We identify manager/firm separations where managers quit for a new job and study abnormal returns associated with these events. Applying analyses from labor economics, we argue that the average ability of managers who resign for a similar position at another firm should be higher than that of managers who die suddenly. Controlling for age and tenure, we find that firms losing managers to other firms experience an average abnormal return of −1.51%, compared to +3.82% for firms whose managers die suddenly. We use differences in returns across groups to measure the value of differences in managerial ability.

Segment reporting, Competition, Aggregation, Private information

We provide new evidence on the relation between option-based compensation and risk-taking behavior by exploiting the change in the accounting treatment of stock options following the adoption of FAS 123R in 2005. The implementation of FAS 123R represents an exogenous change in the accounting benefits of stock options that has no effect on the economic costs and benefits of options for providing managerial incentives. Our results do not support the view that the convexity inherent in option-based compensation is used to reduce risk-related agency problems between managers and shareholders. We show that all firms dramatically reduce their usage of stock options (convexity) after the adoption of FAS 123R and that the decline in option use is strongly associated with a proxy for accounting costs. Little evidence exists that the decline in option usage following the accounting change results in less risky investment and financial policies.

We examine the relation between audit committee compensation and the demand for monitoring of the financial reporting process. We find that total compensation and cash retainers paid to audit committees are positively correlated with audit fees and the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, our proxies for the demand for monitoring. Our results are robust to the inclusion of audit committee quality, measured as the committee chair financial expertise. Our results suggest a recent willingness by firms to deviate from the historically prevalent one-size-fits-all approach to director pay in response to increased demands on audit committees and differential director expertise.

Using consumer complaints filed with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as a measure for the quality of financial products and services, we present evidence of racial disparities in the service quality received by consumers. Consumers in high‐minority communities file more complaints than those in low‐minority communities, and the racial gap in financial complaints increased by more than 60% during the COVID‐19 pandemic. Using a triple‐difference approach, we establish the role of corporate social attitudes, reflected in, for example, inclusive promotion practices and diversity in leadership, in mitigating the complaint racial gap and its pandemic‐period increase. Our results shed light on how inclusive corporate culture filters through an organization to benefit minority communities and underscore the effect of corporate social attitudes on important stakeholder outcomes.