Many finance jobs entail the risk of large losses, and hard‐to‐monitor effort. We analyze the equilibrium consequences of these features in a model with optimal dynamic contracting. We show that finance jobs feature high compensation, up‐or‐out promotion, and long work hours, and are more attractive than other jobs. Moral hazard problems are exacerbated in booms, even though pay increases. Employees whose talent would be more valuable elsewhere can be lured into finance jobs, while the most talented employees might be unable to land these jobs because they are “too hard to manage.”

We examine voluntary disclosure decisions when firms are uncertain about audience preferences and are risk averse. In contrast to classic “unraveling” results, some firms remain silent in equilibrium. Silence is safer than disclosure; silence reduces the sensitivity of a firm’s payoff to audience preferences. Increases in firm (audience) risk-aversion reduce (increase) disclosure. Our model explains why some firms do not disclose earnings breakdowns, executive compensation, or Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance when they face diverse audiences, and why they disclose less under regulatory rules mandating that disclosure be entirely public.

We study trade between an informed seller and an uninformed buyer who have existing inventories of assets similar to those being traded. We show that these inventories could induce the buyer to increase the price (a run-up) but could also make trade impossible (a freeze) and hamper information dissemination. Competition can amplify the run-up by inducing buyers to purchase assets at a loss to prevent competitors from purchasing at lower prices and releasing bad news about inventories. In a dynamic extension, we show that a market freeze could be preceded by high prices. Finally, we discuss empirical and policy implications.

Association, for some very helpful comments. Any errors are our own. Share prices generally fall when a firm announces a seasoned equity offering (SEO). A stan-dard explanation of this fact is that an SEO communicates negative information to investors. We show that if repeated capital market transactions are possible, this same asymmetry of information between firms and investors implies that some firms also repurchase shares in equilibrium. A subset of these firms directly profit from the repurchase transaction, while other firms repurchase in order to improve the terms of a subsequent SEO. The possibil-ity of repurchases reduces both SEOs and investment. Overall, our analysis highlights the importance of analyzing SEOs and repurchases in a unified framework. Share prices generally fall in response to a firm’s announcement of a seasoned equity offering (SEO).1 The standard explanation for this empirical regularity is that a firm has information that investors lack, and a SEO reveals to investors that the firm’s information is negative (see, in particular, Myers and Majluf (1984)). In equilibrium firms with negative information issue equity, and accept the negative share price response because the SEO

We propose a labor market model in which agents with heterogenous ability levels choose to work as bankers or as financial regulators. When workers extract intrinsic benefits from working in regulation (such as public-sector motivation or human capital accumulation), our model jointly predicts that bankers are, on average, more skilled than regulators and their compensation is more sensitive to performance. During financial booms, banks draw the best workers away from the regulatory sector and misbehavior increases. In a dynamic extension of our model, young regulators accumulate human capital and the best ones switch to banking in mid-career.

Regulators express growing concern over predatory loans, which we take to mean loans that borrowers should decline. Using a model of consumer credit in which such lending is possible, we identify the circumstances in which it arises both with and without competition. We find that predatory lending is associated with highly collateralized loans, inefficient refinancing of subprime loans, lending without due regard to ability to pay, prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and poorly informed borrowers. Under most circumstances competition among lenders attenuates predatory lending. We use our model to analyze the effects of legislative interventions.