We compare institutional execution costs across the major U.S. exchanges using a sample of institutional equity orders in firms that switch exchanges. Execution costs including commissions are essentially indistinguishable across these exchanges. We also find the fraction of trading volume from momentum traders is greater on the NYSE than either the Nasdaq or AMEX and that orders are more likely to be worked by an institution's trading desk on the NYSE than on the Nasdaq. These results suggest that institutions actively manage execution strategies, taking into account characteristics of the markets in which they trade.

We examine the effects of trading and information flows on the short-run behavior of stock prices by comparing the behavior of stock return volatility during trading and nontrading periods. We define nontrading periods as periods when exchanges and businesses are open but traders endogenously choose not to trade. After correcting for the bid/ask bounce and stickiness in quotes, we find that a large proportion of daily stock return volatility occurs without trades, especially for large firms. Furthermore, we provide new evidence that public (versus private) information is the major source of short-term return volatility.

In a sample of non-U.S. regulatory regime shifts, we find that expanded short selling is associated with stock price declines, reductions in capital expenditure, and lower asset growth. In a reversal of results found for U.S. stocks in a study of Regulation SHO by Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston (2015), our results are stronger for large firms than for small firms. We also show that this investment effect is stronger for firms that previously relied on outside financing. Our results suggest that short-sale policies affect corporate investment and that this effect is not driven by capital constraints.