Abstract I document that the network structure of the online economy significantly contributes to rising industry concentration. Firms that are central in the online economy benefit more from increased economies of scale, decreased search costs, and network effects resulting from digitalization. Industries with firms that are more central become more concentrated and central firms have larger increases in market share. These results are driven by firms’ ability to generate revenue, as evidenced by central firms earning higher risk-adjusted returns and having more positive earnings surprises. Centrality is also associated with increasing productivity, but profitability only increases for central firms in business-to-consumer industries.

In the dynamic model of banking, a bank's option to hide its loan losses by rolling over non-performing loans is shown to worsen moral hazard. Contrary to the classic theory, moral hazard may arise even when a bank cannot seek a correlated risk for its loans. The loans seem to be performing and the bank makes a profit although it is de facto insolvent. When the bank's balance sheet includes hidden non-performing loans, the bank may optimally shrink lending or gamble for resurrection by growing aggressively. To eliminate this type of moral hazard, which is broadly consistent with evidence from emerging economies, a few regulatory implications are suggested.

Individuals involved in basic research, like other workers, respond to incentives. Funding agencies provide implicit incentives when they specify the rules by which awards are made. The following analysis is an exercise in understanding incentives at an applied level. Specific rules are examined. What is the effect of rewarding past effort? What happens when a few large awards are replaced by many small awards? How does the timing of an award affect effort? How does an agency choose which topics to fund? Socially optimal rules are derived.

This paper examines the costs, wealth effects, and determinants of international capital raising for a sample of 260 public debt issues made by non-U.S. firms in the Yankee bond market. We find that investors demand economically significant premiums on bonds issued by firms that are located in countries that do not protect investors' rights and do not have a prior history of ongoing disclosure. The results provide support for the literature that suggests better legal protections and more detailed information disclosure increases the price investors will pay for financial assets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: F3, G1.

This paper examines whether monetary policy responsibilities alter the central bank's role as a bank supervisor. The analysis focuses on the United States, where the Federal Reserve System shares supervisory duties with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Among the three institutions, the Fed is the only one responsible for monetary policy. Hence, the Fed's supervisory behavior—as captured by formal actions—is compared with the behavior of the other two agencies. The results suggest that the Fed's monetary policy responsibilities do alter its bank supervisory behavior: indicators of monetary policy affect the supervisory actions of the Fed, but do not affect the actions of the other two agencies.

We assess the role that monetary policy plays in the decision to default using a General Equilibrium model with collateralized loans, trade in fiat money and production. The monetary authority extends long-term credit against risky collateral along with its traditional monetary operations. The value of collateral depends on traditional monetary policy and agents can optimally choose to default depending on the relative value of the collateral to the face value of the loan. Default results in foreclosure, higher borrowing costs, inefficient investment and a decrease in total output. We show that pre-crisis contractionary monetary policy interacts with Fisherian debt-deflation dynamics and can increase the probability that a crisis occurs.

Abstract Using a novel typology of serial acquirers, we examine several puzzles documented in the prior literature. We show that acquisitions by different types of acquirers are driven by different factors, they acquire different sizes of targets, and subsequent acquisitions by acquirers are predictable ex ante. Controlling for market anticipation, the most frequent serial acquirers do not earn declining returns as they continue acquiring, while less frequent acquirers do. Our methodology enhances our understanding of serial acquisition dynamics, anticipation, and economic value adjustments. The methodology is likely to be relevant to topics related to event anticipation beyond those covered in this study. (JEL G14, G34, G35)

The 2005 split-share reform in China mandated the conversion of previously non-tradable stocks into tradable status. The reform was swift and changed investors’ability to trade corporate equities in a US$400 billion market. This paper examines the e¤ects of stock markets on …rms ’ real and …nancial outcomes. It does so exploiting multiple institutional features of the Chinese equity conversion program. We …rst examine a pilot trial conducted at the beginning of the reform, which we are able to replicate using the same data and selection criteria that was used by policy-makers. We also take advantage of the staggered nature of the conversion schedule used in the second phase of the reform, whereby over one thousand …rms converted their shares at di¤erent times within a government-dictated window. These various wrinkles produce counterfactuals against which to gauge the economic importance of secondary equity trading. Using a time-varying treatment estimation approach, we identify increases in corporate pro…tability, investment, value, and productivity as shares start to trade freely in organized exchanges. We also identify changes in …rms’propensity to issue new shares and engage in merger deals, as well as changes in their dividend and capital structure policies. Our …ndings provide new insights on the role of stock markets in shaping corporate activity

We explore one channel through which interest-rate derivatives usage affects loan growth positively in bank holding companies (BHCs). If interest-rate derivatives usage allows a BHC to substitute more freely among sources of funds, then its reliance on less interest-rate-sensitive sources such as core deposits should be lower. We test the hypothesis that if BHCs use interest-rate derivatives to reduce the adverse effects of interest-rate uncertainty on lending, then their loan growth should be less sensitive to core deposit growth. We find that loan growth is less sensitive to core deposit growth for interest-rate derivatives users than for non-users and that this sensitivity is lower when the extent of derivatives usage is higher. One important implication is that the funding flexibility enjoyed by BHCs using interest-rate derivatives should allow these BHCs to provide a smoother and higher level of intermediation, leading to more stable loan growth and greater economic stability.