Many view the period after the Second Industrial Revolution as a paradigm of a transition to a new economy following a technological revolution, including the Information Technology Revolution. We build a quantitative model of diffusion and growth during transitions to evaluate that view. With a learning process quantified by data on the life cycle of US manufacturing plants, the model accounts for the key features of the transition after the Second Industrial Revolution. But we find that features like those will occur in other transitions only if a large amount of knowledge about old technologies exists before the transition begins.

We examine the limiting behavior of cooperative and noncooperative fiscal policies as countries' market power goes to zero. We show that these policies converge if countries raise revenues through lump-sum taxation. However, if there are unremovable domestic distortions, such as distorting taxes, there can be gains to coordination even when a single country's policy cannot affect world prices. These results differ from the received wisdom in the optimal tariff literature. The key distinction is that, contrary to the tariff literature, the spending decisions of governments are explicitly modeled.

We analyze the effects of money injections on interest rates and exchange rates when agents must pay a Baumol‐Tobin‐style fixed cost to exchange bonds and money. Asset markets are endogenously segmented because this fixed cost leads agents to trade bonds and money infrequently. When the government injects money through an open market operation, only those agents that are currently trading absorb these injections. Through their impact on these agents’ consumption, these money injections affect real interest rates and real exchange rates. The model generates the observed negative relation between expected inflation and real interest rates as well as persistent liquidity effects in interest rates and volatile and persistent exchange rates.

A common view is that bailouts of firms by governments are needed to cure inefficiencies in private markets. We propose an alternative view: even when private markets are efficient, costly bankruptcies will occur and benevolent governments without commitment will bail out firms to avoid bankruptcy costs. Bailouts then introduce inefficiencies where none had existed. Although granting the government orderly resolution powers which allow it to rewrite private contracts improves on bailout outcomes, regulating leverage and taxing size is needed to achieve the relevant constrained efficient outcome, the sustainably efficient outcome. This outcome respects governments' incentives to intervene when they lack commitment.

Bank of Minneapolis and University of Minnesota. We thank the NSF for financial support. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. The Great Depression is not yet well understood. Economists have offered many theories for both the massive decline and the slow recovery of output during 1929—39, but no consensus has formed on the main forces behind this major economic event. Here we describe and demonstrate a simple methodology for determining which types of theories are the most promising. Several prominent theories blame the Great Depression on frictions in labor and capital markets. The sticky wage theory is that wage stickiness together with a monetary contraction produces a downturn in output. (See Michael Bordo, Christopher Erceg, and Charles Evans 2001.) The cartelization theory is that an increase in cartelization and unionization leads to a slow recovery. (See Harold Cole and Lee Ohanian 2001.) The investment friction theory is that monetary contractions increase frictions in capital markets that produce investment-driven downturns in output.

This paper develops the quantitative implications of optimal fiscal policy in a business cycle model. In a stationary equilibrium, the ex ante tax rate on capital income is approximately zero. The tax rate on labor income fluctuates very little and inherits the persistence properties of the exogenous shocks; thus there is no presumption that optimal labor tax rates follow a random walk. Most of the welfare gains realized by switching from a tax system like that of the United States to the Ramsey system come from an initial period of high taxation on capital income.

Policy-Driven Productivity in Chile and Mexico in the 1980's and 1990's by Raphael Bergoeing, Patrick J. Kehoe, Timothy J. Kehoe and Raimundo Soto. Published in volume 92, issue 2, pages 16-21 of American Economic Review, May 2002