Recent developments in the theory of strategic bargaining demonstrate how informational asymmetries can lead to prolonged and costly bargaining. These models can be applied to contract negotiations, yielding an economic theory of strikes. To date, however, few empirical tests of these models have been carried out. In this paper, a set of predictions concerning the incidence and unconditional duration of strikes is derived from a simple bargaining model in which the union is uncertain about the firm's future profitability. These predictions are then tested on a micro data set of major U.S. contract negotiations that took place from 1973 to 1977.

This paper examines the effect of earnings taxes on wage variability over time. We estimate a "hedonic wage locus," which indicates how the market allows individuals to substitute the mean level of the wage for its variability across jobs. Information from this locus is used to estimate the parameters of individuals' indifference curves between the mean and temporal variation of hourly wages. On the basis of these utility-function parameters, we predict that lowering the rate of taxation on earnings would on average lead workers to choose jobs with slightly lower pretax mean wages and with less pretax wage variation.

The essence of corporate control includes the hiring and firing of key managers. We examine changes in equity values when the Board of Directors appoints and dismisses top-level managers. The evidence suggests that management changes signal shifts in company policy and raise shareholder wealth, internal promotions confirm the soundness of investment by large companies in firm-specific human capital while external appointments do not, promotions occur more often than external appointments but decline in importance as firm size decreases, and dismissal is not a favored means to handle managerial underperformance but is associated with stock price increases when used.

This study identifies part of the social loss attendant upon displacement as the remaining value of the assets specific to the severed employment relationship. A bargaining model is used to link wage-tenure profiles to the amount of information firms and workers possess about the duration of that relationship. If information is good, the profile will flatten as displacement approaches. Using PSID data for workers separated between 1977 and 1981, wage-tenure profiles are found not to change. This suggests that either workers, or both firms and workers, are surprised by the displacement. The present value of that part of the social loss attributable to the worker's share of firm-specific capital is around $7,000 (1980 dollars).

The development of organized markets for speculative-grade corporate debt has provided financial researchers with an opportunity to examine the pricing of default risk. By incorporating previous work on the default experience of low-rated corporate debt, this paper presents an introduction to risk-neutral models of risky-bond pricing and uses these to examine the relationship between the default premium embodied in bond yields and actual default rates. The contribution of macroeconomic information to the default premium is also examined. The author finds that holders of low-grade bonds have, on average, been compensated for losses due to default.

ABSTRACT The development of organized markets for speculative‐grade corporate debt has provided financial researchers with an opportunity to examine the pricing of default risk. By incorporating previous work on the default experience of low‐rated corporate debt, this paper presents an introduction to risk‐neutral models of risky‐bond pricing and uses these to examine the relationship between the default premium embodied in bond yields and actual default rates. The contribution of macroeconomic information to the default premium is also examined. The author finds that holders of low‐grade bonds have, on average, been compensated for losses due to default.

This paper examines the effect of federal deductibility of state and local taxes on the fiscal behavior of state and local governments. The primary finding is that deductibility affects the way that state-local governments finance their spending as well as the overall level of spending.