Using City of Oakland data during COVID-19, we document that small-business components of survival capabilities (i.e., revenue resiliency, labor flexibility, and committed costs) vary by firm size. Nonemployer businesses rely on low-cost structures to survive. Microbusinesses (1–5 employees) depend on 14% greater revenue resiliency. Enterprises (6–50 employees) use labor flexibility to survive but face 10%–20% higher residual closure risk from committed costs. The evidence argues for size targeting of financial support programs, including committed costs and revenue-based lending programs. Supporting the capabilities mapping, we find that the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) increased medium-run survival probability by 20.5% specifically for microbusinesses.

We examine the persistence of corporate corruption for a sample of privately-held firms from 12 Central and Eastern European countries from 2001 to 2015. Using publicly available information and stochastic frontier analysis, we create a proxy for corporate corruption based on a firm's internal inefficiency. We find that corruption enhances a firm's profitability. A channel analysis further reveals that inflating staff costs is the most common approach by which firms divert funds to finance corruption. In spite of corruption's negative effects on a country's economy, we conclude that it persists because of its ability to improve corporate profitability. We refer to this effect as the Corporate Advantage Hypothesis.

This study investigates whether brokerage houses appear to provide stock tips to politicians. Our results indicate that trades by politicians who are politically connected to the brokerage house where the trade is executed are more profitable. Our estimates suggest that these connected trades earn an incremental 0.3% over a five-day window relative to the politician's average profitability. Given the average number of trades our sample politicians execute in a year, the 0.3% return per trade translates to an incremental $3,411 in trading profits each year. We provide additional support by investigating the frequency and differential profitability of politicians' trades immediately before the brokerage house issues a revised recommendation, as well as during a period when Goldman, Sachs & Co. was sanctioned for providing stock tips to high priority clients. Additional tests suggest that brokerages may provide stock tips to politicians in exchange for favorable legislative outcomes or political information.

We examine S&P 500 firms over 1999–2014 that characterize their annual performance with extreme positive language. Only 18% of such firms increase shareholder value, while over 80% have either negative or insignificant abnormal returns. Our evidence suggests that firms often base their claims of extreme positive performance on high raw returns or strong relative accounting performance. In comparison to firms that generate positive abnormal returns without boasting, our sample firms tend to have superior accounting performance. We conclude that boasting about performance is rarely associated with value creation and is more consistent with an emphasis on accounting metrics.

Stability of the banking system and macroprudential regulation are essential for healthy economic growth. In this paper we study the European bank network and its vulnerability to stressing different bank assets. The importance of macroprudential policy is emphasized by the inherent vulnerability of the financial system, high level of leverage, interconnectivity of system's entities, similar risk exposure of financial institutions, and susceptibility for systemic crisis propagation through the system. Current stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority do not take in consideration the connectivity of the banks and the potential of one bank vulnerability spilling over to the rest of the system. We create a bipartite network with bank nodes on one hand and asset nodes on the other with weighted links between the two layers based on the level of different countries’ sovereign debt holdings by each bank. We propose a model for systemic risk propagation based on common bank exposures to specific asset classes. We introduce the similarity in asset distribution among the banks as a measure of bank closeness. We link the closeness of asset distributions to the likelihood that banks will experience a similar level and type of distress in a given adverse scenario. We analyze the dynamics of tier 1 capital ratio after stressing the bank network and find that while the system is able to withstand shocks for a wide range of parameters, we identify a critical threshold for both asset risk and bank response to a shock beyond which the system transitions from stable to unstable.

At an initial time, an individual forms a belief about a future random outcome. As time passes, the individual may obtain, privately or subjectively, further information, until the outcome is eventually revealed. How can a protocol be devised that induces the individual, as a strict best response, to reveal at the outset his prior assessment of both the final outcome and the information flows he anticipates and, subsequently, what information he privately receives? The protocol can provide the individual with payoffs that depend only on the outcome realization and his reports. We develop a framework to design such protocols, and apply it to construct simple elicitation mechanisms for common dynamic environments. The framework is general: we show that strategyproof protocols exist for any number of periods and large outcome sets. For these more general settings, we build a family of strategyproof protocols based on a hierarchy of choice menus, and show that any strategyproof protocol can be approximated by a protocol of this family.

We provide evidence that discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP) convey value-relevant information to the market that is highly dependent upon the state of the economy. DLLP is associated with negative abnormal returns during bad economic states characterized by growing default concerns, but it is associated with significantly higher abnormal stock returns in good economic states, as banks relax underwriting standards and look to accelerate loan growth. Exploring the underlying link, we find that banks recording higher provisions during good times realize significantly higher earnings and loan growth in the subsequent year, whereas such banks experience further increases in non-performing loans following periods of distress. These findings are not driven by the 2008 financial crisis when investors responded even more negatively to DLLP. With new accounting standards requiring an even greater degree of subjective judgment, regulators should ensure the informativeness of bank loss reserves is preserved.

Companies have collected billions in premiums from privately sold put options written on their own stock. It is puzzling that counterparties, investment banks, would agree to make such transactions with better-informed companies which have extraordinary ability to time the market as documented by Jenter et al. (2011). To resolve this puzzle, we develop a model that shows that investment banks, by offering to buy put options from better-informed parties, receive private information about issuing companies. Our model also incorporates the practice of firms (such as Microsoft) of sometimes repurchasing their own put options and thus providing additional private information to investment banks. Empirically, we find support for our theory from an abnormal 9% increase in the stock prices and a 40% increase in the trading volumes around the put sales. Examination of 13D filings reveals that trading by upper management insiders cannot completely account for the change in volume.

We study the role of delegated monitoring in crowdfunded microfinance. We use data from Kiva, a crowdfunding platform, where crowds lend to borrowers through microfinance institutions (MFIs) instead of lending directly. These MFIs monitor debt contracts on behalf of crowds. We find that borrowers who are more intensely monitored by MFIs are more likely to repay crowdfunded loans on time. Monitoring is particularly important in reducing repayment problems of individual loans rather than group-based loans. Monitoring has a stronger impact in less competitive lending markets. We also find that when lending to borrowers, crowds are attentive to the loan-administering MFI's ability to monitor loans.

We document how demand shocks in export markets lead French multiproduct exporters to reallocate the mix of products sold in those destinations. In response to positive demand shocks, French firms skew their export sales toward their best-performing products. We develop a theoretical model of multiproduct firms and derive the specific demand conditions (with endogenous price elasticities) needed to generate these product-mix reallocations. Under those demand conditions, the increased competition from demand shocks in export markets also induces productivity changes within the firm. We empirically test for this connection between demand shocks and the productivity of multiproduct firms. We find that this connection is economically substantial.