This paper examines the predictions of the performance based arbitrage hypothesis for the merger arbitrage market. Performance based arbitrage [Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. The limits of arbitrage. Journal of Finance, 52 (1), 35–55] is the notion that funds under management are withdrawn from arbitrageurs following trading losses, resulting in inefficient prices for securities subject to arbitrage trades. I examine general comovement in merger arbitrage spreads and the response of spreads to large arbitrage losses and substantial changes in deal flow. I find little evidence that merger arbitrage spreads exhibit systematic comovement or are substantially affected by important liquidity events in this market.

This paper documents average acquisition discounts for stand-alone private firms and subsidiaries of other firms (unlisted targets) of 15% to 30% relative to acquisition multiples for comparable publicly traded targets. My results are strongly consistent with the notion that sale prices for unlisted targets are affected by both the need for, and availability of, the liquidity provided by the buyer. Corporate parents are significantly liquidity-constrained prior to the sale of a subsidiary, particularly when the subsidiary is being sold for cash. Furthermore, acquisition discounts are significantly greater when debt capital is relatively more expensive to obtain, and when the parent firm has below-market stock returns in the 12 months prior to the sale.

The method of payment choice in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions has been the subject of much research in the finance literature. But significant changes in the economic environment of acquirers in the U.S. call into question whether known stylized facts are still valid and motivate us to undertake new empirical analyses. Using a large sample of M&A transactions spanning the last two decades, we investigate the financial constraints versus ownership dilution tradeoff that potentially drives negotiations about the method of payment (i.e., stock or cash), controlling for an extensive list of other potential determinants. The main takeaway from our analyses is that financial constraints are a dominant factor motivating acquirers to include stock (at least partially) in the method of payment package in M&A transactions in the recent period.

Most extant studies consider golden parachutes as the totality of change-in-control payments. However, for the median CEO of firms listed in the S&P SmallCap 600 index in 2009, golden parachute payments are only 46% of total change-in-control compensation. We measure total change-in-control payments using newly available data for this sample. Our results show that the total payments to the departing CEO are estimated at 1.1% of market value (on average). We also show that newly earned compensation (as opposed to accelerated vesting of lagged incentive pay) makes up approximately half of total change-in-control payments for the median CEO, and these two components of severance pay are positively correlated (contrary to existing theory). Furthermore, change-in-control payments do not appear to impede takeover offers or affect takeover premiums. Total change-in-control payments are small on average, and boards seem to take care in negotiating these terms with incumbent CEOs so that change-in-control payments do not adversely affect the firm's prospects in the takeover market.

The monthly volatility of IPO initial returns is substantial, fluctuates dramatically over time, and is considerably larger during “hot” IPO markets. Consistent with IPO theory, the volatility of initial returns is higher for firms that are more difficult to value because of higher information asymmetry. Our findings highlight underwriters’ difficulty in valuing companies characterized by high uncertainty, and raise serious questions about the efficacy of the traditional firm‐commitment IPO process. One implication of our results is that alternate mechanisms, such as auctions, could be beneficial for firms that value price discovery over the auxiliary services provided by underwriters.

We argue that the method of payment in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) can mitigate country-level governance risk for the acquirer. We find a greater use of stock as the method of payment in cross-border deals involving targets from countries with high governance risk relative to that in the acquirer's country. This increased use of stock in riskier cross-border deals is consistent with the optimal reaction of the acquirer to avoid overpayment, even though we also show that the use of stock (instead of cash) as the method of payment in cross-border deals is associated with a lower likelihood of deal completion. Furthermore, for more recent periods (i.e., after 2000) we show that the use of stock (cash) has increased (decreased) significantly in cross-border deals, resulting in convergence with the method of payment used in domestic deals.

We examine the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the outcomes of merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. We find that acquirers whose executives have a higher level of D&O insurance coverage experience significantly lower announcement-period abnormal stock returns. Further analyses suggest that acquirers with a higher level of D&O insurance protection tend to pay higher acquisition premiums and their acquisitions appear to exhibit lower synergies. The evidence provides support for the notion that the provision of D&O insurance can induce unintended moral hazard by shielding directors and officers from the discipline of shareholder litigation.

This paper demonstrates that firms receiving above-industry-average support in their “say-on-pay” (SoP) votes engage in more M&A transactions in the subsequent year. Our empirical findings suggest that high levels of SoP voting support may boost managerial confidence, thereby stimulating increased pursuit of acquisitions. Moreover, we observe that managers garnering higher SoP vote support are more likely to secure shareholders' backing in M&A votes, receive higher compensation in successful deals, and face a reduced likelihood of forced turnover following unsuccessful deals. Additionally, we find that both short-term and long-term M&A performance significantly improves in deals announced by managers receiving higher SoP voting support. These findings contribute to our understanding of the relation between shareholder support for CEOs and firm investment.

We analyze the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the spreads charged on bank loans. We find that higher levels of D&O insurance coverage are associated with higher loan spreads and that this relation depends on loan characteristics in economically sensible ways and is attenuated by monitoring mechanisms. This association between loan spreads and D&O insurance coverage is robust to controlling for endogeneity (because both could be related to firm risk). Our evidence suggests that lenders view D&O insurance coverage as increasing credit risk (potentially via moral hazard or information asymmetry). Further analyses show that higher levels of D&O insurance coverage are associated with greater risk taking and higher probabilities of financial restatement due to aggressive financial reporting. While greater use of D&O insurance increases the cost of debt, we find some evidence that D&O insurance coverage appears to improve the value of large increases in capital expenditure for firms with better internal and external governance.