Performance pay for tax collectors has the potential to raise revenues, but might come at a cost if it increases the bargaining power of tax collectors vis-à-vis taxpayers. We report the first large-scale field experiment on these issues, where we experimentally allocated 482 property tax units in Punjab, Pakistan, into one of three performance pay schemes or a control. After two years, incentivized units had 9.4 log points higher revenue than controls, which translates to a 46% higher growth rate. The scheme that rewarded purely on revenue did best, increasing revenue by 12.9 log points (64% higher growth rate), with little penalty for customer satisfaction and assessment accuracy compared to the two other schemes that explicitly also rewarded these dimensions. The revenue gains accrue from a small number of properties becoming taxed at their true value, which is substantially more than they had been taxed at previously. The majority of properties in incentivized areas in fact pay no more taxes, but instead report higher bribes. The results are consistent with a collusive setting in which performance pay increases collectors’ bargaining power over taxpayers, who have to either pay higher bribes to avoid being reassessed or pay substantially higher taxes if collusion breaks down.

July 01 2018 Review of Economics and Statistics over the Past 100 Years: Authorship Asim I. Khwaja, Asim I. Khwaja Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Kunal Mangal Kunal Mangal Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Asim I. Khwaja Kunal Mangal Online Issn: 1530-9142 Print Issn: 0034-6535 © 2018 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2018 The Review of Economics and Statistics (2018) 100 (3): i–v. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_e_00743 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Asim I. Khwaja, Kunal Mangal; Review of Economics and Statistics over the Past 100 Years: Authorship. The Review of Economics and Statistics 2018; 100 (3): i–v. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_e_00743 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsThe Review of Economics and Statistics Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2018 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2018 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

May 01 2018 Review of Economics and Statistics over the Past 100 Years: A Counting Exercise Asim I. Khwaja, Asim I. Khwaja Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Kunal Mangal Kunal Mangal Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Asim I. Khwaja Kunal Mangal Online Issn: 1530-9142 Print Issn: 0034-6535 © 2018 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2018The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Review of Economics and Statistics (2018) 100 (2): i–v. https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_e_00742 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Asim I. Khwaja, Kunal Mangal; Review of Economics and Statistics over the Past 100 Years: A Counting Exercise. The Review of Economics and Statistics 2018; 100 (2): i–v. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_e_00742 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsThe Review of Economics and Statistics Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2018 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2018The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship mechanism, whereby bureaucrats sequentially choose desired locations in order of performance. We evaluate this using a two-year field experiment with 525 property tax inspectors in Pakistan. The mechanism increases annual tax revenue growth by 30–41 percent. Inspectors whom our model predicts face high equilibrium incentives under the scheme indeed increase performance more. Our results highlight the potential of periodic merit-based postings in enhancing bureaucratic performance.

We exploit an unexpected inflow of liquidity in an emerging market to study how capital is intermediated to firms. We find that backward-looking credit limit constraints imposed by banks make it difficult for firms to borrow, despite readily available bank liquidity, healthy aggregate demand, and a sharply falling cost of capital. The resulting aggregate failure to extend and retain capital in the economy suggests that agency costs that force banks to rely on sticky balance-sheet-based credit limits prevent emerging economies from effectively intermediating capital.

We study the impact of providing school report cards with test scores on subsequent test scores, prices, and enrollment in markets with multiple public and private providers. A randomly selected half of our sample villages (markets) received report cards. This increased test scores by 0.11 standard deviations, decreased private school fees by 17 percent, and increased primary enrollment by 4.5 percent. Heterogeneity in the treatment impact by initial school test scores is consistent with canonical models of asymmetric information. Information provision facilitates better comparisons across providers, and improves market efficiency and child welfare through higher test scores, higher enrollment, and lower fees.

We estimate the impact on pilgrims of performing the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. Our method compares successful and unsuccessful applicants in a lottery used by Pakistan to allocate Hajj visas. Pilgrim accounts stress that the Hajj leads to a feeling of unity with fellow Muslims, but outsiders have sometimes feared that this could be accompanied by antipathy toward non-Muslims. We find that participation in the Hajj increases observance of global Islamic practices, such as prayer and fasting, while decreasing participation in localized practices and beliefs, such as the use of amulets and dowry. It increases belief in equality and harmony among ethnic groups and Islamic sects and leads to more favorable attitudes toward women, including greater acceptance of female education and employment. Increased unity within the Islamic world is not accompanied by antipathy toward non-Muslims. Instead, Hajjis show increased belief in peace, and in equality and harmony among adherents of different religions. The evidence suggests that these changes are likely due to exposure to and interaction with Hajjis from around the world, rather than to a changed social role of pilgrims upon return.

Lack of trust in state institutions, often due to poor service provision, is a pervasive problem in many developing countries. If this increases reliance on non-state actors for crucial services, the resulting self-reinforcing cycle can further weaken the state. This paper examines whether such a cycle can be disrupted. We focus on dispute resolution in rural Punjab, Pakistan. We find that providing information about reduced delays in state courts leads to citizens reporting higher willingness to use state courts and to greater fund allocations to the state in two lab-in-the-field games designed to measure trust in state and non-state actors in a high-stakes setting. More interestingly, we find indirect effects on non-state actors. After receiving state positive information, respondents report lower likelihood of using non-state institutions and reduce funds allocated to them in field games. Furthermore, we find similar direct and indirect effects on a battery of questions concerning people's beliefs about these actors, including a decreased allegiance to the non-state actor. We rationalize these results with a model of motivated reasoning whereby reduced usage of non-state institutions makes people less likely to hold positive views about them. These results indicate that, despite substantial distrust of the state in Pakistan, credible new information can change beliefs and behavior. The feedback loop between state ineffectiveness and the legitimacy of non-state actors may be reversible.

We assess whether financing can help private schools, which now account for one-third of primary school enrollment in low- and middle-income countries. Our experiment allocated unconditional cash grants to either one (L) or all (H) private schools in a village. In both arms, enrollment and revenues increased, leading to above-market returns. However, test scores increased only in H schools, accompanied by higher fees, and a greater focus on teachers. We provide a model demonstrating that market forces can provide endogenous incentives to increase quality and increased financial saturation can be used to leverage competition, generating socially desirable outcomes.

We estimate the equilibrium effects of a public school grant program administered through school councils in Pakistani villages with multiple public and private schools and clearly defined catchment boundaries. The program was randomized at the village level, allowing us to estimate its causal impact on the market. Four years after the start of the program, test scores were 0.2 standard deviations higher in public schools. We find evidence of an education multiplier: test scores in private schools were also 0.2 standard deviations higher in treated markets. Consistent with standard models of product differentiation, the education multiplier is greater for those private schools that faced a greater threat to their market power. Accounting for private sector responses increases the program’s cost-effectiveness by 85% and affects how a policy maker would target spending. Given that markets with several public and private schools are now pervasive in low- and middle-income countries, prudent policy requires us to account for private sector responses to public policy, both in policies’ design and evaluation.