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Home Country Investor Protection, Ownership Structure and Cross‐Listed Firms' Compliance with SOX‐Mandated Internal Control Deficiency Disclosures

Contemporary Accounting Research 2013 30(4), 1490-1523 open access
We examine whether home country investor protection and ownership structure affect cross‐listed firms' compliance with SOX ‐mandated internal control deficiency ( ICD ) disclosures. We develop a proxy for the likelihood of cross‐listed firms' ICD misreporting during the Section 302 reporting regime. For cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, we have three main findings. First, firms whose managers control their firms and have voting rights in excess of cash flow rights are more likely to misreport ICD than other firms during the Section 302 reporting regime. Second, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and voluntary deregistration from the SEC prior to the Section 404 effective date. Third, for firms that chose not to deregister, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and the reporting of previously undisclosed ICD s during the Section 404 reporting regime. We do not find similar evidence for cross‐listed firms domiciled in strong investor protection countries. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that, for cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, managers who have the ability and incentive to expropriate outside minority shareholders are reluctant to disclose ICD s in order to protect their private control benefits. The results of our study should be of interest to regulators who wish to identify noncompliant firms for closer supervision, investors who wish to identify ex ante red flags for poor financial disclosure quality, and researchers who wish to understand the economic forces governing cross‐listed firms' financial disclosure behavior.

The use of cash flows metrics in CEO compensation and the design of loan contracts

Contemporary Accounting Research 2024 41(4), 2384-2416 open access
This study examines whether using cash‐flow‐based performance metrics (CFM) in CEO compensation contracts affects the design of loan contracts. Cash‐flow‐based performance evaluation explicitly motivates the CEO to improve the firm's cash flows, which may enhance debt repayment ability and reduce credit risk. We thus hypothesize that lenders, anticipating this incentive effect, offer lower loan spreads and reduce cash‐flow‐based performance covenants when firms use CFM in CEO compensation contracts. Consistent with our expectation, the use of CFM is associated with lower loan spreads and less use of cash‐flow‐based performance covenants. These findings remain robust after we account for endogeneity. Furthermore, these results are more pronounced in firms with higher credit risk or risk of cash flow shortfalls, suggesting that lenders consider internally generated cash flows more valuable when borrowers face higher external financing costs or have greater liquidity concerns. Additionally, we find that using CFM is associated with improved cash flow performance and enhanced creditworthiness, which supports the notion that CFM is an effective incentive mechanism. Overall, our evidence suggests that lenders consider the incentive effect of cash‐flow‐based performance evaluation in the debt contracting process.