I demonstrate that ratings-based capital rules, including both the current Basel Accord and its proposed revision, can be reconciled with the general class of credit value-at-risk models. Each exposure's contribution to VaR is portfolio-invariant only if (a) dependence across exposures is driven by a single systematic risk factor, and (b) no exposure accounts for more than an arbitrarily small share of total portfolio exposure. Analysis of rates of convergence to asymptotic VaR leads to a simple and accurate portfolio-level add-on charge for undiversified idiosyncratic risk. There is no similarly simple way to address violation of the single factor assumption.

We survey the evidence bearing on measurement error in the CPI and provide our best estimate of the magnitude of CPI bias. We also identify a "weighting" bias in the CPI that has not been previously discussed in the literature. In total, we estimate that the CPI overstates the change in the cost of living by about 0.6 percentage point per year, with a confidence interval that ranges from 0.1 to 1.2 percentage points. Roughly half of this bias is accounted for by the CPI's inability to fully capture the welfare improvement from quality change and the introduction of new items. Our bias estimate is smaller than that found in several earlier studies, in part because the BLS has recently made a variety of improvements to its procedures; our study highlights several potential areas for further improvement.

This paper explores the effect of equity volatility on corporate bond yields. Panel data for the late 1990s show that idiosyncratic firm‐level volatility can explain as much cross‐sectional variation in yields as can credit ratings. This finding, together with the upward trend in idiosyncratic equity volatility documented by Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), helps to explain recent increases in corporate bond yields.

This study investigates the relationship between underpricing, ownership structure and post-listing liquidity of initial public offerings (IPOs). It is argued that higher underpricing induces both broader investor participation and creates a more diffuse ownership structure. These two factors are in turn positively associated with the level of post-listing trading, and therefore offer an explanation of how underpricing can influence liquidity. Using a sample of Australian IPOs, we provide evidence of statistically significant relationship between underpricing and various proxies for shareholding distribution and liquidity. This result remains robust after controlling for a number of potential underlying factors that may drive both underpricing and ownership allocation decisions. Overall, our analysis suggests that liquidity is a partial but important benefit of underpricing an IPO.

Using a comprehensive data set of Portuguese manufacturing firms, we show that the firm size distribution is significantly right-skewed, evolving over time toward a lognormal distribution. We also show that selection accounts for very little of this evolution. Instead, we propose a simple theory based on financing constraints. A calibrated version of our model does a good job at explaining the evolution of the firm size distribution.

This paper proposes a new simulation‐based approach for optimal portfolio allocation in realistic environments with complex dynamics for the state variables and large numbers of factors and assets. A first illustration involves a choice between equity and cash with nonlinear interest rate and market price of risk dynamics. Intertemporal hedging demands significantly increase the demand for stocks and exhibit low volatility. We then analyze settings where stock returns are also predicted by dividend yields and where investors have wealth‐dependent relative risk aversion. Large‐scale problems with many assets, including the Nasdaq, SP500, bonds, and cash, are also examined.

We examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. Our model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed “watchdogs” can implement institutionally preferred policies. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion. Our model also highlights the necessity of penalties on insiders when there is dissension among board members. However, penalties for dissent appeared to have little impact on the experimental outcomes.