We compare the investment of standalone firms across regions after a positive shock to the investment opportunities generated by a large-scale highway development project. We show that the standalones’ investment sensitivity is lower in regions with a higher density of business groups in the local area. We investigate mechanisms driving our results and find support for a financing mechanism whereby banks allocate capital preferentially to group-affiliated firms in responding to the increase in credit demand. Overall, our study documents that business groups have spillover effects on standalone firms.

Around the world, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Outside the U.S. and the U.K., pyramidal control structures, cross shareholding and super voting rights are common. Using these devices, a family can control corporations without making a commensurate capital investment. In many countries, such families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries'' economies. Three points emerge. First, at the firm level, these ownership structures vest dominant control rights with families who often have little real capital invested n creating agency and entrenchment problem simultaneously. In addition, controlling shareholders can divert corporate resources for private benefits using transactions within the pyramidal group. The result is a poor utilization of resources. At the economy level, extensive control of corporate assets by a few families distorts capital allocation and reduces the rate of innovation. The result is an economy-wide misallocation of resources, and slower economic growth.

We study the evolution of Korean chaebols (business groups) using ownership data. Chaebols grow vertically (as pyramids) when the controlling family uses well-established group firms (“central firms”) to acquire firms with low pledgeable income and high acquisition premiums. Chaebols grow horizontally (through direct ownership) when the family acquires firms with high pledgeable income and low acquisition premiums. Central firms trade at a relative discount, due to shareholders’ anticipation of value-destroying acquisitions. Our evidence is consistent with the selection of firms into different positions in the chaebol and ascribes the underperformance of pyramidal firms to a selection effect rather than tunneling.

We examine the effect of pay transparency on the gender pay gap and firm outcomes. Using a 2006 legislation change in Denmark that requires firms to provide gender‐disaggregated wage statistics, detailed employee‐employer administrative data, and difference‐in‐differences and difference‐in‐discontinuities designs, we find that the law reduces the gender pay gap, primarily by slowing wage growth for male employees. The gender pay gap declines by 2 percentage points, or 13% relative to the prelegislation mean. Despite the reduction of the overall wage bill, the wage transparency mandate does not affect firm profitability, likely because of the offsetting effect of reduced firm productivity.

We show cash windfalls affect the real economy by spurring entrepreneurship. We identify these effects using the Spanish Christmas Lottery, which provides a unique setting as prizes are geographically concentrated and distributed among thousands of households. We find higher start-up entry, job creation, and self-employment in winning regions. Consistent with a financial constraints channel, results are strongest in sectors relying on external finance and regions with limited credit access. Newly created firms are larger, more profitable, and survive longer. For existing firms, however, growth and profitability do not respond to lottery awards, but wages increase due to tighter labor markets.