I assess time-series return predictability using a weighted least squares estimator that is around 25% more efficient than ordinary least squares (OLS) because it incorporates timevarying volatility into its point estimates. Traditional predictors, such as the dividend yield, perform better in-and out-of-sample when using my estimator, indicating the insignificant OLS estimates may be false negatives driven by a lack of power. Some newer predictors, such as the variance risk premium and the president's political party, are insignificant when using my estimator, indicating the significant OLS estimates may be false positives driven by a few periods with high expected volatility.

Portfolio performance measures using holdings data are panel regressions. The returns of a fund’s stocks are regressed on its lagged portfolio weights. Stock fixed effects isolate average performance from time-series predictive ability. Control variables condition for fund performance on the characteristics of the stocks held. The long-term performance of average holdings drives some of the classical measures, while predictive ability drives others. A “buy-and-hold drift,” where portfolio weights increase over time in the higher alpha stocks, affects performance measures. Investor flows respond to average performance net of the buy-and-hold drift.

This paper evaluates a form of contingent capital for financial institutions that converts from debt to equity if two conditions are met: the firm's stock price is at or below a trigger value and the value of a financial institutions index is also at or below a trigger value. This structure potentially protects financial firms during a crisis, when all are performing badly, but during normal times permits a bank performing badly to go bankrupt. I discuss a number of issues associated with the design of a contingent capital claim, including susceptibility to manipulation, whether conversion should be for a fixed dollar amount of shares or a fixed number of shares; uniqueness of the share price when contingent capital is outstanding; the susceptibility of different contingent capital schemes to different kinds of errors (under and over-capitalization); and the losses likely to be incurred by shareholders upon the imposition of a requirement for contingent capital. I also present an illustrative pricing example.

This paper shows that Edgeworth expansions for option valuation are equivalent to approximating option payoffs using Hermite polynomials. Consequently, the value of an option is the value of an infinite series of replicating polynomials. The resultant formulas express option values in terms of skewness, kurtosis, and higher moments. Unfortunately, the Hermite series diverges for fat-tailed models, so we provide alternative moment-based formulas. These formulas are a computationally efficient alternative to Fourier transform valuation and can value options even when the characteristic function is unknown. Applications include the first convergent solution for Hull and White’s stochastic volatility model.

SFAS 142 requires managers to estimate the current fair value of goodwill to determine goodwill write-offs. In promulgating the standard, the FASB predicted that managers will, on average, use the fair-value estimates to convey private information on future cash flows. The current fair value of goodwill is unverifiable because it depends in part on management’s future actions (including managers’ conceptualization and implementation of firm strategy). Agency theory predicts managers will, on average, use the unverifiable discretion in SFAS 142 consistent with private incentives. We test these hypotheses in a sample of firms with market indications of goodwill impairment. Our evidence, while consistent with some agency-theory based predictions, does not confirm the private information hypothesis.

Prior literature and anecdotal evidence, most recently provided by allegations relative to Enron, Global Crossing, and WorldCom, suggest that failing firms (defined here as prebankruptcy firms) may be motivated to engage in fraudulent financial reporting to conceal their distress. I examine two research questions: (1) Are failing firms' prebankruptcy financial statements more likely to exhibit signs of material income increasing earnings manipulation than those of nonfailing firms? (2) Do auditors detect the overstatements in firms that they perceive to be failing? I predict and find that as (ex post) bankrupt firms that do not (ex ante) appear to be distressed approach bankruptcy, their financial statements reflect significantly greater material income‐increasing accrual magnitudes in nongoing‐concern years than do control firms. The accrual behavior of these firms resembles that of bankrupt firms that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has sanctioned for fraud. Like sanctioned firms, the nonstressed bankrupt firms display significantly greater (material) increases in receivables; inventory; property, plant, and equipment; sales; net working capital, current, and discretionary accruals in prebankruptcy nongoing‐concern years than do control firms. They also display significantly more negative changes in cash flows from operations and net cash and a greater disparity between accrual‐based net income and operating cash flows than do control firms, consistent with Lee, Ingram, and Howard 1999. Finally, I predict and find that these firms' going‐concern years reflect evidence consistent with auditor‐prompted reversal of previous overstatements. These results are based on parametric and nonparametric tests for various subsample combinations drawn from a sample of 293 bankrupt firms representing approximately 2,500 observations.

This study examines discretionary accruals imbedded in quarterly earnings announcements that precede executive stock option grants. Prior research indicates that managers attempt to increase the value of their option pay (by depressing the option's exercise price) through a variety of strategies including timing voluntary disclosures, influencing option grant dates, or managing accruals. This study extends the research by jointly examining managerial incentives and opportunities to pursue an accruals-based strategy. We find evidence that discretionary accruals are lower when option pay is high and when concurrent firm performance is poor (incentive factors), but only when firms issue grants following earnings announcements relatively infrequently (opportunity factor). For firms that follow a predictable grant schedule, managers behave as if they believe that investors will discount earnings-based signals preceding the grant. Our results suggest that the decision to pursue an option-related strategy is influenced by economic tradeoffs. From a policy perspective, our results have relevance for the ongoing debate over option compensation practices, appropriate disclosure to investors, and the quality of corporate earnings.

We present a dynamic rational expectations model of closed-end fund discounts that incorporates feedback effects from activist arbitrage and lifeboats. Both activist arbitrage and lifeboats distort closed-end fund prices and lead to narrower discounts. Furthermore, both activist arbitrage and lifeboats effectuate an ex post wealth transfer from managers to investors but an ex ante wealth transfer from low-ability managers to high-ability managers. On average, investor wealth is unaffected by either activist arbitrage or lifeboats because their potential benefits are factored into higher fund prices. Although lifeboats can reduce takeover attempts, they do not increase expected managerial wealth.