A two-stage stock-financed merger occurs when an acquiring firm first issues shares, and then engages in a cash acquisition shortly afterward. Such deals allow us to test two important hypotheses derived from decoupling: by clienteles via segmentation and by time. The acquirer's value is maximized by selling shares to investors preferring to hold them, and use the raised cash to pay the target shareholders (the decoupling by clienteles hypothesis). Two-stage deals also provide an option to the acquirers by allowing them to decouple their own shares from the correlated target's shares by issuing at an earlier date and wait for good acquisition opportunities (the time decoupling hypothesis). We find empirical evidence in support of both hypotheses.

We examine the impact of familiarity with business segments on CEOs' divestment decisions. We find CEOs are less likely to divest assets from familiar than from non-familiar segments. We attribute this effect to CEOs' comparative information advantage with respect to familiar segments. Consistent with this information advantage, we document that the familiarity effect is particularly strong in R&D intensive industries. We further find the familiarity effect to be most pronounced for longer-tenured CEOs who have built up sufficient political power over the course of several years in office to enable implementation of their preferred divestment choices. We also document the value effects of divestments and show that familiarity affects returns on divestment announcements.

A country's cumulative experience with statehood influences its ability to consolidate power and create a capable bureaucracy. Longer statehood experience gives countries more time to adapt their laws to local needs, provided the legal system is adaptable. We find that, relative to British common law countries with the most flexible laws, German and Scandinavian civil law countries initially exhibit lower financial development. However, as their history of statehood grows longer, financial development improves in countries with adaptable laws such as the German and Scandinavian civil law countries. This is not the case in French civil law countries with more rigid legal systems. Our results mainly show no or at most a weakly negative effect of French civil law legal origin on financial development. We also explore how changes in stock market development over time, financial integration, and financial crises are impacted by statehood experience, legal origins and their interaction.

It is well established in the literature that financial development (FD) is conducive to growth, and yet the channels through which FD affects growth are not well understood. Using a unique new panel data set for 21 OECD countries over the past 140 years, this paper examines the extent to which FD transmits to growth through ideas production, savings, fixed investment, and schooling. Unionization and agricultural share are used as instruments for FD. The empirical results show that FD influences growth through all four channels. In particular, ideas production is found to be the most important channel through which FD affects growth.