We show that political geography has a pervasive effect on the cross-section of stock returns. We collect election results over a 40-year period and use a political alignment index (PAI) of each state's leading politicians with the ruling (presidential) party to proxy for local firms’ proximity to political power. Firms whose headquarters are located in high PAI states outperform those located in low PAI states, both in terms of raw returns, and on a risk-adjusted basis. Overall, although we cannot rule out indirect political connectedness advantages as an explanation of the PAI effect, our results are consistent with the notion that proximity to political power has stock return implications because it reflects firms’ exposure to policy risk.

When do multinational corporations (MNCs) derive the most from internalizing the transfer of proprietary technological knowhow? We revisit this question, which lies at the core of theories on multinationality and performance, from the perspective of corporate strategy involving a mix of green versus nongreen innovation effort and foreign operations focusing on countries with high versus low environmental standards. We find that high exposure to foreign markets with more stringent environmental regulations stimulates MNCs' green patent applications. Predictably, the pursuit of green innovation is positively associated with firm value in the long run. This long-run advantage produces higher economic rents when MNCs' home countries rely on more clean energy for power generation, have a more developed economy and have a more effective government. We further show that this long-run value enhancement effect is more pronounced in Mining & Oil and energy sectors (i.e., more polluting) than sales and service sectors (i.e., less polluting). In addition, MNCs' environmental competitive advantage obtained through green innovation activities is coupled with exposure to MNCs' host countries with high long-term and femininity orientations. Overall, our study highlights that green technology development is a main source of value creation for multinationals.

We investigate whether and how multinationality affects the opaqueness of the firm. We use multiple alternative measurements of multinationality and opaqueness. Spanning nearly three decades for a large sample of US non-financial firms, we find a statistically and economically significant, positive relationship between multinationality and opaqueness. We find that this positive relationship hinges on whether or not the degree of foreign involvement is compatible with the structure of the firm's foreign operations network. Our results imply that multinationality's impact on opaqueness is alleviated when there is harmony between the size of foreign involvement and the extent of the MNC network's geographic dispersion. Previous literature has implicitly assumed a simple, positive relationship. This is the first study to explicitly address the question in a comprehensive manner.

Using a sample of state pension funds’ equity holdings, we find evidence of not only local bias, but also bias towards politically-connected stocks. Political bias is detrimental to fund performance. State pension funds have longer holding durations of politically-connected local firms and display disposition behavior in these positions. Political bias is positively related to the percentage of politically-affiliated trustees on the board and Congressional connections. The more politically-affiliated trustees on the board, the more the fund shifts toward risky asset allocations. Overall, our results imply that political bias is likely costly to taxpayers and pension beneficiaries.

We investigate the market efficiency implications of firm-specific return variation measured by absolute idiosyncratic volatility. We find that the absolute idiosyncratic volatility (the variance of the residual from an asset-pricing model) displays a positive and robust relationship to mispricing, which reflects an increasing role of noise traders. Previous literature has produced similar – or opposing – results. We deepen our understanding of the previous conflicting results by showing that (1) market volatility by itself is associated with mispricing, (2) absolute idiosyncratic volatility is associated with mispricing even when controlling for market volatility, (3) the strength of the association between absolute idiosyncratic volatility and mispricing depends on the level of market volatility, and (4) absolute and relative measures of idiosyncratic volatility have opposing associations with mispricing. Our findings contribute to the existing literature by reconciling the mixed results for the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and mispricing displayed in the previous literature.

In line with the view that politics can complicate M&A deals, we find that firms contributing to political action committees or involved in lobbying are less likely to be acquired and their takeover process is lengthier. As we empirically show, this can be explained by the fact that politicians have motives to interfere with the takeover process due to career concerns, in terms of getting re-elected and raising funds for future campaigns. We also document that politically connected target firms command higher takeover premiums from bidders lacking political expertise, consistent with the notion that the market regards target firms' connections, not easily replicable by bidders, as means to enhance growth opportunities of the merged firm.

Previous literature finds a positive association between short-term changes in institutional holdings (especially those of local institutions) and subsequent short-term stock performance. We contribute by investigating the importance of geographical proximity under policy uncertainty. We show that the short-term informational advantage of local institutions only thrives in areas that are either politically closely aligned with the president or where the state government (governorship and legislature) is under the control of one party. Our findings are important in understanding the avenues through which geographical proximity may provide the basis for exploitable informational advantages.

Reexamining CEO personality traits from a real options theory perspective, we suggest that the firm's strategic flexibility can be worsened by CEO conscientiousness and neuroticism. We use a measure of strategic flexibility as the firm's ability to take advantage of heightened volatility, which then results in superior stock returns. Our results suggest that strategic adaptability is impeded by rigid planning, resistance to change (conscientiousness) and lack of emotional stability (neuroticism). For firms that experience a decrease in volatility, the opposite holds. In line with trait activation theory, our results imply that the effect of specific CEO personality traits on firm dynamics and performance is contingent and context-specific. Our findings are economically significant and have important implications concerning CEO selection and management.