This paper examines underwriters' pricing errors and the information content of first‐day trading activity in IPOs. We show that first‐day winners continue to be winners over the first year, and first‐day dogs continue to be relative dogs. Exceptions are “extra‐hot” IPOs, which provide the worst future performance. We also demonstrate that large, supposedly informed, traders “flip” IPOs that perform the worst in the future. IPOs with low flipping generate abnormal returns of 1.5 percentage points per month over the first six months beginning on the third day. We show that flipping is predictable and conclude that underwriters' pricing errors are intentional.

There are significant differences among sell-side analysts in how frequently they revise recommendations. We show that much of this variation is an analyst-individual trait. Analysts who change recommendations more slowly make recommendations that are more influential and generate better portfolio returns. Slower-revising analysts tend to change recommendations following corporate news that are harder to interpret by nonstock experts, and our evidence suggests that their investment value derives from their ability to better interpret hard-to-assess information. On average, analysts change recommendations less frequently as their career progresses; however, recommendation speed-style is the dominant predictor of their recommendation value.