We find that in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis banks replenished only 12% of crisis-related losses through SEOs in 2009 and 2010. However, SEOs are disproportionately conducted by Capital Purchase Program (CPP) recipients, and this is not explained by CPP recipients’ economic and regulatory capital needs. SEOs in 2009 and 2010 by CPP recipients alone account for 27% by number, and 50% by dollar amount, of all SEOs by U.S. banks between 1994 and 2010, indicating the CPP is an influential event in the history of U.S. bank SEOs during this period. Controlling for economic and regulatory capital determinants of SEOs, CPP recipients were more likely than non-recipients to have a SEO within four quarters subsequent to CPP receipt. SEO proceeds were used to repay CPP receipts without jeopardizing loan growth. Banks that received CPP funds prior to the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), and banks with greater reliance on non-traditional banking activities, were more likely to have a SEO expeditiously and repay CPP funds early. Collectively, the results provide new evidence on the realized consequences of the CPP for bank SEOs. Tests suggest the CPP's indirect costs of restrictions on corporate policies and actions as the most likely explanation for the results.

This study investigates the efficacy of a fundamental analysis-based approach to screen U.S. bank stocks. We construct an index (BSCORE) based on fourteen bank–specific valuation signals. We document a positive association between BSCORE and future profitability changes, as well as current and one-year-ahead stock returns, implying that BSCORE captures forward looking information that the markets are yet to impound. A hedge strategy based on BSCORE yields positive hedge returns for all but two years during our 1994–2014 sample period. Results are robust to partitions of size, analyst following, and exchange listing, and persist after adjusting for risk factors. We further document a positive relation between BSCORE and future analyst forecast surprises as well as earnings announcement period returns, and a negative relation between BSCORE and future performance-based delistings. Overall, our results show that a fundamental analysis-based approach can provide useful insights for analyzing banks.

Using an extensive database of 356,463 sell‐side equity analysts' reports from 2002 to 2009, this study is one of the first to analyze the readability of analysts' reports. We first examine the determinants of variations in analyst report readability. Using several proxies for ability, we show that reports are more readable when issued by analysts with higher ability. Second, we test the relation between analysts' report readability and stock trading volume reactions. We find that trading volume reactions increase with the readability of analysts' text, consistent with theoretical models that predict that more precise information (and hence more informative signals) results in investors' initiating trades. These results support the view that the readability of analysts' reports is important to analysts and capital market participants.

A few highly successful firms (“superstar firms”) have captured large market shares and earned massive profits in recent decades. We examine whether superstar firms are associated with a greater likelihood of financial distress for firms exposed to them in product markets. Building on recent research, we identify superstars as firms with the highest markups in the industry and whose industry markup share increases over time. We then measure, with product similarity scores, a firm’s overall product market exposure to superstars. We document that firms with greater exposure are more likely to file for bankruptcy. We examine why superstar exposure is associated with bankruptcy and show that firms with the greater superstar exposure exhibit weaker financial performance and greater riskiness. Furthermore, we show that the association between superstar exposure and the likelihood of bankruptcy strengthens when superstars have greater market power.

Non-arm’s-length transactions between a firm and its related parties, or related-party transactions (RPTs), are widely used in emerging economies. We examine the effect of creditor rights on the usage of financing RPTs using the enactment of India’s Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) of 2016 as a shock to creditor rights. We show that stronger creditor rights make arm’s-length external financing more attractive relative to RPT financing. In particular, we find that firms that are ex ante more likely to be affected by IBC (i.e., those with low asset tangibility) reduce their dependence on financing-related RPTs, in particular, RPT loan inflows. This effect is strengthened for firms with greater financial constraints and higher growth opportunities. Our findings suggest that creditor rights influence financing choices and contribute to our understanding of how insolvency reforms affect financing and RPTs in emerging markets.

Using a new database that contains accounting data for a large sample of U.S. private firms, we provide an investigation of financial reporting quality (FRQ) of U.S. private versus public firms. We find that in general public firms have higher accrual quality and are more conservative. The results are consistent with public firms' reporting reflecting greater demand for financial information. However, these reporting qualities of public firms are mitigated or eliminated in settings where public firms are more likely to manage earnings or face reduced demand for their financial information. Our study contributes not only to the current debate on private versus public financial accounting, but also to the broader literature attempting to understand the determinants of FRQ.

Corporate spinoffs are important events that are accompanied by valuation and credit‐risk implications for the parent firm. Among other benefits, spinoffs can improve corporate focus and enhance valuation transparency. In the debt‐contracting context, however, spinoffs can also be associated with negative outcomes for the divesting firms. We examine whether banks, due to their timely access to material private information, are able to ascertain the likelihood and the implications of impending spinoffs for the parent firm before a formal public announcement of the spinoff. Our empirical analyses indicate that, in the 365‐day pre‐spinoff announcement period, banks charge incrementally higher (lower) spreads to borrowers with increased (decreased) post‐spinoff riskiness relative to nondivesting firms. This suggests that, while lenders recognize the value‐ and transparency‐enhancing effects of spinoffs, they are also able to foresee potentially negative implications of these divestitures. Cross‐sectional analyses indicate that banks charge incrementally lower loan spreads if spinoffs result in high‐risk borrowers having either higher reporting quality or lower reporting or operational complexity. These results suggest that the post‐spinoff increase in riskiness is compensated by the divestiture benefits typically associated with spinoffs. Similarly, high‐risk borrowers incur larger spreads if they do not undergo “focus‐increasing” spinoffs. Overall, our findings suggest that banks are able to ex ante determine the implications of important corporate events such as spinoffs.

We investigate how the tone of sell-side debt analysts' discussions about debt-equity conflict events affects the informativeness of debt analysts' reports in debt markets. Conflict events such as mergers and acquisitions, debt issuance, share repurchases, or dividend payments potentially generate asset substitution or wealth expropriation by equity holders. We document that debt analysts routinely discuss these conflict events in their reports. More importantly, discussions about conflict events that we code as negative are associated with increases in credit spreads and bond trading volume. Consistent with the informational value of debt analysts' discussions in secondary debt markets, we find that negatively coded conflict discussions predict higher bond offering yields in the primary bond market. In additional analyses, we measure the tone of debt analysts' discussions based on their disagreement with the tone of equity analysts' discussions and find that the informativeness of debt analysts' reports is higher when our coding indicates that conflict events are viewed negatively by debt analysts but positively by equity analysts.