Abstract We show that newly hired workers earn higher wages in response to higher firm leverage. Consistent with compensating differential models, these higher wages appear to reflect compensation for the risk of earnings losses in the event of financial distress. For tenured workers, increases in leverage are not associated with higher wages. Our findings suggest that the wage costs of debt and optimal capital structure for a firm depend on expected employee turnover, as well as on the firm’s future growth and hiring plans. Variation in local labor market conditions also significantly affects the relationship between firm leverage and employee pay. (JEL G32, G33, J21, J31, J61) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract Using contingent-claims valuation, we introduce novel hedge ratios for credit exposures using put options. Option hedge ratios are generally in line with the empirical sensitivities of credit spread changes to put option returns and, relative to stock hedge ratios, produce further reductions in volatility for a portfolio of North American firms. We show that option hedge ratios capture option-specific credit exposure related to the VIX index and the default spread, which is unaccounted for by Merton’s (1974) equity hedge ratios alone. Combining stocks and put options for credit risk hedging can be done effectively using the volatility smirk. (JEL E43, E44, G10)

This article is a review of a 531 page book that in turn is a review and evaluation of the 2319 page Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed by Congress on July 16, 2010. The overriding theme of the book is to pose two approaches to attaining financial stability in the future. One approach is to establish a council of wise men and women supported by an army of highly skilled professional financial economists to formulate and implement regulations designed to prevent future financial crises that wreak havoc on the real economy and require financial support from taxpayers. This is the approach of the Dodd–Frank Act. The second approach proposed by the authors of this book is to design a taxing system that taxes systemically important financial institutions on the basis of their contribution to systemic risk. Borrowing ideas from the literature on the taxation of negative externalities their view is that financial institutions that create crises should pay for the clean-up. They also argue that requiring the financial polluters to pay for the creation of systemic risk will reduce the supply of systemic risk. The reader is invited to decide which approach is best.

Abstract. We formalize the effects of an earnings disclosure on security prices under an assumption of limited liability. We derive various nonlinear relations between equity prices and earnings under a variety of capital structure assumptions and. if possible, we tie the relations attained to results from the existing empirical literature. We also characterize how debt prices respond to earnings when holders of debt have limited liability. Finally, we analyze how changes in the degree of leverage and conversion features of debt affect the relation between price and earnings.

There are numerous aspects concerning financial regulation which the current financial turmoil has high-lighted. These include: (1) the form of deposit insurance; (2) bank solvency regimes, ‘prompt corrective action’; (3) Central Banks’ money market operations; (4) commercial bank liquidity risk management; (5) procyclicality of CARs (and mark-to-market); lack of counter-cyclical instruments; (5) boundaries of regulation, conduits, SIVs and reputational risk; (6) crisis management: (a) within countries, e.g. UK Tripartite Committee; or (b) cross-border, how to allocate the burden of cross-border defaults? This paper describes how the crisis exposed regulatory failings, drawing largely on UK experience, and suggests remedies.

The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, I attempt a taxonomy of the extant accounting literature on disclosure: that is, a categorization of the various models of disclosure in the literature into well-integrated topics. With regard to the taxonomy, I suggest three broad categories of disclosure research in accounting. The first category, which I dub “association-based disclosure”, is work that studies the effect of exogenous disclosure on the cumulative change or disruption in investors’ individual actions, primarily through the behavior of asset equilibrium prices and trading volume. The second category, which I dub “discretionary-based disclosure”, is work that examines how managers and/or firms exercise discretion with regard to the disclosure of information about which they may have knowledge. The third category, which I dub “efficiency-based disclosure”, is work that discusses which disclosure arrangements are preferred in the absence of prior knowledge of the information, that is, preferred unconditionally. Then, in the final section of the paper, I recommend information asymmetry reduction as one potential starting point for a comprehensive theory of disclosure. That is, I recommend information asymmetry reduction as a vehicle to integrate the efficiency of disclosure choice, the incentives to disclose, and the endogeneity of the capital market process as it involves the interactions among individual and diverse investors.

In this discussion I comment on the contribution of two papers toward our understanding of how disclosure affects the cost of capital. Specifically, in the context of these papers, I comment on whether disclosure ameliorates or exacerbates the cost of capital that arises from the existence of information asymmetries in capital markets. This is a notion that should be of fundamental interest in that it provides an economic basis for evaluating the costs and benefits of accounting information.

This paper addresses the First Theorem of Welfare Economics in a moral hazard environment. An entrepreneur sells equity in a firm which he supplies with an unobservable, costly input. How much equity he retains determines his incentives and is observed by investors. The investors have rational expectaions which cause the equity price to increase in the amount of equity the entrepreneur retains. This gives the entrepreneur an incentive to retain equity and hence supply input. The entrepreneur may also be bound by an explicit incentive contract. In this framework, not all competitive equilibria are efficient, as defined relative to the moral hazard constraint. However, equilibria can be inefficient only if the entrepreneur's optimal input is nonunique or exhibits positive income effects.

Abstract We use party-identifying language—like “liberal media” and “MAGA”—to identify Republican users on the investor social platform StockTwits. Using a difference-in-difference design, we find that partisan Republicans remain relatively unfazed in their beliefs about equities during the COVID-19 pandemic, while other users become considerably more pessimistic. In cross-sectional tests, we find Republicans become relatively more optimistic about stocks that suffered the most during the COVID-19 crisis, but more pessimistic about Chinese stocks. Finally, stocks with the greatest partisan disagreement on StockTwits have significantly more trading in the broader market, explaining 28% of the increase in stock turnover during the pandemic. Authors have furnished data and an Internet Appendix, which are available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract In March 2020, banks faced the largest increase in liquidity demands ever observed. Firms drew funds on a massive scale from preexisting credit lines in anticipation of cash flow and financial disruptions stemming from the advent of the COVID-19 crisis. The increase in liquidity demands was concentrated at the largest banks, who serve the largest firms. Precrisis financial condition did not constrain large banks’ liquidity supply. Coincident inflows of funds from both the Federal Reserve’s liquidity injection programs and depositors, along with strong preshock bank capital, explain why banks were able to accommodate these liquidity demands. (JEL G21, G28) Received June 7, 2020; editorial decision June 23, 2020 by Editor Isil Erel.