We show that inflation risk is priced in international asset returns. We analyze inflation risk in a framework that encompasses the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) of Adler and Dumas (1983). In contrast to the extant empirical literature on the ICAPM, we relax the assumption that inflation rates are constant. We estimate and test a conditional version of the model for the G5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US) over the period 1975–1998 and find evidence of statistically and economically significant prices of inflation risk (in addition to priced nominal exchange rate risk). Our results imply a rejection of the restrictions imposed by the ICAPM. In an extension of our analysis to 2003, we show that even after the termination of nominal exchange rate fluctuations in the euro area in 1999, differences in inflation rates across countries entail non-trivial real exchange rate risk premia.

We present a model of intuitive inference, called “local thinking,” in which an agent combines data received from the external world with information retrieved from memory to evaluate a hypothesis. In this model, selected and limited recall of information follows a version of the representativeness heuristic. The model can account for some of the evidence on judgment biases, including conjunction and disjunction fallacies, but also for several anomalies related to demand for insurance.

This paper investigates the effects of largest-shareholder ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and audit quality on the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into share prices, as measured by stock price synchronicity, of Chinese-listed firms over the 1996–2003 period. We show that synchronicity is a concave function of ownership by the largest shareholder with its maximum at an approximate 50% level. Further, we find that synchronicity is higher when the largest shareholder is government related. We also find that foreign ownership and auditor quality are inversely associated with synchronicity. Finally, we show that the amount of earnings information reflected in stock returns is lower for firms with high synchronicity.

We model how lobbying by interest groups affects the level of investor protection. In our model, insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors (financial intermediaries), and entrepreneurs who plan to take companies public in the future, compete for influence over the politicians setting the level of investor protection. We identify conditions under which this lobbying game has an inefficiently low equilibrium level of investor protection. Factors that operate to reduce investor protection below its efficient level include the ability of corporate insiders to use the corporate assets they control to influence politicians, as well as the inability of institutional investors to capture the full value that efficient investor protection would produce for outside investors. The interest that entrepreneurs (and existing public firms) have in raising equity capital in the future reduces but does not eliminate the distortions arising from insiders' interest in extracting rents from the capital public firms already have. Our analysis generates testable predictions, and can explain existing empirical evidence, regarding the way in which investor protection varies over time and around the world.

We investigate corporate financial policies in the presence of both temporary and permanent shocks to firms’ cash flows. In our framework, cash flows can be negative and are imperfectly correlated with firm value, and earnings volatility differs from asset volatility. These results are consistent with empirical stylized facts. They are also contrary to the implications of existing dynamic capital structure models that allow only for permanent shocks to cash flows. Temporary shocks increase the importance of financial flexibility and may provide an intuitively simple and realistic explanation of empirically observed financial conservatism and low leverage phenomena. The theoretical framework developed in this article general enough to be used in various corporate finance applications.

A unifying framework to test for causal effects in nonlinear models is proposed. We consider a generalized linear-index regression model with endogenous regressors and no parametric assumptions on the error disturbances. To test the significance of the effect of an endogenous regressor, we propose a statistic that is a kernel-weighted version of the rank correlation statistic (tau) of Kendall (1938). The semiparametric model encompasses previous cases considered in the literature (continuous endogenous regressors (Blundell and Powell (2003)) and a single binary endogenous regressor (Vytlacil and Yildiz (2007))), but the testing approach is the first to allow for (i) multiple discrete endogenous regressors, (ii) endogenous regressors that are neither discrete nor continuous (e.g., a censored variable), and (iii) an arbitrary “mix” of endogenous regressors (e.g., one binary regressor and one continuous regressor).

Why does schooling attainment vary widely across countries? Why are differences in schooling attainment highly persistent? I show that cross-country differences in schooling are related to political institutions, such as democracy and local democracy (political decentralization), which are affected by colonial factors. By using the number of native cultures before colonization as an instrument for political decentralization, I show that after controlling for the causal effect of income on schooling, the degree of democratization positively affects the development of primary education, whereas political decentralization has a positive and significant impact on more advanced levels of schooling.

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), in their joint Financial Statement Presentation project, are reconsidering the basic format of financial statements. The Boards’ preliminary discussions related to this joint project indicate that they intend to modify the required financial statements to increase the proximity of performance‐related information for each reported period. We provide evidence related to this potential change by investigating the effects of financial statement information proximity on investors’ ability to learn the forecast‐relevant time series properties of reported cash flows and accruals. We also examine the role feedback plays in this relationship. Our experimental results suggest that nonprofessional investors are able to more quickly learn the relation between current period cash flows and accruals and future cash flow realizations when financial statement information is presented in a single statement rather than separated into two statements. In addition, we find that nonprofessional investors exhibit lower levels of absolute forecast errors and less forecast dispersion when financial statement information is unified into a single statement. Finally, we provide evidence that nonprofessional investors who receive extensive outcome feedback on a single page initially learn more quickly and later, after learning has leveled off, accurately forecast more consistently than do investors who receive extensive or limited feedback spread across two pages. Overall, our results provide evidence on the effectiveness of alternate financial statement presentation formats and the potential usefulness of receiving more extensive feedback.

Orientador :Regina C.C.P. Moran

Abstract We examine the wealth effects of 3 regulatory changes designed to improve minority-shareholder protection in the Chinese stock markets. Using the value of a firm’s related-party transactions as an inverse proxy for the quality of corporate governance, wefind that firms with weaker governance experienced significantly larger abnormal returns around announcements of the new regulations than did firms with stronger governance. We also find that firms with strong ties to the government did not benefit from the regulations, suggesting that minority shareholders did not expect regulators to enforce the new rules on firms where blockholders have strong political connections.