M. H. Franco Wong, The Association between SFAS No. 119 Derivatives Disclosures and the Foreign Exchange Risk Exposure of Manufacturing Firms, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 387-417

This study investigates the joint effects of accountability and time budgets on auditors' testing strategies. The task studied, substantive analytical procedures, requires auditors to identify and test hypotheses when investigating the cause of unexpected fluctuations. Thus, auditors must determine the number of tests to conduct (i.e., extent), the number of potential hypotheses to directly test (i.e., breadth), the number of tests for each hypothesis (i.e., depth) and the number of potential error or non‐error hypotheses to test (i.e., focus). Testing strategies, which we define as choices made with respect to extent, focus, depth, and breadth of testing, have significant practical and theoretical implications. For example, reducing the breadth of testing may result in failure to test the correct hypothesis, potentially impairing audit effectiveness. In this study, auditors inherited five potential causes of an unexpected increase in the gross margin of a client. As in practice, their task was to conduct tests to investigate and identify the actual cause of the fluctuation. Auditors were randomly assigned to one of four conditions created by fully crossing accountability and time budgets. The results indicate that accountability leads to an increase in the extent and breadth of testing but does not affect the depth of testing. Further, accountability leads to an increase in the testing of errors but results in a decrease in the testing of non‐errors. The focus on breadth and error testing is consistent with the notion that accountability, to a superior with unspecified preferences, promotes more cautious behavior. The results also show that a time budget decreases the extent and depth of testing but does not affect the breadth of testing. There was no evidence that the two factors interactively affected testing strategies or performance. Finally, increased breadth of testing was the mechanism that led to better performance as measured by the identification of the actual cause of the unexpected fluctuation.

This paper derives the optimal size of the financial sector using a general equilibrium framework that is an extension of the paper of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) [Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 663–691]. We show that the financial sector has a unique optimal size relative to the size of the economy as a whole. Creating and maintaining this sector requires diversion of some physical capital from production of output to monitoring that production. However, the efficiency gain in output production brought about by monitoring warrants the diversion. It is also found that the optimal size of the financial sector is independent of the state of the economy and does not vary over the business cycle.

The hospital market is served by firms that are private for-profit, private not-for-profit, and government-owned and operated. I use a plausibly exogenous change in hospital financing that was intended to improve medical care for the poor to test three theories of organizational behavior. I find that the critical difference between the three types of hospitals is caused by the soft budget constraint of government-owned institutions. The decision-makers in private not-for-profit hospitals are just as responsive to financial incentives and are no more altruistic than their counterparts in profit-maximizing facilities. My final set of results suggests that the significant increase in public medical spending examined in this paper has not improved health outcomes for the indigent.

A valid Edgeworth expansion is established for the limit distribution of density-weighted semiparametric averaged derivative estimates of single index models. The leading term that corrects the normal limit varies in magnitude, depending on the choice of bandwidth and kernel order. In general this term has order larger than the n−1/2 that prevails in standard parametric problems, but we find circumstances in which it is O(n−1/2), thereby extending the achievement of an n−1/2 Berry-Esseen bound in Robinson (1995a). A valid empirical Edgeworth expansion is also established. We also provide theoretical and empirical Edgeworth expansions for a studentized statistic, where some correction terms are different from those for the unstudentized case. We report a Monte Carlo study of finite sample performance.

We investigate how banking market competition, informational opacity, and sensitivity to shocks have changed over the last three decades by examining the persistence of firm-level rents. We develop propagation mechanisms with testable implications to isolate the sources of persistence. Our analysis suggests that different processes underlie persistence at the high and low ends of the performance distribution. Our tests suggest that impediments to competition and informational opacity continue to be strong determinants of persistence; that the reduction in geographic regulatory restrictions had little effect on competitiveness; and that persistence remains sensitive to regional/macroeconomic shocks. The findings also suggest reasons for the recent record profitability of the industry.

This paper considers the interpretation of evidence from social experiments when persons randomized out of a program being evaluated have good substitutes for it, and when persons randomized into a program drop out to pursue better alternatives. Using data from an experimental evaluation of a classroom training program, we document the empirical importance of control group substitution and treatment group dropping out. Evidence that one program is ineffective relative to close substitutes is not evidence that the type of service provided by all of the programs is ineffective, although that is the way experimental evidence is often interpreted.

We examine how owners of productive resources (e.g., public enterprises or financial capital) optimally allocate their resources among wealth-constrained operators of unknown ability. Optimal allocations exhibit: (1) shared enterprise profit—the resource owner always shares the operator's profit; (2) dispersed enterprise ownership—resources are widely distributed among operators of varying ability; (3) limited benefits of competition—the owner may not benefit from increased competition for the resource; and, sometimes, (4) diluted incentives for the most capable—more capable operators receive smaller shares of the returns they generate. Implications for privatizations and venture capital arrangements are explored. (JEL D82, D44, D20)

Individual investors who hold common stocks directly pay a tremendous performance penalty for active trading. Of 66,465 households with accounts at a large discount broker during 1991 to 1996, those that trade most earn an annual return of 11.4 percent, while the market returns 17.9 percent. The average household earns an annual return of 16.4 percent, tilts its common stock investment toward high‐beta, small, value stocks, and turns over 75 percent of its portfolio annually. Overconfidence can explain high trading levels and the resulting poor performance of individual investors. Our central message is that trading is hazardous to your wealth.

This paper documents some empirical facts about ex‐day abnormal returns to high dividend yield stocks that are potentially subject to corporate dividend capture. We find that average abnormal ex‐dividend day returns are uniformly negative in each year after the introduction of negotiated commission rates and that time variation in ex‐day returns during the negotiated commission rates era is consistent with corporate tax‐based dividend capture. Ex‐day returns are more negative when the tax advantage to corporate dividend capture is greatest and more positive when increases in transaction costs and risk reduce incentives to engage in corporate tax‐based dividend capture.