS-NS, indicating lower firm-specific idiosyncratic information being priced in credit markets. A strategic-disclosure incentive among debtors avoiding creditor intervention seems more dominant than the disciplining effect, suggesting how strengthening creditor rights affects power rebalancing between creditors and shareholders.

Does partisanship influence loan allocation through the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)? We examine the 2020 Presidential campaign contributions made by lenders’ employees as a partisanship measure and leverage the PPP’s phased implementation under both the Trump and the Biden administrations. We find that partisan misalignment increases lending, particularly to small and first-time PPP borrowers, as well as those in Republican areas. Misalignment is also associated with higher payroll coverage for small businesses. Our findings are consistent with Republican-leaning lenders viewing the PPP’s 2021 phase as a legacy policy of the prior administration, shedding new light on the partisan-alignment phenomenon in finance.

Firms under common ownership have incentives to soften competition. I exploit unique data from Norway to document the economy-wide extent of common ownership, covering private and public firms and the universe of shareholders. Using exogenous variation in common ownership at the firm-household level due to marriages among individual shareholders, I show that firms experiencing an increase in common ownership due to a marriage increase profit margins by 7 to 16 percentage points, compared to firms affected by similar marriages that do not experience a change in common ownership.