We present a new methodology for studying the problem of intra-firm bargaining, based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment. We develop and analyse a general non-cooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its employees and consider outcomes which are immune to renegotiations by any party. Equilibrium firm profits are characterizable as both a weighted average of a neo-classical (non-bargaining) firm's profits and a generalization of Shapley value for a corresponding cooperative game. Furthermore, the resulting payoffs induce economically significant distortions in the firm's input and organizational-design decisions.

This paper examines the value relevance of fair value data disclosed under SFAS 107 by banks for 1992 and 1993. Collectively, the evidence suggests differences between fair and book values of financial instruments are associated with market-to-book ratios. However, fair value disclosures for financial instruments other than securities are value-relevant only in limited settings. In addition, only in 1992 are fair value variables associated with market-to-book ratios after incorporating existing historical cost information. Further analysis suggests the weaker 1993 results are not necessarily due to increased measurement error in fair value numbers.

We operationalize a firm's competitive strategy through a new empirical measure, and develop a framework for empirical analysis of the market value of strategic behavior. Using this framework, we study announcement effects of R&D spending. The announcing firm's stock prices are positively influenced by a change in spending, and negatively by our competitive strategy measure (CSM). Competitors' stock prices are positively influenced by the interaction between the market's reaction to the announcing firm and the CSM. Our results are consistent with positive effects of ‘accommodating’ competition with strategic substitutes, and nonpositive effects of ‘tough’ competition with strategic complements.

This paper seeks to develop a structural model that lets data on asset returns and trading volume speak to whether volatility autocorrelation comes from the fundamental that the trading process is pricing or, is caused by the trading process itself. Returns and volume data argue, in the context of our model, that persistent volatility is caused by traders experimenting with different beliefs based upon past profit experience and their estimates of future profit experience. A major theme of our paper is to introduce adaptive agents in the spirit of Sargent (1993) but have them adapt their strategies on a time scale that is slower than the time scale on which the trading process takes place. This will lead to positive autocorrelation in volatility and volume on the time scale of the trading process which generates returns and volume data. Positive autocorrelation of volatility and volume is caused by persistence of strategy patterns that are associated with high volatility and high volume. Thee following features seen in the data: (i) The autocorrelation function of a measure of volatility such as squared returns or absolute value of returns is positive with a slowly decaying tail. (ii) The autocorrelation function of a measure of trading activity such as volume or turnover is positive with a slowly decaying tail. (iii) The cross correlation function of a measure of volatility such as squared returns is about zero for squared returns with past and future volumes and is positive for squared returns with current volumes. (iv) Abrupt changes in prices and returns occur which are hard to attach to 'news.' The last feature is obtained by a version of the model where the Law of Large Numbers fails in the large economy limit.

Inequality measures are often used to summarize information about empirical income distributions. However the resulting picture of the distribution and of changes in the distribution can be severely distorted if the data are contaminated. The nature of this distortion will in general depend upon the underlying properties of the inequality measure. This issue is investigated theoretically using a technique based on the influence function, and the magnitude of the effect is illustrated using a simulation. Both direct nonparametric estimation from the sample, and indirect estimation using a parametric model are considered; in the latter case the application of a robust estimation procedure is demonstrated. The results are applied to two micro-data examples. Copyright 1996 by The Econometric Society.

We analyze the rationale for limit order trading. Use of limit orders involves two risks: 1) an adverse information event can trigger an undesirable execution, and 2) favorable news can result in a desirable execution not being obtained. On the other hand, a paucity of limit orders can result in accentuated short-term price fluctuations that compensate a limit order trader. Our empirical tests suggest that trading via limit orders dominates trading via market orders for market participants with relatively well balanced portfolios, and that placing a network of buy and sell limit orders as a pure trading strategy is profitable.

The paper suggests a new test for rent-sharing in the U. S. labor market. Using an unbalanced panel from the manufacturing sector, it shows that a rise in a sector's profitability leads after some years to an increase in the long-run level of wages in that sector. The paper controls for workers' characteristics, for industry fixed effects, and for unionism. Lester's range of wages is estimated, for rentsharing reasons alone, at approximately 24 percent of the mean wage.