Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources Get access R. M. Solow R. M. Solow Massachusetts Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 41, Issue 5, December 1974, Pages 29–45, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296370 Published: 01 December 1974

Field research attempted to measure the risky environments, the information structures, the institutions, and the risk-response mechanisms of ten villages in northern Thailand. Various key features are then modeled in an abstract but realistic way, either with a full-information risk-sharing model or an information-constrained version of the same model. Observations from some of the villages seem consistent with one or the other of these models, but in many of the villages one is left with risk-response variations across households which suggest that Pareto improvements are possible.

K. R. MacCrimmon, M. Toda; The Experimental Determination of Indifference Curves1, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 36, Issue 4, 1 October 1969, Page

For the last ten years environmentalists and the trade policy community have engaged in a heated debate over the environmental consequences of liberalized trade. The debate was originally fueled by negotiations over the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations, both of which occurred at a time when concerns over global warming, species extinction and industrial pollution were rising. Recently it has been intensified by the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and proposals for future rounds of trade negotiations. The debate has often been unproductive. It has been hampered by the lack of a common language and also suffered from little recourse to economic theory and empirical evidence. The purpose of this essay is set out what we currently know about the environmental consequences of economic growth and international trade. We critically review both theory and empirical work to answer three basic questions. What do we know about the relationship between international trade, economic growth and the environment? How can this evidence help us evaluate ongoing policy debates? Where do we go from here?

R. Sato, M. Beckmann; Neutral Inventions and Production Functions: an Addendum, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 35, Issue 3, 1 July 1968, Pages 366,

Abstract We study the mispricing information present in the target prices of US and international analysts. We hypothesize that asymmetry in the value-relevance of the information that managers supply to analysts, combined with asymmetry in the incentives facing analysts to curry favor with managers, leads to analyst-claimed undervaluation being more predictive of future stock returns than analyst-claimed overvaluation. Our empirical tests isolate analyst-claimed mispricing by first removing analysts’ estimates of the cost of equity from the returns implied by target prices and then separating analyst-claimed undervaluation from overvaluation. We find that target prices only predict future returns (at 16 cents to 18 cents on the dollar) when analysts claim undervaluation, not when they claim overvaluation. We also observe that analyst-claimed undervaluation predicts future returns more strongly after firms experience low returns and when macro-driven valuation uncertainty is low.

A nation's economic geography can have an enormous impact on its development. In Thailand, we show that a high concentration of enterprise in an area predicts high subsequent growth in and around that area. We also find spatially contiguous convergence of enterprise with stagnant areas left behind. Exogenous physiographic conditions are correlated with enterprise location and growth. We fit a structural, micro-founded model of occupation transitions with fine-tuned geographic capabilities to village data and replicate these salient facts. Key elements of the model include costs, credit constraints on occupation choice, and spatially varying expansion of financial service providers.

We develop a theory of resource management where the degree to which countries escape the tragedy of the commons is endogenously determined and explicitly linked to changes in world prices and other possible effects of market integration. We show how changes in world prices can move some countries from de facto open access situations to ones where management replicates that of an unconstrained social planner. Not all countries can follow this path of institutional reform and we identify key country characteristics (mortality rates, resource growth rates, technology) to divide the world's set of resource rich countries into Hardin, Ostrom and Clark economies. Hardin economies are not able to manage their renewable resources at any world price, have zero rents and suffer from the tragedy of the commons. Ostrom economies exhibit de facto open access and zero rents for low resource prices, but can maintain a limited form of resource management at higher prices. Clark economies can implement fully efficient management and do so when resource prices are sufficiently high. The model shows heterogeneity in the success of resource management is to be expected, and neutral technological progress works to undermine the efficacy of property rights institutions.