We estimate the effect of immigrant legalization on the crime rate of immigrants in Italy by exploiting an ideal regression discontinuity design: fixed quotas of residence permits are available each year, applications must be submitted electronically on specific “click days,” and are processed on a first come, first served basis until the available quotas are exhausted. Matching data on applications with individual-level criminal records, we show that legalization reduces the crime rate of legalized immigrants by 0.6 percentage points on average, on a baseline crime rate of 1.1 percent.

We develop a model explaining how criminal organizations strategically use pre-electoral violence as a way of influencing electoral results and politicians' behaviour. We then characterize the incentives to use such violence under different levels of electoral competition and different electoral rules. Our theory is consistent with the empirical evidence within Sicily and across Italian regions. Specifically, the presence of organized crime is associated with abnormal spikes in violence against politicians before elections-particularly when the electoral outcome is more uncertain-which in turn reduces voting for parties opposed by criminal organizations. Using a very large data set of parliamentary debates, we also show that violence by the Sicilian Mafia reduces anti-Mafia efforts by members of parliament appointed in Sicily, particularly from the parties that traditionally oppose the Mafia.

We investigate the impact of job loss on crime and the mitigating role of unemployment benefits, exploiting detailed individual‐level data linking employment careers, criminal records, and welfare registries for the universe of male workers in Brazil. The probability of committing crimes increases on average by 23% for workers displaced by mass layoffs, and by slightly less for their cohabiting sons. Using causal forests, we show that the effect is entirely driven by young and low‐tenure workers, while there is no heterogeneity by education and income. Regression discontinuity estimates indicate that unemployment benefit eligibility completely offsets potential crime increases upon job loss, but this effect vanishes completely immediately after benefit expiration. Our findings point to liquidity constraints and psychological stress as the main drivers of criminal behavior upon job loss, while substitution between time on the job and leisure does not seem to play an important role.

We study the political impact of commercial television in Italy exploiting the staggered introduction of Berlusconi’s private TV network, Mediaset, in the early 1980s. We find that individuals with early access to Mediaset all-entertainment content were more likely to vote for Berlusconi’s party in 1994, when he first ran for office. The effect persists for five elections and is driven by heavy TV viewers, namely the very young and the elderly. Regarding possible mechanisms, we find that individuals exposed to entertainment TV as children were less cognitively sophisticated and civic-minded as adults, and ultimately more vulnerable to Berlusconi’s populist rhetoric.

We analyze the contribution of legal status incentives on the marriage choices of natives and migrants. Access to legal status reduces the probability of immigrants intermarrying with natives by 40% and increases the hazard rate of separation for intermarriages by 20%. We develop and estimate a multidimensional equilibrium model of marriage, fertility, and separation, where individuals match on observed and unobserved characteristics. Allowing for trade-offs between cultural distance, legal status, and other socioeconomic spousal characteristics, we quantify the role of legal status and the strength of cultural preferences and evaluate the welfare consequences of granting legal status to immigrants.

We estimate the employment effects of a large program of public investment subsidies to private firms that ranked applicants on a score reflecting both objective rules and local politicians' discretion. Leveraging the rationing of funds as an ideal Regression Discontinuity Design, we characterize the heterogeneity of treatment effects and cost‐per‐new‐job across inframarginal firms and estimate the cost‐effectiveness of subsidies under factual and counterfactual allocations. Firms ranking high on objective rules and firms preferred by local politicians generated larger employment growth on average, but the latter did so at a higher cost per job. We estimate that relying only on objective criteria would reduce the cost per job by 11%, while relying only on political discretion would increase such cost by 42%.

We provide the first estimates of intergenerational income mobility using tax data for a large developing country, namely Brazil. We measure formal income from tax and payroll data, and we train machine learning models on census and survey data to predict informal income. We quantify the estimation bias resulting from income imputation and other sources of measurement error, and show that such bias remains negligible in our context. A 10 percentile increase in parental income rank is associated on average with a 5.5 percentile increase in child income rank, with considerable variation across sociodemographic groups and geographical areas.

We estimate impacts of male job loss, female job loss, and male unemployment benefits on domestic violence (DV) in Brazil. We merge individual-level employment and welfare registers with different measures of DV: judicial cases brought to criminal courts, the use of public shelters by victims, and mandatory DV notifications by health providers. Leveraging mass layoffs for identification, we first show that both male and female job loss, independently, lead to large, and pervasive increases in DV. Using a regression discontinuity design, we then show that access to unemployment benefits does not reduce DV while benefits are being paid, and it leads to higher DV risk once benefits expire. Our findings can be explained by the negative income shock brought by job loss and by increased exposure of victims to perpetrators, as partners tend to spend more time together after displacement. Although unemployment benefits partially offset the income drop following job loss, they reinforce the exposure shock as they increase unemployment duration. Since our results cannot be explained by prominent DV theories, we propose a simple model formalizing these mechanisms.