A nationwide panic forced President Roosevelt to declare a banking holiday in March 1933. The government reopened banks sequentially using a process that sent noisy signals about banks’ health. New microdata reveals that the public responded to these signals. Deposits at rapidly reopened banks rebounded quicker than at comparable or stronger banks that reopened even a few days later. The stigma of late reopening shifted funds from stigmatized to lauded banks and among communities that they served. Despite persisting over a decade, the shift had no measurable impact on the rate at which localities recovered from the Great Depression.

We study the effects of the Liberty Bond drives of World War I on financial intermediation in the 1920s and beyond. Using panel data on US counties, and an instrument that captures differences in the approaches used to market the bonds, we find that higher Liberty Bond subscription rates led to an increase in investment banks and a contraction in commercial bank assets. We also find that in the late 1930s, individuals residing in states where Liberty Bond subscription rates had been higher were more likely to report owning stocks or bonds. Although they were conducted to support the American effort in World War I, these bond drives reshaped American finance.

We study the role of war bonds and inflation in post-WWII federal elections. After WWII, major bouts of inflation in 1946-48 and 1950-51 depressed the real returns of the bonds sold to households during the war. In a difference-in-differences framework, we find that counties with higher war bond purchases shifted their votes towards the Republican Party in postwar elections. To address the endogeneity of war bond purchases, we use an instrumental variables design, and obtain similar results. Bond ownership raised the saliency of inflation, and the severe rise in prices after the war triggered a backlash against the incumbent Democrats.

Liquidity shocks transmitted through interbank connections contributed to bank distress during the Great Depression. New data on interbank connections reveal that banks were vulnerable to closures of their correspondents and their respondents. Further, banks were less responsive to network liquidity risk in their management of cash and capital buffers after the Federal Reserve was established, suggesting that banks expected the Fed to reduce that risk. The Fed's presence weakened incentives for the most systemically important banks to maintain capital and cash buffers against liquidity risk, and thereby likely contributed to the banking system's vulnerability to contagion during the Depression.