We investigate the extent to which income measurement by major early 20th‐century U.S. railroads shows evidence of lower income smoothness and increased conservatism following new fixed asset accounting rules issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1907 and 1908 and concurrent rate regulation regime shifts. Accounting rules promulgated by the ICC after the Hepburn Act of 1906 are the first accounting rules in U.S. history in which regulators could enforce such rules under federal law to increase compliance. Our samplewide results are more consistent with increased conservatism than with income smoothing. Additional tests indicate these effects are more pronounced for firms subject to more intense rate regulation by the ICC, which suggests that the tie‐in between accounting regulation and product/service market regulation influences how managers respond to new accounting rules.

This paper presents a theory to explain the economic value of tranching and provides empirical evidence to support the theoretical implications. I show that riskier firms are more likely to take loans with multiple tranches. Therefore, the average credit spread on a syndicated loan with multiple tranches is higher than that on a non-tranched loan. However, after accounting for the risk characteristics of a tranched loan, I show that borrowings that are a part of tranched loans have lower credit spreads than otherwise identical non-tranched loans. I also show that the benefits of tranching accrue primarily to riskier borrowers.

Does AI make firms vulnerable or resilient to cyberrisk? We develop a firm-year measure of AI intensity for U.S. listed firms using patents and 10-K business descriptions. A 1-standard-deviation increase in cyberrisk reduces patenting by 25%–30% for non-AI firms, with larger declines in data-intensive technologies. Frontier AI firms are much less affected, and their valuations rise when cyberrisk is high. This resilience does not extend to firms that adopt external AI tools without internal AI innovation. The evidence fits two channels: cyberrisk raises the cost of data-intensive innovation, and internal AI development builds organizational capacity to sustain innovation under cyberrisk.

This study shows that U.S. individual investors hold under-diversified portfolios, where the level of under-diversification is greater among younger, low-income, less-educated, and less-sophisticated investors. The level of under-diversification is also correlated with investment choices that are consistent with over-confidence, trend-following behavior, and local bias. Furthermore, investors who over-weight stocks with higher volatility and higher skewness are less diversified. In contrast, there is little evidence that portfolio size or transaction costs constrains diversification. Under-diversification is costly to most investors, but a small subset of investors under-diversify because of superior information.

We hypothesize that vanity amplifies realization utility in teams; admitting mistakes is particularly painful when mistakes have to be admitted to self and colleagues. Consistent with the Vanity hypothesis, U.S. stock funds run by teams hold on to losers when losers were initiated by a subset of the team (to avoid admitting a mistake to their non-initiating colleagues), when initiators of loser positions are more experienced (to avoid losing authority by admitting mistakes to junior colleagues), and when all colleagues agree that a position is a loser. Vanity is costly – losers held underperform by a risk-adjusted 1% annually.

This paper proposes that individuals with higher intolerance of uncertainty are more prone to misreporting their performance in internal reporting settings when there is high performance evaluation uncertainty. In contrast, under low performance evaluation uncertainty, intolerance of uncertainty does not affect performance misreporting. We test this prediction across six studies. Studies 1–4 operationalize performance evaluation uncertainty through supervisor's word-deed inconsistency and examine the effect in real-world (Studies 1–2) and controlled experimental settings (Studies 3–4). To assess generalizability, Study 5 manipulates leadership and organizational change and Study 6 manipulates market change to create different levels of performance evaluation uncertainty. Across all six studies, we find consistent support for our hypothesis. Individuals with higher intolerance of uncertainty experience stronger uneasy, negative feelings (e.g., discomfort and anxiety) when performance evaluation uncertainty is high, and the desire to reduce these negative feelings leads them to impulsively misreport their performance. This paper highlights the emotion-driven aspect of performance misreporting and demonstrates that misreporting is shaped not only by individual traits but also by supervisor's behavior and broader organizational and environmental factors that contribute to performance evaluation uncertainty.

Chinese banks have become the largest cross-border creditors for almost half of all emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). While they look similar to other EMDE banks in terms of ownership and balance-sheet structure, their global cross-border lending resembles that of banks from advanced economies along several dimensions, especially when lending to EMDEs. We find that geographical distance poses a barrier for cross-border lending, including for Chinese banks. For them, given their network of affiliates, this barrier is lower than for other EMDE banks, more like US or European banks. We show that across all bank nationalities, bilateral economic interactions, like trade, FDI and portfolio investment, all positively correlate with cross-border lending. What stands out is that Chinese banks’ lending to EMDEs correlates more than any other nationality with trade, but there is no such correlation with FDI and, unlike all other banks, their lending correlates negatively with portfolio investment.

A cross-sectional analysis of cash compensation paid to CEOs of 713 US firms reveals that the sensitivity of compensation to earnings varies directly with earnings persistence. Additional analysis indicates that this sensitivity is greater for cases where executives are approaching retirement. Such evidence suggests the use of earnings persistence to counterbalance adverse consequences of earnings-based contracting with managers who face finite decision horizons.

We examine whether corporate bankruptcies influence bank loan characteristics of geographically proximate firms. Controlling for industry contagion and local economic conditions, firms headquartered near a bankruptcy event experience a 7 basis point increase in loan spreads. The effect is transitory and cannot be fully explained by local correlated information or lenders’ financial health. Instead, the effect is more pronounced for informationally opaque bankruptcies and borrowers, and weakened among loans with relationship lenders and lenders with significant local presence.