In some cultures vast personal wealth is lauded whereas in others, it is viewed with suspicion and contempt. In recent years, a super rich elite of business people has emerged in China, and, given the country's cultural and socialist past, we believe that people are more likely to react negatively to reports of conspicuous wealth. To test our arguments, we examine the reactions to and consequences of China's entrepreneurs being included on the Hurun Rich List. We find negative consequences for stock market traded firms controlled by the Rich List entrepreneurs: stock prices decline, government subsidies are reduced, and the named entrepreneurs are more likely to be investigated. These effects are strongest in rent-seeking industries and are mitigated by philanthropy.

We investigate whether business groups in China act as internal capital markets, in an environment that is characterized by a high level of government intervention, a weak legal system, and an underdeveloped financial market. We study how institutional factors, such as the ultimate owner and level of market development, shape the role of these business groups. We find that business groups help member firms overcome constraints in raising external capital, and that the internal capital market within a business group is more likely to be an alternative financing channel among state-owned firms than among private firms. We also find that the internal capital market is more likely to help those affiliated firms which are private, local government owned relative to those owned by central government, or located in regions with a well-developed institutional environment. We present evidence of the role of business groups in risk sharing among affiliated firms, but find that business group affiliation has no impact on firm accounting performance. This study sheds new light on the theory of the firm and its boundaries, and provides a better understanding of China's rapidly growing economy.

State-controlled listed firms in China receive preferential treatment when borrowing from commercial banks; in contrast, private controlled firms rely on informal finance and on trade credit. We argue for and find evidence that private firms located in higher social trust regions use more trade credit from suppliers, extend more trade credit to customers, and collect receivables and pay payables more quickly. These findings are enhanced for firms located in provinces with weak protection of property rights. Our results are robust to different measures of social trust, legal environment, and endogeneity. Overall, our results show that social trust helps private firms overcome institutional difficulties in financing their activities.

This paper investigates the effect of financial deepening on the relationship between trade credit and cash holdings among Chinese listed firms. We first document an asymmetric effect of trade payables and receivables on cash holdings, in that firms hold an additional 0.71 of cash for every 1 of credit payable but use 1 of receivables as a substitute for only 0.15 of cash. We then find that firms in regions with higher levels of financial deepening hold less cash for payables while substituting more receivables for cash. A more highly developed financial sector helps firms to better use trade credit as a short-term financing instrument. Finally, we find that the ratio at which receivables are substituted for cash increased following the implementation of the new receivables pledge policy in 2007, which allowed firms to use receivables as security for loans. This policy event represents an exogenous shock that mitigates the endogeneity concern.

We examine whether social ties between engagement auditors and audit committee members shape audit outcomes. Although these social ties can facilitate information transfer and help auditors alleviate management pressure to waive correction of detected misstatements, close interpersonal relations can undermine auditors' monitoring of the financial reporting process. We measure social ties by alma mater connections, professor-student bonding, and employment affiliation, and audit quality by the propensity to render modified audit opinions, financial reporting irregularities, and firm valuation. Our evidence implies that social ties between engagement auditors and audit committee members impair audit quality. In additional results consistent with expectations, we generally find that this relation is concentrated where social ties are more salient, or firm governance is relatively poor and agency conflicts are more severe. Implying reciprocity stemming from social networks, we also report some suggestive evidence that audit fees are higher in the presence of social ties between an engagement auditor and the audit committee. Collectively, our analysis lends support to the narrative that the negative implications—namely, worse audit quality and higher audit fees—of these social ties may outweigh the benefits.