Estimated negative substitution effects on work hours question the empirical validity of the classical labor supply model. Estimates are reconciled by allowing a dual choice of hours and effort for piecerate workers. In such a model, these negative substitution effects result from substituting on‐ and off‐the‐job leisure. We test our model using controlled experimentation on human subjects. These experiments, while not naturally occurring environments, represent real economic choices and can generate data unavailable elsewhere (e.g., effort data). The results support our model, and they have implications both for labor management and for empirical research focusing only on the hours choice.

We compare institutional execution costs across the major U.S. exchanges using a sample of institutional equity orders in firms that switch exchanges. Execution costs including commissions are essentially indistinguishable across these exchanges. We also find the fraction of trading volume from momentum traders is greater on the NYSE than either the Nasdaq or AMEX and that orders are more likely to be worked by an institution's trading desk on the NYSE than on the Nasdaq. These results suggest that institutions actively manage execution strategies, taking into account characteristics of the markets in which they trade.

Psychological research indicates that people have a cognitive bias that leads them to misinterpret new information as supporting previously held hypotheses. We show in a simple model that such confirmatory bias induces overconfidence: given any probabilistic assessment by an agent that one of two hypotheses is true, the appropriate beliefs would deem it less likely to be true. Indeed, the hypothesis that the agent believes in may be more likely to be wrong than right. We also show that the agent may come to believe with near certainty in a false hypothesis despite receiving an infinite amount of information.

This paper presents an approximate analytical solution to the optimal consumption and portfolio choice problem of an infinitely lived investor with Epstein-Zin-Weil utility who faces a constant riskless interest rate and a time-varying equity premium. When the model is calibrated to U. S. stock market data, it implies that intertemporal hedging motives greatly increase, and may even double, the average demand for stocks by investors whose risk-aversion coefficients exceed one. The optimal portfolio policy also involves timing the stock market. Failure to time or to hedge can cause large welfare losses relative to the optimal policy.

This paper provides evidence on a previously unidentified source of managerial incentives: concerns about post-retirement board service. Both the likelihood that a retired CEO serves on his own board two years after departure, as well as the likelihood of serving as an outside director on other boards, are positively and strongly related to his performance while CEO. Retention on the CEO's own board depends primarily on stock returns, while service on outside boards is better explained by accounting returns. The evidence also suggests that firms consider ability in choosing board members.

This paper examines segregation in American cities from 1890 to 1990. We divide the century into three time periods. From 1890 to 1940, ghettos were born as blacks migrated to urban areas and cities developed vast expanses filled with nearly exclusively black housing. From 1940 to 1970, black migration continued and ghettos expanded. Since 1970, there has been a decline in segregation as blacks have moved to suburban areas and central cities have become less segregated. Across all of these time periods there is a strong positive relation between urban population or density and segregation. We then examine why segregation has varied so much over time. We find evidence that the mechanism sustaining segregation has changed. In the mid-20th century taken by whites to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods. By 1990, these legal barriers enforcing segregation had been replaced by decentralized racism, where whites pay more than blacks to live in predominantly white areas.

Abstract This paper examines underwriters' pricing errors and the information content of first‐day trading activity in IPOs. We show that first‐day winners continue to be winners over the first year, and first‐day dogs continue to be relative dogs. Exceptions are “extra‐hot” IPOs, which provide the worst future performance. We also demonstrate that large, supposedly informed, traders “flip” IPOs that perform the worst in the future. IPOs with low flipping generate abnormal returns of 1.5 percentage points per month over the first six months beginning on the third day. We show that flipping is predictable and conclude that underwriters' pricing errors are intentional.

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Abstract Trade credit is created whenever a supplier offers terms that allow the buyer to delay payment. In this paper we document the rich variation in interfirm credit terms and credit policies across industries. We examine empirically the firm's basic credit policy choices: whether to extend credit or to require cash payment; and, if credit is extended, whether to adopt simple net terms or terms with discounts for prompt payment. We also examine determinants of variations in two‐part terms. Results are supportive primarily of theories that explain credit terms as contractual solutions to information problems concerning product quality and buyer creditworthiness.