If regulation fails to differentiate between priced and idiosyncratic risk, it incentivizes investors to reach for yield. Studying securitization exposures on the balance sheets of German banks, I show evidence consistent with this prediction. Banks with tight regulatory constraints (low capital adequacy ratios) invest more in higher yielding ABSs conditionally on rating-implied regulatory risk weights. ABS investments of constrained banks tend to perform worse ex post in terms of collateral delinquency and lose value. Differences in bank sophistication, market power, or incentives to retain securitizations are unlikely to explain the riskier ABS investments of constrained banks.

We test if issuers of asset- and mortgage-backed securities receive rating favors from agencies with which they maintain strong business relationships. Controlling for issuer fixed effects and a large set of credit risk determinants, we show that agencies publish better ratings for those issuers that provide them with more bilateral securitization business. Such rating favors are larger for very complex structured debt deals and for deals issued during the credit boom period. Our analysis is based on a new deal-level rating statistic that accounts for the full distribution of tranche ratings below the AAA cut-off point of a structured debt deal.

Some bank regulators require that performance bonuses for risk managers (RMs) and for employees in front offices (FOs) be linked to distinct performance metrics, as correlated pay incentives could lead RMs to rubber-stamp risky investments. We theoretically show that a positive correlation between FOs and RMs is optimal for banks, but can be socially excessive in leveraged institutions. Using data from German bank employees, we show empirically that incentive pay is indeed positively correlated between RMs and FOs. Consistent with our predictions, bonus correlations are higher in banks with higher leverage and weaker performance during the Great Financial Crisis.

Past research has suggested that firms can significantly reduce their exposure to moderate exchange rate fluctuations by means of pass-through and hedging. Studying the appreciation of the Swiss franc by 17% on January 15, 2015, we show that firms remain exposed to extreme currency events. Pass-through, a way to share the costs of exchange rate risk with foreign customers, fails after extreme exchange rate shocks, particularly in competitive industries. Firms’ exposure to currency tail risk has real consequences for their investment. The decrease in investment is explained by a reduction in profitable investment opportunities and not by financial constraints.

Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who potentially force borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders’ incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the effects of empty creditors on firm outcomes depend on the distribution of bargaining power among claimholders. If creditors would face powerful shareholders in debt renegotiation, firms are more likely to face the empty creditor problem. The empirical evidence confirms that more CDS insurance is written on firms with strong shareholders and that CDSs increase the bankruptcy risk of these same firms. The ensuing effect on firm value is negative.

Using regulatory data, we study German bank lending in countries targeted by financial sanctions. We find that domestic banks in Germany reduce lending in sanctioned countries, whereas their foreign bank affiliates outside Germany increase lending. In some cases, this is because the bank affiliates’ host countries have not imposed sanctions themselves. However, even German bank affiliates in host countries that enact sanctions like Germany increase lending if these host countries lack strong institutions and anticrime policies. These findings suggest that even universally adopted sanctions distort bank capital flows and competition if the level of their enforcement varies across bank locations.

We argue that risk sharing motivates the bankwide structure of bonus pay. In the presence of financial frictions that make external financing costly, the optimal contract between shareholders and employees involves some degree of risk sharing whereby bonus pay partially absorbs negative earnings shocks. Using payroll data for 1.26 million employee-years in all functional divisions of Austrian, German, and Swiss banks, we uncover several empirical patterns in bonus pay that are difficult to rationalize exclusively with incentive theories of bonus pay but that support an important risk sharing motive.