Some bank regulators require that performance bonuses for risk managers (RMs) and for employees in front offices (FOs) be linked to distinct performance metrics, as correlated pay incentives could lead RMs to rubber-stamp risky investments. We theoretically show that a positive correlation between FOs and RMs is optimal for banks, but can be socially excessive in leveraged institutions. Using data from German bank employees, we show empirically that incentive pay is indeed positively correlated between RMs and FOs. Consistent with our predictions, bonus correlations are higher in banks with higher leverage and weaker performance during the Great Financial Crisis.

Past research has suggested that firms can significantly reduce their exposure to moderate exchange rate fluctuations by means of pass-through and hedging. Studying the appreciation of the Swiss franc by 17% on January 15, 2015, we show that firms remain exposed to extreme currency events. Pass-through, a way to share the costs of exchange rate risk with foreign customers, fails after extreme exchange rate shocks, particularly in competitive industries. Firms’ exposure to currency tail risk has real consequences for their investment. The decrease in investment is explained by a reduction in profitable investment opportunities and not by financial constraints.