We argue that conservatism improves investment efficiency. In particular, we predict that it resolves debt-equity conflicts, facilitating a firm׳s access to debt financing and limiting underinvestment. This permits the financing of prudent investments that otherwise might not be pursued. Our empirical results confirm these predictions. We find that more conservative firms invest more and issue more debt in settings prone to underinvestment and that these effects are more pronounced in firms characterized by greater information asymmetries. We also find that conservatism is associated with reduced overinvestment, even for opaque investments such as research and development.

We examine insider trading profitability and common identity between insiders and top executives. We argue that common gender and the resulting social connections influence access to private information, wherby insiders benefit from greater information-sharing with top executives of the same gender. Using a large sample of US firms between 1995 and 2016, we find higher (lower) insider trading profitability for female (male) insiders in the presence of a female CEO or CFO. We also find that, in isolation, other social and professional commonalities, such as age, ethnicity, having attended the same university or having worked at the same firm also increase insider profitability, albeit to a lesser extent. Our evidence suggests that some of these commonalities enhance the common gender effect when combined with it. We examine formal interactions and find that attending meetings and serving on committees with top executives of the same gender enables private information-sharing, consistent with gender acting as an informational channel. We also document greater clustering of insiders' trades around the trades made by common gender top executives. Our findings are consistent with flows of private information from CEOs and CFOs to less informed common gender insiders.

We investigate the role of prudential supervisors’ independence in affecting income smoothing behavior in European banks. Powerful national supervisors are predicted to influence the accounting practices of their supervised entities, shaping the properties of the accounting numbers they prepare. In particular, we study whether greater independence of powerful supervisors from the government and from the industry is associated with lower income smoothing. We use the mandatory adoption of a single set of accounting standards in Europe as a shock to the influence of prudential supervisors over national banks’ accounting practice. Our results confirm that political and industry independence of the supervisor are important determinants of income smoothing. This suggests that independence of prudential supervisors is a desirable governance characteristic, with positive impacts on financial transparency.

Recent research in accounting suggests female directors exert more stringent monitoring over the financial reporting process than their male counterparts. However, an emerging literature in finance and economics provides mixed findings and questions whether females in leadership roles significantly differ from their male counterparts. Building on this literature, we re-examine the link between the presence of female directors, gender biases, and financial statements quality. Using a large sample of UK firms we find that a larger percentage of women among independent directors is significantly associated with lower earnings management practices. However, we show that this relation disappears if we focus on firms that do not discriminate against women in the access to directorships. Finally, we provide evidence that gender biases are associated with lower earnings quality. We interpret our results as consistent with (1) prior evidence that males and females do not differ substantially when performing the same role in highly specialized positions, and with (2) discrimination being an important factor explaining the association between female directors and accounting quality.

We examine disasters caused by individual firms with severe environmental impacts. These disasters trigger industry-wide demand for corporate social responsibility (CSR). We analyze whether affected firms respond by adopting substantive or symbolic CSR measures. We find that firms increase overall CSR performance through improvements in diversity and human rights rather than decreasing environmental concerns. This suggests firms prioritize symbolic CSR to legitimize their operations rather than substantive measures to mitigate environmental harm. We also document diverging costs and welfare effects. On average, substantive CSR actions are costlier and cause lower margins but avoid divestments by ESG-oriented funds while improving long-term credit ratings. Some of these benefits of substantive actions also accrue through symbolic actions at a lower cost.

We examine how investment professionals assess the usefulness of financial accounting information depending on their information acquisition objectives and preparers' earnings management incentives. We conduct a survey experiment based on face-to-face interviews with investment professionals and document two main results. First, we find that, compared with investment professionals assigned a firm valuation objective, those assigned a managerial performance evaluation objective assess accounting information as significantly less useful. Second, we find no systematic evidence that preparers' earnings management incentives negatively affect investment professionals' assessments of accounting information usefulness. To elucidate this second finding, we conduct a large-scale follow-up online experiment. Our results continue to offer no support for the effect of earnings management incentives on investment professionals' assessments of accounting information usefulness, irrespective of preparers' corporate governance quality. Instead, we find that poor corporate governance, by itself, reduces the usefulness of accounting information to investment professionals.