We examine how an M&A advisor’s position in the network of investment banks affects its ability to create value for acquirers in takeover transactions. We show that acquirers enlisting the services of more centrally positioned M&A advisors enjoy higher announcement abnormal returns and pay lower takeover premiums. Consistent with the idea that central network positions convey an information advantage, we find that the effects are stronger for acquirers facing greater target information asymmetry and for M&A advisors depending more on networks for target-specific information. The information advantage primarily comes from network contacts that had previously assisted the targets in equity issuance. Centrally positioned advisors charge premium fees; network banks appear to enjoy a significant advantage in the competition for future co-advisory appointments.

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We investigate the impact of cyberattacks on a firm's equity issuance decisions. Our findings indicate that firms targeted by cyberattacks are less likely to pursue seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) afterward. This effect is more pronounced when the target firm has lower external financing needs and operates in a poor information environment. This result remains robust after addressing sample selection bias through propensity score matching and entropy balancing approaches. We attribute this reduction in SEO activities to reputation loss, investors' adverse selection, and the resulting higher equity financing costs. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the negative impact of cyberattacks on SEOs extends to industry peers. This spillover effect is stronger when the target firm suffers significant reputation loss, when the stock prices of peers closely correlate with those of the target firm, when peer firms possess a higher ex-ante cyber risk, and when they are more vulnerable to future cyberattacks.

We examine whether analysts' forecast properties deter inefficient labor investment decisions. Using accuracy and dispersion as analysts' forecast properties, we find that more accurate and less dispersed forecasts are associated with less inefficient corporate labor investments. Utilizing Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) as an exogenous variation to analysts' forecast activities, we find a causal relationship between analysts' forecast properties and labor investment inefficiency. We also find that more accurate and less dispersed forecasts decrease labor cost stickiness. Our results are consistent with the view that analysts' forecast properties enhance the information environment, which, in turn, improves corporate labor investment decisions.

Firm fixed effects alone explain as much of the variation in acquirer returns as all the firm- and deal-specific characteristics combined. An interquartile range of acquirer fixed effects is over 6%, comparable to the interquartile range of acquirer returns. Acquirer returns persist over time, but mainly at the top end of the distribution. Persistence continues under different chief executive officers (CEOs), and attributes of the broader management team do not explain the fixed effect. Firm-specific heterogeneity in acquirer returns suggests that some organizations are extraordinary acquirers irrespective of the leadership at the top and the deal structures they choose. Implications for the M&A research are discussed.

We examine the impact of CEOs’ public charity affiliations on corporate labor violations and find that public-charity-affiliated CEOs have a lower likelihood of engaging in labor violations than their non-affiliated peers. In a disaggregated analysis, we find the result to be driven primarily by wage and hour violations. This finding is validated when we compare changes in wage and hour violations around different types of CEO turnover. We further identify the promotion of a positive corporate culture and an increase in labor-related expenditures as the main channels through which CEOs’ public charity affiliations affect wage and hour violations. In addition, we find that firms led by public-charity-affiliated CEOs experience lower employee turnover. The impact of public-charity-affiliated CEOs on reducing the likelihood of wage and hour violations is persistent and is more pronounced for CEOs who exhibit more altruistic behavior prior to assuming office. Overall, we provide persuasive evidence that CEOs’ public charity affiliations are beneficial to firms.