External recruitment is often believed to be harmful in that it trades off the need for outside talents with the incentives of inside workers. This article shows that, even from an incentive viewpoint, external recruitment has its powerful function. Specifically, if promotion is based on relative performance, then negative activities (sabotages) are a valuable instrument for competition. This results in inefficiency of the firm. External recruitment, by reducing the marginal return of negative effort relative to that of productive effort, restores the incentives in productive activity. Even without sabotage concern, external recruitment can avoid shirking equilibrium or prevent workers’ collusion.

A simple general equilibrium production economy matches moments of the value premium and equity premium. Value firms have low productivity, but will eventually produce high cash flows. The present value of these temporally distant cash flows is especially sensitive to equity premium movements. The value premium is the reward for bearing this sensitivity. Capital adjustment costs are important. Without these costs, value firms would disinvest heavily, leading to high cash flows today, low cash-flow growth going forward, and little exposure to discount rate shocks. Empirical evidence verifies that value firms have higher cash-flow growth and supports other predictions.

We find that firms that provide limited liability and indemnification for their directors enjoy higher credit ratings and lower yield spreads. We argue that such provisions insulate corporate directors from the discipline from potential litigation, and allow them to pursue their own interests by adopting low-risk, self-serving operating strategies, which coincidentally redound to the benefit of corporate bondholders. Our evidence further suggests that the reduction in the cost of debt may offset the costs of directorial shirking and suboptimal corporate policies occasioned by this insulation, which may explain why stockholders have little incentive to rescind these legal protections.

This paper examines how climate risk transparency influences house prices and credit supply. I contend that inadequate property-level climate risk disclosures induce homebuyers to demand a risk aversion discount on house prices, creating a potential market for lemons. Employing a stacked difference-in-differences design, I find that flood risk disclosure laws, by enhancing dwelling-specific flood risk transparency, raise house prices on average by 7.6%. Results strengthen in states with stricter disclosure requirements. Exploiting within-state heterogeneity and controlling for housing market trends, I find that the effects persist and intensify in regions with higher aggregate exposure to flood risk, greater information frictions, and more attention to climate risks. Conversely, the effectiveness of flood risk disclosure laws attenuates in regions where households are less concerned about climate change. Additionally, less sophisticated lenders extend credit to financially constrained borrowers in response to the laws but experience lower profitability.

We investigate the effect of information asymmetry on corporate tax avoidance. Using a difference-in-differences matching estimator to assess the effects of changes in analyst coverage caused by broker closures and mergers, we find that firms avoid tax more aggressively after a reduction in analyst coverage. We further find that this effect is mainly driven by firms with higher existing tax-planning capacity (e.g., tax-haven presence), smaller initial analyst coverage, and a smaller number of peer firms. Moreover, the effect is more pronounced in industries where reputation matters more and in firms subject to less monitoring from tax authorities.

Languages differ widely in the ways they encode time. I test the hypothesis that the languages that grammatically associate the future and the present, foster future-oriented behavior. This prediction arises naturally when well-documented effects of language structure are merged with models of intertemporal choice. Empirically, I find that speakers of such languages: save more, retire with more wealth, smoke less, practice safer sex, and are less obese. This holds both across countries and within countries when comparing demographically similar native households. The evidence does not support the most obvious forms of common causation. I discuss implications for theories of intertemporal choice.

In the unconditional moment restriction model of Hansen (), specification tests and more efficient estimators are both available whenever the number of moment restrictions exceeds the number of parameters of interest. We show that a similar relationship between potential refutability of a model and existence of more efficient estimators is present in much broader settings. Specifically, a condition we name local overidentification is shown to be equivalent to both the existence of specification tests with nontrivial local power and the existence of more efficient estimators of some “smooth” parameters in general semi/nonparametric models. Under our notion of local overidentification, various locally nontrivial specification tests such as Hausman tests, incremental Sargan tests (or optimally weighted quasi likelihood ratio tests) naturally extend to general semi/nonparametric settings. We further obtain simple characterizations of local overidentification for general models of nonparametric conditional moment restrictions with possibly different conditioning sets. The results are applied to determining when semi/nonparametric models with endogeneity are locally testable, and when nonparametric plug‐in and semiparametric two‐step GMM estimators are semiparametrically efficient. Examples of empirically relevant semi/nonparametric structural models are presented.

There is often evidence of confusion between two forms of the constant percentage learning curve model: the cumulative average and the individual unit forms. Failure to distinguish between the two models can lead to their misuse and to potentially serious errors of estimation. A precise statement of the difference between the two clarifies the errors of misspecification. This note provides an analytical comparsion of the two models and addresses empirical estimation issues. Résumé. On a souvent la preuve de la confusion entre deux formules de modèle de la courbe d'apprentissage à pourcentage constant: celle de la moyenne cumulative et celle de l'unité individuelle. Le fait de ne pas distinguer les deux modèles peut conduire à une mauvaise utilisation et éventuellement à de sérieuses erreurs d'estimation. Un examen précis de la différence entre les deux peut clarifier les erreurs de spécification. Cet article présente une comparaison analytique des deux modèles et traite des questions d'estimation empirique.