We provide maximum likelihood estimators of term structures of conditional probabilities of corporate default, incorporating the dynamics of firm-specific and macroeconomic covariates. For US Industrial firms, based on over 390,000 firm-months of data spanning 1980 to 2004, the term structure of conditional future default probabilities depends on a firm's distance to default (a volatility-adjusted measure of leverage), on the firm's trailing stock return, on trailing S&P 500 returns, and on US interest rates. The out-of-sample predictive performance of the model is an improvement over that of other available models.

We provide the impact on asset prices of search-and-bargaining frictions in over-the-counter markets. Under certain conditions, illiquidity discounts are higher when counterparties are harder to find, when sellers have less bargaining power, when the fraction of qualified owners is smaller, or when risk aversion, volatility, or hedging demand is larger. Supply shocks cause prices to jump, and then “recover” over time, with a time signature that is exaggerated by search frictions: The price jump is larger and the recovery is slower in less liquid markets. We discuss a variety of empirical implications.

Abstract We measure credit risk premia—prices for bearing corporate default risk in excess of expected default losses—using Markit CDS and Moody’s Analytics EDF data. We find dramatic variation over time in credit risk premia, with peaks in 2002, during the global financial crisis of 2008–09, and in the second half of 2011. Even after normalizing these premia by expected default losses, median credit risk premia fluctuate over time by more than a factor of 10. Credit risk premia comove with macroeconomic indicators, even after controlling for variation in expected default losses, with higher premia per unit of expected loss during times of market-wide distress. Countercyclical variation of premia-to-expected-loss ratios is more pronounced for investment-grade issuers than for high-yield issuers.

This chapter introduces the institutional setting of over-the-counter (OTC) markets and raises some of the key conceptual issues associated with market opaqueness. An OTC market does not use a centralized trading mechanism, such as an auction, specialist, or limit-order book, to aggregate bids and offers and to allocate trades. Instead, buyers and sellers negotiate terms privately, often in ignorance of the prices currently available from other potential counterparties and with limited knowledge of trades recently negotiated elsewhere in the market. OTC markets are thus said to be relatively opaque; investors are somewhat in the dark about the most attractive available terms and about whom to contact for attractive terms. Prices and allocations in OTC markets are, to varying extents, influenced by opaqueness and by the role of intermediating brokers and dealers.

We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of Information sharing in a large population Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern Individuals choose the effort with which they search for others from whom they can gather additional information. When two agents meet, they share their information The Information gathered is further shared at subsequent meetings, and so on. Equilibria exist in which agents search maximally until they acquire sufficient information precision and then search minimally A tax whose proceeds are used to Subsidize the costs of search improves information sharing and can, in some cases, increase welfare on the other hand, endowing agents with public signals reduces Information sharing and can, in some cases, decrease welfare

We construct a model for pricing sovereign debt that accounts for the risks of both default and restructuring, and allows for compensation for illiquidity. Using a new and relatively efficient method, we estimate the model using Russian dollar‐denominated bonds. We consider the determinants of the Russian yield spread, the yield differential across different Russian bonds, and the implications for market integration, relative liquidity, relative expected recovery rates, and implied expectations of different default scenarios.

Abstract We show that the likelihood of a liquidity crunch in wholesale U.S. dollar funding markets depends on levels of reserve balances at the financial institutions that are the most active intermediaries of these markets. Heightened risk of an imminent liquidity crunch is signaled by significant delays in intraday payments to these large financial institutions over the prior two weeks. Our study contributes to the broader dialogue surrounding the Federal Reserve’s ongoing quantitative tightening.

ABSTRACT We test the doubly stochastic assumption under which firms' default times are correlated only as implied by the correlation of factors determining their default intensities. Using data on U.S. corporations from 1979 to 2004, this assumption is violated in the presence of contagion or “frailty” (unobservable explanatory variables that are correlated across firms). Our tests do not depend on the time‐series properties of default intensities. The data do not support the joint hypothesis of well‐specified default intensities and the doubly stochastic assumption. We find some evidence of default clustering exceeding that implied by the doubly stochastic model with the given intensities.

ABSTRACT Corporate credit lines are drawn more heavily when funding markets are stressed. This elevates expected bank funding costs. We show that credit supply is dampened by the associated debt‐overhang cost to bank shareholders. Until 2022, this impact was reduced by linking the interest paid on lines to a credit‐sensitive reference rate like the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR). We show that transition to risk‐free reference rates may exacerbate this friction. The adverse impact on credit supply is offset if drawdowns are expected to be deposited at the same bank, which happened at some of the largest banks during the global financial crisis and COVID recession.